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STANDING FOR NOTHING: THE PARADOX OF
DEMANDING CONCRETE CONTEXT FOR
FORMALIST ADJUDICATION
David M. Driesent
This Article examines a paradox found in public law cases. While jus-
ticiability doctrines aim to provide concrete context for adjudication of public
law questions by insisting upon individual injury, the Supreme Court often
ignores the litigants' injuries when it turns to the merits of cases. Examina-
tion of this paradox leads to a fuller appreciation of the structure and nature
of public law. In particular, it sheds light on a recent debate about whether
constitutional litigation should be seen as concerning individual rights or
the validity of legal rules. It also raises serious questions about the modern
doctrine of standing.
Alexander Bickel, in his influential writing on the "passive virtues,"
viewed justiciability doctrines as an aid to wise decision-making. Bickel em-
phasized that the law of standing would provide concrete information about
the consequences of laws undergoing judicial review that would contribute to
sounder, more enduring judgments regarding constitutionality. But infor-
mation about injury often has no influence upon the merits of public law
cases, and an analysis of the reasons for this lack of influence casts doubt on
justiciability doctrines' capacity to aid wise decision-making. Courts should
adopt a new set of "active virtues"-a set of practices governing the framing,
consideration, and resolution of the merits of public law cases.
INTRODUCTION .................................................... 809
I. CONCRETENESS AND ABSTRACTNESS IN CONSTITUTIONAL
ADJUDICATION .............................................. 815
A. Concreteness and the Law of Standing ............. 815
B. Other Justiciability Doctrines ....................... 826
1. R ipeness ......................................... 827
2. Mootness and Concrete Remedies ................... 829
C. Formalism and Functionalism ....................... 831
D. Models of Abstraction and Concreteness ............ 834
1. The Private Law Model ........................... 835
t J.D., Yale Law School, 1989. Professor, Syracuse University College of Law. The
author wishes to thank Matthew Adler, Peter Bell, Richard Fallon, Robert Pushaw, and
Harry Wellington for helpful comments, Syracuse University College of Law and its Dean,
Hannah Arterian, for research support, Peter Rolph, Melissa Pennington, and Jeff Philps
for research assistance, the students in my citizen suit seminar for their insights and re-
search, and Kira Davis for editing. Of course, the Article reflects my views and I take re-
sponsibility for any errors.
STANDING FOR NOTHING
2. Concreteness in Public Law ........................ 836
II. DOES THE INJURY REQUIREMENT MAKE ADJUDICATION OF
THE MERITS CONCRETE? ................................. 839
A. Cases Not Explicitly Linking Injury to the Merits ... 840
1. Administrative Law Cases ......................... 840
2. Structural Constitutional Law Cases ............... 843
3. Facial Individual Rights Cases ..................... 844
B. As-Applied Individual Rights Claims Often Link
Injury to the M erits ................................. 847
C. Im plicit Linkage .................................... 852
1. Implicit Framing ................................. 853
2. Consequences ..................................... 854
D. The Structure of Linkage ........................... 855
III. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS ............................. 855
A. The Nature of Public Law .......................... 856
B. The Structure of Public Law ........................ 859
1. The Adler-Fallon Debate ........................... 859
2. Structural Constitutional Law ..................... 862
3. Individual Rights ................................ 863
4. Administrative Law .............................. 864
5. Problems on the Border ............................ 865
C. Should Injury Influence Public Law Outcomes? ..... 866
D. Implications for Standing Doctrine and
Justiciability ........................................ 871
E. Passive Virtues Revisited: The Active Virtues ........ 878
1. Confining Decisions to Briefed Issues ............... 879
2. Preferring Narrow Grounds for Decision ............. 881
3. Adding Context and Cultivating Humility .......... 887
CONCLUSION ...................................................... 890
INTRODUCTION
In 1996, Congress passed the Line Item Veto Act (Act).' The Act
addressed the problem of "pork barrel spending"-a representative's
insertion of line items into the federal budget for projects of dubious
general value that deliver federal money to the representative's home
district.2 This pork barrel spending had made it very difficult to prop-
erly manage the federal budget.3 Absent authority to veto each line
I Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§§ 691-692 (2000)).
2 S. REp. No. 104-13, at 2 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 879, 880; see Mary E.
Foster, Note, The Line Item Veto Act After Raines v. Byrd, 20 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 323, 323-24
(1998).
3 See Gordon T. Butler, The Line Item Veto and the Tax Legislative Process: A Futile Effort
at Deficit Reduction, but a Step Toward Tax Integrity, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 6-7 (1997) (discussing
budgetary outcomes and government hardship associated with pork barrel spending).
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item, the President could combat pork barrel spending only by veto-
ing the entire federal budget, which might well have shut down the
federal government. 4
The day after the Act went into effect, six members of Congress
brought suit to challenge the Act's constitutionality. 5 After the district
court declared the Act unconstitutional, 6 the Supreme Court agreed
to hear the case under the statute's provision for expedited review.
7
The Supreme Court held that the congressmen did not "allege [ I]
a sufficiently concrete injury to have established Article III standing."8
The Court linked its concern with concrete injury to the need to adju-
dicate disputes "'traditionally thought to be capable of resolution
through the judicial process.'- 9 The Court contrasted a suit based on
concrete injury with "'amorphous general supervision of" govern-
ment operations.' 0 This suggests that concrete injury would render
the litigation itself more concrete and less "amorphous." And indeed,
the Court and commentators have both linked the requirement of
concrete injury to a desire for more concrete adjudication. 1
Justice Souter wrote separately, in part, because he believed that
the congressmen's injury might "satisfy the requirement of concrete-
ness." 12 Justice Souter, however, ultimately concurred, because he
thought it prudent to avoid immediate involvement in a dispute be-
tween two branches of the federal government and instead await a
case involving more "concrete" injury.
13
Justice Breyer, in dissent, even more clearly linked the concept of
concrete injury to the hope for concrete adjudication. He viewed the
question of standing as, in part, a question of whether "the dispute..
4 See id. at 6; Antony R. Petrilla, Note, The Role of the Line-Item Veto in the Federal Balance
of Power, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 469, 478-79 (1994).
5 See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 814 (1997).
6 Byrd v. Raines, 956 F. Supp. 25 (D.D.C. 1997).
7 See Raines, 521 U.S. at 817-18 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 692(b), (c) (Supp. 11 1994)).
8 Id. at 830; cf Note, Standing in the Way of Separation of Powers: The Consequences of
Raines v. Byrd, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1741, 1752-58 (1999) (criticizing Raines for failure to
grant standing); The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Leading Cases, 111 HARV. L. REV. 197, 227
(1997) (criticizing the Court's confusion of the law of legislative standing); Tracy Rottner
Yu, Casenote, "Standing" in a Quagmire: Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997), 67 U. CIN. L.
REv. 639, 658-668 (1999) (critiquing the Court's reasoning for denying standing, but
agreeing with the result).
9 Raines, 521 U.S. at 819 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968)).
10 Id. at 829 (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell,
J., concurring)).
I 1 See, e.g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 297 (1979)
(distinguishing between a case or controversy and an "abstract question"); ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS
113-27 (2d ed. 1986).
12 Raines, 521 U.S. at 831 (Souter, J., concurring).
13 See id. at 832-34 (Souter, J., concurring).
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[is] concrete."14 Standing should exist, Justice Breyer wrote, because
the plaintiffs ask the court to determine "'a concrete, living contest,'
rather than an "'abstract intellectual proble[m] ."15
Litigants with sufficiently concrete injuries to justify standing sub-
sequently challenged the Act in Clinton v. City of New York. 16 The ma-
jority opinion in Clinton describes the facts giving rise to these injuries
in detail. 17 A federal statute had reduced a subsidy financing medical
care of the indigent by requiring states to subtract from the subsidy
amounts they received through certain taxes on providers., New
York City and certain of its health care providers faced a potential
liability to the government for these monies due to President Clin-
ton's veto of a line item giving New York favorable treatment with re-
spect to Medicaid. 19 A farmers' cooperative faced the loss of a
potential tax benefit, because of another line item veto.20 The Court
found these economic injuries sufficiently concrete to justify
standing.
2 1
Waiting for plaintiffs with concrete injuries to sue, however, did
not lead to particularly concrete adjudication. Rather, Clinton treats
the constitutionality of the line item veto as an "'abstract intellectual
proble[m],' '"22 which the Court resolved through a formalist ap-
proach.2 3 The injuries discussed in such detail at the outset of the
opinion play almost no role in the subsequent discussion of the
merits.
The majority analogized the line item veto to repeal of a statute.
24
Because the Constitution does not authorize presidential repeal of
legislation, reasoned the majority, the statute authorizing presidential
veto of line items conflicts with the Constitution. 25 The Court bol-
stered this reasoning by explaining that the statute as modified by ex-
ercise of the line item veto did not receive the approval of the House
and Senate, as required by Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution.
26
This reasoning makes no reference to injuries, but only to the content
of the Constitution and the statute.
14 Id. at 839 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
15 Id. at 839-40 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Coleman v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
16 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
17 See id. at 421-36.
18 See id. at 422.
19 See id. at 422-23, 426, 430-31.
20 See id. at 423-25, 426-27, 432-36.
21 See id. at 429-436.
22 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 840 (1997) (BreyerJ., dissenting) (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
23 See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 436-49 (1998) (analyzing constitutionality of Act).
24 See id. at 438.
25 See id. at 438-39.
26 See id. at 448-49.
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The Clinton majority refused to analogize the line item veto to the
veto of a bill under Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution. The Court
explained that the traditional veto applies only to an entire bill and
only after the President has signed it into law.27 By contrast, the line
item veto applies to parts of bills and comes before the bill is signed
into law. 28 This formal distinction does not depend upon the nature
of injuries incurred under the statute. Indeed, it would exist with no
injury at all. The opinion's basic affirmative argument-that the line
item veto conflicts with the Constitution, because the Constitution
does not expressly authorize it29-contains not a single reference to
the injury that the Court found so necessary to its constitutional
adjudication.
30
The government attempted to analogize the Act to delegation of
discretionary power to the President, which the Court has upheld.
31 It
relied upon Field v. Clark,3 2 which upheld legislation delegating discre-
tionary authority to impose a tariff in the face of a claim that the stat-
ute unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to the
President.33 The government's analogy persuaded Justices Scalia,
Breyer, and O'Connor that the statute should be upheld.
34
Neither the majority nor the dissent found the concrete factual
context of the Clinton case important in deciding whether to accept
the analogy to Field v. Clark. Indeed, none of the Justices directly men-
tioned the injuries giving rise to justicability in discussing the argu-
ment at the heart of the government's case, 35 and these injuries
27 See id. at 439.
28 See id.
29 See id. at 448 ("[O]ur decision rests on the narrow ground that the procedures
authorized by the Line Item Veto Act are not authorized by the Constitution.").
30 See id. at 436-40.
31 See id. at 442.
32 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
33 See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 442-44 (discussing Field).
34 See id. at 463-69 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. at 473-97
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
35 The majority rejected the analogy to Field v. Clark for three reasons. First, the
power to levy a tariff at issue in Field came into play only when a new condition arose, whilst
exercise of the line item veto would occur without new conditions arising. See Clinton, 524
U.S. at 443. Second, while the Line Item Veto Act authorized but never required a veto,
the Tariff Act did require the imposition of tariffs when the relevant condition arose. See
id. at 443-44. Third, the presidential imposition of a tariff reflected congressional policy
found in the TariffAct. See id. at 444. By contrast, the President relied upon his own policy
judgment in exercising the line item veto while rejecting Congress's chosen policy. See id.
The first two reasons involve comparisons between the Tariff Act and the Line Item Veto
Act with no reference at all to the facts of the Clinton case. See id. at 443-44. In making the
third argument, however, the Court does cite the particular reason President Clinton gave
for one of his line item vetoes to show that presidential judgment operates. See id. at 444
n.35. But this does not amount to consideration of the injury giving rise to standing. In
the end, the Court relied on a purely formalist acontextual argument to justify rejecting
the Field analogy. Unlike predecessor statutes, wrote the majority, the Line Item Veto Act
[Vol. 89:808
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receive only cursory mention in the discussion of subsidiary
arguments.
3 6
The Clinton case illustrates the paradox this Article will explore.
On the one hand, the Supreme Court has insisted on justiciability cri-
"gives the President the unilateral power to change the text of duly enacted statutes." Id. at
447.
The dissents' reasoning also depended in no way upon the nature of the injuries in-
curred by plaintiffs in the case. Justice Scalia explained that "there is not a dime's worth of
difference between Congress's authorizing the President to cancel a spending item, and
Congress's authorizing money to be spent on a particular item at the President's discre-
tion." Id. at 466 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Scalia then
relied on the long history of authorization for discretionary spending to justify upholding
the Act. See id. at 466-69 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). His argument
combines analogy with an appeal to history, without a single reference to the concrete
context provided by having injured plaintiffs before the Court.
Justice Breyer in dissent likewise referred not at all to the injuries making the case
justiciable. He developed an illustration for his rejection of the majority's conclusion from
one of the particular line items President Clinton had vetoed, but did not refer to the
injury that the veto of that line item produced. See id. at 474-75 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Moreover, Breyer supplemented this illustration with another example, from the law of
trust instruments, that has no connection with the facts of the case at all. See id. at 476
(Breyer,J., dissenting). He read the statute as allowing the President to exercise delegated
authority as in Field for reasons unrelated to the injuries inflicted in the Clinton case.
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion claimed that the Act threatened the liberties of
individual citizens. See id. at 449-53 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In making this argument
about the Act's effects he refers not once to the litigants' injuries or liberty interests.
36 The Court's refutation of one of the government's subsidiary arguments refers to
the injuries the actual plaintiffs incurred, but this reference appears incidental. The gov-
ernment relied upon the "'lockbox' provisions" of the statute, which required that line
item veto savings be used reduce the deficit, to argue against characterizing the line item
veto as a repeal of part of a statute. See id. at 440 & n.31. Since that provision has a legal
effect even after the line item veto's exercise-forbidding spending of the cancelled mon-
ies on other priorities-the government argued that the veto amounted to something less
than repeal of the line item. See id. at 440-41. The Court responded to that argument with
a reference to the injuries justifying standing, explaining that the cancellation of line items
had withdrawn benefits from the litigants in the case. See id. at 441. But this reference
seems merely illustrative. The statute itself made it obvious that cancellation of a line item
would prevent the expenditure of the relevant funds, and would therefore prevent some-
body from receiving something. See 2 U.S.C. § 691b(b) (2000) ("Upon the cancellation of
a dollar amount..., the total appropriation for each relevant account of which that dollar
amount is a part shall be simultaneously reduced by the dollar amount of that cancella-
tion."). The validity of the Court's argument in no way depends upon the deprivation of
funds actually injuring anybody. Even if the hospitals losing Medicare funding escaped
injury by making up the funding loss from new private donations, the statute would never-
theless possess the feature that troubled the Court. And certainly nothing about the partic-
ular injury incurred by the hospital, the loss of funding for the indigent, mattered at all to
the lockbox argument. The Court rejected the lockbox argument on the ground that a
repeal of the expenditure alone does constitute at least a "partial repeal" of the line item.
Clinton, 524 U.S. at 441. The Court thus decided this issue by abstract reasoning, not by
responding to any particular injury.
Justice Breyer, in his rejoinder to the majority's dismissal of the lockbox argument,
does not mention injury at all. See id. at 478-79 (Breyer, J., dissenting). He accepted the
government's argument that the lockbox feature does not constitute a repeal, and argued
that it supports his conclusion that the Act delegates executive authority to the President.
See id. at 478-80 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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teria that aim to make adjudication concrete, rather than abstract.
On the other hand, it often relies upon abstract formalist reasoning to
resolve cases on the merits, thereby gaining no benefit from the con-
crete context.
This concreteness paradox leads to fresh questions both about
the so-called "passive virtues," devices for avoiding decisions until an
issue has become concrete and well developed,3 7 and about formal-
ism. What precisely is the value of a concrete context for adjudica-
tion? Do we want judges to respond to injuries of the litigants who
come before them, or, in the words of Justice Roberts, "to lay the...
Constitution ... beside the statute" to see whether the statute conflicts
with that grand document?38 If judges should respond to the injuries
they see, how should those injuries influence them? Are some types of
legal questions inherently abstract? And if so, what value does requir-
ing injury-in-fact have for adjudication?
Part I of this Article explores the role concreteness plays in the
Court's justiciability jurisprudence, with some emphasis upon the doc-
trine of standing. This Part also discusses the role that abstract formal-
ism plays in merits adjudication, with emphasis upon separation of
powers jurisprudence.
Part II tests the hypothesis that the Line Item Veto Act cases sug-
gest: that standing requirements do not give rise to concrete adjudica-
tion. It examines numerous Supreme Court cases to see whether
plaintiffs standing makes merits adjudication more concrete. It then
draws some conclusions about the relationship between standing and
concreteness in adjudication.
Part III develops the theoretical implications of the concreteness
paradox. Analysis of the paradox shows that the Court has not ade-
quately justified the law of standing and illuminates the fundamental
structure of public law.39 The Article closes with a recommendation
37 See BICKEL, supra note 11, at 111-98 (describing the "passive virtues").
38 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 178 (1803) (describing judicial review as an exercise in resolving conflicts
between the statutory law and the Constitution); THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 525 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (same).
39 1 define public law as law creating obligations for government. See, e.g., N. Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67-68 (1982) (plurality opinion) (de-
fining the public rights doctrine). This includes constitutional and most administrative
law. By contrast, private law involves questions of one individual's liability to another. See
id. at 69-70 (plurality opinion). This definition is not uncontroversial, nor does it resolve
all issues. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 598-600 (1985)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (concluding that case about scheme creating rights between pri-
vate parties should be thought of as providing public rights, because public purposes per-
vade the scheme); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1, 35-36 (1979) (defining "all rights enforced by courts" as public) .
814 [Vol. 89:808
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for a new set of "active virtues," that is, a set of practices to follow in
resolving, rather than avoiding, consideration of the merits of cases.
I
CONCRETENESS AND ABSTRACTNESS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION
This Part describes the law of standing and several related jus-
ticiability doctrines. It then presents information about the role of
formalism in constitutional adjudication. It closes with an effort to
elucidate what scholars, lawyers, and judges mean when they distin-
guish between abstract and concrete cases.40 This Part's description
highlights the importance of the concreteness ideal, the notion that
only concrete, rather than abstract, cases should be justiciable under
Article 111.41
A. Concreteness and the Law of Standing
The Supreme Court has held that federal courts may only exer-
cise jurisdiction over cases brought by plaintiffs that have "standing"
to bring the claim. The modern standing doctrine put an emphasis
on concreteness from the beginning.42
In Baker v. Carr,43 the Court asked whether the appellants had
"alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions."44 It described this inquiry as "the
gist of the question of standing."45 Thus, the Baker Court set up assur-
ance of "concrete adverseness" as the measuring rod for an adequate
"personal stake" in a case. 46 Concrete adverseness, claimed the Baker
Court, "sharpens the presentation of issues" to "illuminat[e] . .. diffi-
cult constitutional questions."47 The Court went on to grant standing
to voters challenging redistricting under the Equal Protection
Clause. 48 In a separate passage, the Court formulated the modern
political question doctrine and held that the constitutionality of redis-
40 See, e.g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 297 (1979)
(distinguishing between a case or controversy and "abstract questions").
41 See id.
42 The modern doctrine has some early antecedents. See, e.g., Fairchild v. Hughes,
258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922) (stating that general interest in enforcement of laws is insufficient
basis for lawsuit seeking to invalidate the Nineteenth Amendment).
43 369 U.S. 186 (1962).




48 See id. at 206-07.
2004]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
tricting under the Equal Protection Clause posed a justiciable legal
question.49 By treating standing as a separate doctrinal issue, the
Court began the modern movement toward formulating a distinct
standing doctrine.
Five years later in Flast v. Cohen, the Court elaborated upon the
Baker Court's statement that the gist of the standing inquiry addresses
concreteness concerns. 50 It identified standing doctrine with avoid-
ance of "'ill-defined controversies over constitutional issues ' ' 51 and
cases "of 'a hypothetical or abstract character.' "52 Thus, the Court
relied heavily upon a dichotomy between abstract and concrete cases
to justify a standing requirement. Noting confusion in prior cases re-
garding what standing addressed, the Court, building on Baker, ex-
plained that standing addressed the question of who "is a proper party
to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the
issue itself is justiciable.
' 53
The Flast Court went on to link standing's concrete adverseness
requirement not just to sharp presentation of issues, a concern that
seems to address how well arguments about a predetermined issue are
made, but to the very definition of the issue before the Court.
54 It
also identified standing with vigorous pursuit of litigation. 55 Finally,
the Flast Court claimed that framing of specific issues, "adverseness,"
and vigorous litigation would "assure that the constitutional challenge
will be made in a form traditionally thought to be capable of judicial
resolution." 56 Thus, the Flast Court created a concept of a proper case
as one where "concrete adverseness"57 creates specific issues vigor-
ously litigated by opposing parties. At the time of Flast and Baker, the
Court employed a "legal interest" test to implement the concern over
concrete adverseness. 58 When the Court substituted an injury-in-fact
test requiring past or likely future injury for the legal interest test in
Barlow v. Collins59 and Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp60 in 1970, it continued to treat "concrete adverseness" as
49 See id. at 209-237.
50 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
51 Id. at 100 (quoting United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 90
(1947)).
52 Id. (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937)).
53 Id. (footnote omitted).
54 See id.
55 See id. at 106.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 101.
58 See generally Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the Disintegration of Article III, 74 CAL. L.
REV. 1915, 1920 (1986) (describing the legal interest test).
59 397 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1970).
60 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970) ("The first question is whether the plaintiff alleges that
the challenged action has caused him injury in fact . . ").
816 [Vol. 89:808
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central to the standing inquiry. 6' An injury-in-fact requirement be-
came the means of ensuring the concrete adverseness that standing
doctrine demands.
62
Concrete adverseness remained central as the Court developed
the standing doctrine further. In the 1970s, the Court added to the
injury-in-fact test it first articulated at the beginning of that decade,
requiring a causal link between the alleged injury and the challenged
action, and a likelihood that a favorable judgment will redress the in-
jury alleged.63 The Court repeatedly cited Baker's "concrete adverse-
ness" language to justify all of these requirements and often linked
standing even more directly to a concern for concrete merits
adjudication.
64
For many years, the Court generally treated standing as amenable
to legislative control.65 Barlow, however, began a slow shift toward
constitutionalizing a core set of standing elements as required by Arti-
cle III's language authorizing adjudication of cases or controversies.
66
This shift culminated more than twenty years later in the Court's first
61 See Barlow, 397 U.S. at 164; id. at 170 (Brennan,J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1982)).
62 See id. at 163-64; id. at 170-73 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part);
cf Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979) (requiring "actual or
threatened injury").
63 See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Ap-
proach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 475 (1996) (discussing the Burger Court's creation of
causation and redressability requirements); see also Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426
U.S. 26, 38, 41-42 (1976) (demanding redressability and causation); Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 505 (1975) (noting that indirect link between defendant's action and plaintiffs
harm may make required showing of causation and redressability under Article III more
difficult); United States v. Students Challenging Reg. Agency Procs., 412 U.S. 669, 688-89
(1973) (requiring that plaintiff allege that he was injured or will be injured by the chal-
lenged action); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617-18 (1973) (declining standing
on ground of an insufficient link between plaintiffs alleged injury, deprivation of child
support, and the challenged action, nonenforcement of child support order).
64 See, e.g., Simon, 426 U.S. at 38 n.16, 41-42 (linking causation to concrete adverse-
ness and then equating redressability with causation); Linda RS., 410 U.S. at 616-18 (cit-
ing need for concrete adverseness and then creating a causation requirement out of
demand for a real injury); Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972)
(noting that because plaintiffs allege injury with particularity, no "abstract question" is pre-
sent); Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 586-87 (1972) ("[F]ederal courts do
not decide abstract questions posed by parties who lack 'a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy.'" (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962))).
65 See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing As an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 885 (1983) (explaining that the existence of standing "is
largely within the control of Congress"); see, e.g., Barlow, 397 U.S. at 164-65 (analyzing
question of standing primarily as one of legislative intent).
66 See Barlow, 397 U.S. at 164 (referring to "concrete adverseness required by Article
III"); Scalia, supra note 65, at 885 (describing standing in the mid-1980s as a combination
of prudential limits and a constitutional core); see also U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The
judicial Power shall extend to all Cases .... [and] to Controversies . . ").
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decision explicitly overruling a clear congressional grant of standing,
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.
6 7
Concrete adverseness assumed a leading role in this transforma-
tion. In Barlow, the Court suggested that Article III required concrete
adverseness. 68 In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc.,69 the Court made its growing con-
cept of a concrete case a central element linking Article III to the
burgeoning standing requirements. 70 Valley Forge claimed that a
redressable injury "tends to assure" that the Court will resolve legal
questions "in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appre-
ciation of the consequences ofjudicial action," and identified this pol-
icy of using the context that facts about injury provide to understand
consequences as an "'implicit polic[y] embodied in Article 111.'171
Hence, by the 1970s the Court had identified standing with concrete-
ness in order to encourage good arguments about issues, sharp fram-
ing of what the issues are, and judicial appreciation of the
consequences of possible decisions.7 2
While the Court has repeated the "concrete adverseness" phrase
in numerous cases, 73 it has never explained its meaning. The concept
of "adverseness" seems to demand two parties to litigation that genu-
inely oppose each other. That term alone would indicate the need to
avoid advisory opinions: opinions sought by one party who does not
67 504 U.S. 555, 576-78 (1992) (denying standing under a statute granting any per-
son a right to sue).
68 See Barlow, 397 U.S. at 164.
69 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
70 See id. at 472; Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Govern-
ance, 40 STAN. L. Rv. 1371, 1379 (1988) ("In the 1970s, the Burger Court added causation
as an element of the threshold determination of standing." (footnote omitted)).
71 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968)).
72 See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 222 (1988)
(describing as "numbingly familiar" the litany regarding the standing doctrine's purpose,
which includes "ensuring that a concrete case informs the court of the consequences of its
decisions" (footnote omitted)).
73 See Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REv. 227, 245 (1990) (describing a
personal stake assuring concrete adverseness as the test for standing); see, e.g., Gollust v.
Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 125-26 (1991) (unanimous opinion); Int'l Primate Prot. League v.
Adm'rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 78 (1991), superseded by statute on other grounds as
stated in Darlrymple v. Grand River Dam Auth., 145 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 1998); Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 65 n.5 (1987); United Auto.
Workers v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 289 (1986); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 61-62
(1986); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 939 (1983); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983); Larson v. Valente,
456 U.S. 228, 238-39 (1982); Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486; Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 273
(1979); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978); Hunt v.
Wash. Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 345 (1977); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 52-53 (1976); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 181 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974).
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ask for a binding judgment and faces no opposition.74 It also suggests
disapproval of sham litigation, in which two parties in fact want the
same result from a case, but contrive a dispute to get the court ruling
that both desire.
75
Most commentators agree, however, that the Court does not need
to require injury, causation, and redressability to assure the existence
of a real dispute between two parties. 76 Two parties may have a dis-
pute rendering them adverse to each other even if the plaintiff suffers
no injury. Indeed, several commentators, including then-Judge Scalia,
have suggested that an ideological plaintiff might litigate more vigor-
ously than one who has simply suffered an injury. 77 As long as two
parties genuinely disagree and the plaintiff seeks a judgment, not just
advice, the litigation will be adverse and quite different from a request
for a nonbinding advisory opinion.78
The standing test does not focus on the factors one should evalu-
ate to avoid advisory opinions.79 The injury-in-fact, causation, and
redressability requirements do not require an adverse party, because
74 See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Pas-
sive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40, 42 (1961) (suggesting that standing is a shorthand for
ideas related to avoiding advisory opinions).
75 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943) (vacating a collusive
suit); Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 251, 254-256 (1850) (distinguishing between a "real
dispute" and a case where the parties share a "common interest").
76 See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 72, at 247 (explaining that "standing doctrine . . . is
not ... a particularly good[ ] protection against advisory opinions"); Pushaw, supra note
63, at 462 (arguing thatJustice Frankfurter "cleverly co-opted the historical term 'advisory
opinion' and gave it a new meaning" by linking it to standing, ripeness, and mootness).
77 See Louis J. Jaffe, The Citizen As Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideo-
logical Plaintiff 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033, 1037-38 (1968) (discussing similarities between
ideological plaintiffs and plaintiffs suffering actual injury); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitu-
tional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1385 (1973) (arguing that "there
is no reason to believe that litigants with a 'personal interest' will present constitutional
issues any more sharply or ably than the Sierra Club or the ACLU");Joseph L. Sax, Stand-
ing To Sue: A Critical Review of the Mineral King Decision, 13 NAT. RESOURCES J. 76, 82 (1973)
(suggesting that Sierrra Club would make a better plaintiff than a park user for the Mineral
King litigation); Scalia, supra note 65, at 891 (noting that standing doctrine is "ill designed"
"'to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens presentation of issues,'" since
"[o]ften the very best adversaries are national organizations" with "a keen interest in the
abstract question at issue in the case"); Mark V. Tushnet, Comment, The Sociology of Article
III: A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1698, 1704 (1980) ("[T]he Court
recognizes that in reality an organization will often be a more effective litigant than a
single individual."); cf. Richard H. Fallon,Jr., OfJusticiability, Remedies, and Public Law Litiga-
tion: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 49-50 (1984) (arguing that a
plaintiff who is willing to pay for litigation likely feels a personal stake in the outcome).
78 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Court Should Have Remained Silent: Why the Court Ered in
Deciding Dickerson v. United States, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 305-06 (2000) (noting that
Court's prohibition of advisory opinions requires thatjudgment must have some effect).
79 See Fletcher, supra note 72, at 247.
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they typically focus only upon the plaintiff.8 While the plaintiff must
trace her injury to a challenged action and argue that a judicial order
would remedy the harm, she need not show that the defendant op-
poses the order she seeks.81 In that sense standing doctrine is under-
inclusive as a means of avoiding advisory opinions.82 In another
sense, standing is overinclusive. When a court issues an order after
hearing from a proponent and opponent of the order, it has not is-
sued an advisory opinion, even if the court order requested does not
remedy the plaintiffs concrete injury. It has issued an order limiting
the defendant's conduct, not a response to a unilateral request for
advice.83 Since the Court has a separate doctrine prohibiting advisory
opinions,8 4 it does not need a standing doctrine to perform this
function.85
Sham litigation might well include a plaintiff who can meet the
requisites of standing, so constitutional standing requirements also
seem ill-suited to the task of avoiding sham litigation. Detecting the
sham would require a comparison between the interests of the plain-
tiffs and the defendants to determine whether they coincide,8 6 but the
three-part constitutional test for standing does not focus upon this
comparison.8 7 Nor do sincere ideological plaintiffs experiencing no
personal injury present sham litigation if they seek a judgment against
an adverse opponent.
80 See Ellyn J. Bullock, Acid Rain Falls on the Just and the Unjust: Why Standing's Criteria
Should Not Be Incorporated into Intervention of Right, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 605, 641 ("Standing
is overwhelmingly a plaintiffs hurdle.").
81 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 924, 935-36 (1983) (holding that Chadha met
causation and redressability requirements, even though the INS supported his position on
the merits).
82 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 78, at 289-91, 304-06 (arguing that Court issued
an advisory opinion when it ruled on the constitutionality of a statute challenging Miranda
at the behest of an amicus when no party to the case raised the issue).
83 See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III's Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions
of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 447, 513-14 (1994) (noting that "[c]ontrary to
current understanding," early Supreme Court cases on advisory opinions insisted only that
resolution of a case must be "final . . . and public").
84 See Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105
HARV. L. REv. 605, 643-44 (1992).
85 Cf Pushaw, supra note 63, at 442-44 (discussing evolution of prohibition on advi-
sory opinions into "prohibition against rendering a decision in a litigated case because of
standing, ripeness, or mootness concerns," and arguing that this constitutes a misinterpre-
tation of the prohibition on advisory opinions).
86 See, e.g., Chadha, 462 U.S. at 931 n.6 (finding jurisdiction, even though the INS
sided with Chadha, because of intervention of both Houses of Congress as adverse parties);
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911) (holding that no jurisdiction can exist
without truly adverse parties).
87 See Bullock, supra note 80, at 641-42 ("Standing is overwhelmingly a plaintiffs hur-
dle .... The only standing requirement that implicates defendants is causation, and there
defendants are implicated only peripherally .... ).
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Of course, no doctrine perfectly achieves its intended purpose, so
a showing of underinclusion and overinclusion by itself does not nec-
essarily establish a fatal defect. But standing doctrine prohibits so
much genuinely adversarial litigation (flowing from ideological con-
flict without injury), and fails so completely to capture the rare case
that is not truly adversarial (sham litigation), that the assurance of
"adverseness" cannot count as a substantial justification for standing
doctrine.
Since the concept of adverseness does not, by itself, explain in-
jury-based standing's constitutional status, the idea that the adverse-
ness must be "concrete" should help explain the mystery. But here
the Court's poor use of the English language hinders understand-
ing.a8 The phrase "concrete adverseness" does not have any readily
apparent meaning.8 9 Parties either are adverse or they are not.
The Court's repeated insistence that concrete adverseness should
sharpen presentation of arguments, illuminate difficult questions, and
frame issues furthers understanding. 90 Surely, this view suggests that
standing requirements make the case itself more concrete. That is,
parties meeting the injury-in-fact test will present a more concrete
case, thereby making issues more concrete, and creating more con-
88 Cf Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Marbury and the Constitutional Mind: A Bicentennial Essay
on the Wages of Doctrinal Tension, 91 CAL. L. REv. 1, 33 (2003) (translating concrete adverse-
ness as "concrete adversity between the parties").
89 The Court's usage taken out of context might suggest that it intends to distinguish
concrete from abstract adversarial relationships. Thinking of relationships between peo-
ple, or worse, between institutions (since many cases have institutional defendants and
plaintiffs) as either abstract or concrete, however, seems unusual and not entirely clear.
Would such a concept distinguish between cases in which the plaintiffs and defendants
know each other prior to the litigation (concrete adverseness) and those where they do not
(abstract adverseness)? Would it distinguish litigation involving personal insults (concrete
adverseness) from litigation involving impersonal legal arguments (abstract adverseness)?
Would it mean to distinguish cases in which the litigants have adverse interests about some
matter of principle (abstract adverseness) from cases where they have a narrower disagree-
ment (concrete adverseness)? None of these ideas seems central to standing, for once
injury occurs, disagreement can be as impersonal or principled as the litigants wish.
Moreover, it is very hard to see why the concreteness of the relationship between
plaintiff and defendant should hinge upon the existence of an injury to the plaintiff. For
example, the Court has held that litigants seeking to challenge government administration
of laws protecting endangered species who have no concrete plans to see these animals
generally cannot claim injury-in-fact. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564
(1992); id. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring). By contrast, litigants that have such plans can
claim injury. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Yet in either case, the relationship between
the plaintiff and defendant is essentially the same. The plaintiff believes that the govern-
ment defendant has misconstrued the law and failed to take actions that should help pro-
tect the species. It sues the government for relief. Unless one imagines that the intensity
of the adversarial relationship varies with the concreteness of the injury, it is hard to distin-
guish the relationship between the injured plaintiff and the government from the relation-
ship between the non-injured plaintiff and the government.
90 See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 238-39 (1982) (quoting Baker on these
points); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (same).
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crete results. This reading also comports with important early ante-
cedents of modern standing doctrine. 9'
Of course, the Court may simply mean that cases involving an
injured plaintiff create a concrete adverse relationship, while cases in-
volving a plaintiff experiencing no injury-in-fact involve an abstract ad-
verse relationship. If so, the Court has simply stated the requirement
for injury-in-fact twice, once clearly and once obliquely, without ex-
plaining why Article III demands an injury-in-fact requirement.
Indeed, any coherent explanation of why Article III's conferral of
jurisdiction over "Cases . . . [or] Controversies ' 92 bars litigation
brought without standing must hinge on some judicial definition of
cases (and controversies). 93 Hence, the Court must mean that the
concreteness it seeks applies to the case, i.e., the adjudication of the
merits of controversies.
The suggestion that justiciability doctrines, such as the doctrine
of standing, aim to make litigation more concrete has firm roots in
constitutional scholarship. 94 This suggestion played a leading role in
Alexander Bickel's writing about "passive virtues," i.e., techniques for
avoiding or delaying constitutional decision-making in the Supreme
Court.95 Bickel has suggested that justiciability doctrines, doctrines
91 See United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-90 (1947) (identifying
"'concrete legal issues .... not abstractions'" as requisite for constitutional litigation and
expressing concern regarding the lack of specific facts about which of plaintiff's activities
the challenged Hatch Act prohibited (quoting United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power
Co., 311 U.S. 377, 423 (1940))); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41
(1937) (describing a "justiciable controversy" as a controversy satisfying requirement for a
concrete dispute touching a legal relationship between parties); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley
Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 324 (1936) (calling for "action of a definite and concrete character"
rather than "determination of abstract questions"); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,
486-88 (1923) (rejecting taxpayer standing to challenge grant program under the federal
statute because case raised abstract questions of political power); United States v. Alaska
S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113, 116 (1920) (stating that Court will not decide abstract questions of
law that will not affect the case); Liverpool, N.Y. and Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm'rs of Emigra-
tion, 113 U.S. 33, 38-39 (1885) (describing question of whether Congress constitutionally
sanctioned collection of "head mon[ies]" as abstract when state law may not have author-
ized the collection); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 74 (1831) (Thomp-
son, J., dissenting) (stating that the "Court can have no right to pronounce an abstract
opinion upon the constitutionality of a state law").
92 U.S. CONST. art. III, §2, cl. 1.
93 See Arizonans for Official Eng. v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997) ("Standing to sue
or defend is an aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement [of Article III]." (citations
omitted)). See generally Pushaw, supra note 83 (arguing for distinct, separate meanings for
"Cases" and "Controversies").
94 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 77, at 14 (noting in the context of Article III "adverse-
ness in fact" that a "concrete injury helps frame issues in a factual context suitable for
judicial resolution" (footnote omitted)); Monaghan, supra note 77, at 1372 (stating that
"constitutional questions" must "be presented in a manner sufficiently concrete for resolu-
tion of the problem").
95 See BICKEL, supra note 11, at 98-111 (describing the "passive virtues"). Bickel
explains:
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allowing the Court to avoid deciding cases otherwise properly before
it, help the Court make wise decisions.96 Bickel suggests that concrete
litigation makes wise decisions more likely and that the standing re-
quirement fosters concrete litigation.
97
The Court has also explained that separation of powers requires
the standing doctrine.98 It regards standing as a tool to ensure that
courts stay within their properly limited role under the Constitution
and do not usurp the powers of the executive or legislative branches
of government.99 Even though the Court's increased reliance upon
separation of powers seems to have led to somewhat less emphasis on
concrete adverseness, concrete adverseness remains part of the doc-
trine.'00 Moreover, this separation of powers rationale aims to explain
why the Court reads Article III to require standing. 01 Abstract separa-
One of the chief faculties of the judiciary.... which fits the courts for the
function of evolving and applying constitutional principles, is that ... the
judgment of courts may be had in concrete cases that exemplify the actual
consequences of legislative or executive actions. Thus is the Court enabled
to prove its principles as it evolves them. The concepts of "standing" and
"case and controversy" tend to ensure this ....
Id. at 115.
Numerous authors have commented on the impact of Bickel's theory of the passive
virtues. See Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the Counter-
majoritarian Difficult,, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 760 (1997) (declaring that Bickel's "master-
piece, The Least Dangerous Branch, is rightly counted as the most important work of
constitutional scholarship written in the last half-century" (footnote omitted)); Barry Fried-
man, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficult,, Part
Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 201 (2002) (describing Bickel's framing of the "'counter-
majoritarian difficulty'" in The Least Dangerous Branch as "[catching] the attention of the
ages"); Pushaw, supra note 63, at 465 ("Alexander Bickel set forth a theory [of the passive
virtues] that would have a lasting impact on the Court." (footnote omitted)).
96 See BICKEL, supra note 11, at 115 ("[T] here are sound reasons, grounded not only in
theory but in the judicial experience of centuries, here and elsewhere, for believing that
the hard, confining, and yet enlarging context of a real controversy leads to sounder and
more enduring judgments."); see also Michael C. Doff, Facial Challenges to State and Federal
Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REv. 235, 246 (1994) (assuming "that courts function best when
presented with concrete rather than abstract controversies").
97 See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 11, at 115-17. While Bickel's writing only addresses
constitutional decision-making in the Supreme Court, the concreteness requirement now
also applies to nonconstitutional litigation and to cases in lower federal courts. See
Fletcher, supra note 72, at 229. Bickel's (and the Supreme Court's) notion that a court
would benefit from more concrete adjudicative settings can clearly apply to lower courts as
well as the High Court.
98 SeeAllen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) ("[T]he law of Art. III standing is built
on a single basic idea-the idea of separation of powers.").
99 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998) (resting interpre-
tation of Article III standing on separation of powers rather than text of Article III); Glad-
stone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979) (noting that standing confines
courts to their "'properly limited... role.., in a democratic society"' (quoting Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975))).
100 See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1998) (disclaiming sole reliance on con-
crete adverseness as basis for standing).
101 See Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000) (declaring
that the standing requirements are an "'essential and unchanging part' of Article III's case-
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tion of power principles have not supplanted Article III as the source
of standing limitations.10 2 As a result, the purpose behind the "con-
crete adverseness" rationale of tying Article III to standing doctrine
remains vital.
A separation of powers theory still requires an explanation of why
Article III requires injury-in-fact based standing. Stating that standing
limits the Court to its proper role does not begin to explain what that
proper role is. 10 3 A separation of powers approach requires a theory
of what precisely the role of the judiciary is.' 0 4 And a theory of stand-
ing must explain why that role justifies a particular standing doctrine,
such as the requirement that litigants experience injury-in-fact.
The Court's desire to avoid improper interference in the political
decisions of the executive and legislative branches does not explain
injury-based standing any more than a simple statement that a court
must remain within its proper role. Judicial interference with political
decisions arises not from grants of standing but from orders issued
correcting constitutional and statutory violations. Everyjudicial order
in public law interferes with one of the other branches of govern-
ment.10 5 The Court issues such orders only when it concludes that
another branch of government has violated the law. 10 6 If that conclu-
sion is correct and appropriate, then the interference will usually be
proper. 0 7 The Court has separate doctrines-the political question
doctrine and various doctrines of equitable discretion-to prevent is-
or-controversy requirement, and a key factor in dividing the power of government between
the courts and the two political branches" (citation omitted) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992))).
102 See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102 n.4 (reaffirming centrality of Article III in standing
analysis).
103 Cf Nichol, supra note 58, at 1948 (accusing the Court of using separation of powers
as a label to accompany a decision not to hear a case, with no explanation as to why it
requires that result).
104 See Bandes, supra note 73, at 230-31, 263 (arguing that acknowledgement of the
role of separation of powers is only the initial step and that inquiry into the role of the
federal judiciary is also required); see also Scalia, supra note 65, at 894 (asking whether the
doctrine of standing is "functionally related to the distinctive role that we expect the courts
to perform").
105 Cf Dorf, supra note 96, at 245-46 (noting that "any restriction on judicial power"
limits "interference with the other branches of government").
106 See Pushaw, supra note 63, at 469 (federal courts inevitably "'interfere"' with the
majoritarian branches when these branches "exceed ... constitutional bounds").
107 See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996) (declaring that "[i]t is for the courts to
remedy past or imminent official interference with individual inmates' presentation of
claims to the courts"); Fallon, supra note 88, at 14 (arguing that if Congress "could exceed
constitutional bounds without being subject to judicial check, then the restraining func-
tion of a written constitution would be obliterated"); Pushaw, supra note 63, at 484-85
(federal courts properly enforce executive branch duty to "take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed" when they order compliance with a statute); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing
and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1471 (1988) (stating that "the
'take Care' clause . . . do[es] not authorize the executive branch to violate the law").
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suance of improper orders, those that resolve political rather than le-
gal questions or unduly intrude upon the political process."'8 The
question of improper interference properly focuses upon the merits,
the political question doctrine, and questions of equitable discretion,
not upon injuries to parties.' 09
The suggestion that standing avoids improper interference with
other branches of government functions as a tautology, not an expla-
nation. If one assumes that a proper judicial case requires injury,
then one can say that any case without an injury is an improper pro-
ceeding. The characterization of such a case as an improper proceed-
ing can then plausibly support an inference that any order issuing
from such a case is improper. Since orders always interfere, the Court
can link standing to improper interference in this way. But this link-
ing does not explain why a proper judicial proceeding must have in-
jury; it just assumes it to be true.
The view that separation of powers requires a contested case,"10
as I have explained above, does not justify the injury-in-fact require-
ment. The Court's discussion of concrete adverseness constitutes the
Court's only explanation as to why a proper judicial role requires it to
distinguish cases with injured plaintiffs from cases with other genu-
inely interested litigants seeking a binding judgment. The lack of any
other explanation for why separation of powers justifies modern
standing doctrine necessarily implies that the desire for a "concrete"
case must perform the key role of explaining why Article III requires
injury-based standing.
108 See Pushaw, supra note 63, at 489 (suggesting the Court combine permissive stand-
ing with use of the political question and ripeness doctrines to meet "efficiency" concerns);
Fallon, supra note 77, at 43-47 (suggesting that doctrines of equitable discretion provide
the proper restraint on remedies); see also, e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499-504
(1974) (discussing doctrines of equitable relief).
109 See Fallon, supra note 77, at 42 (noting that the injury requirement "erects no signif-
icant barrier against judicial overextension at the remedial stage"); Tushnet, supra note 77,
at 1700 (suggesting that separation of powers principles are better considered under the
political question doctrine than under standing doctrine); Kerry C. White, Note, Rule 24(A)
Intervention of Right: Why the Federal Courts Should Require Standing To Intervene, 36 Lov. L.A.
L. REv. 527, 553-554 (2002) (standing does not focus upon the "issues of the case," but
upon the party and her injury); see also, e.g., Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 811-16 (1974)
(addressing equitable discretion of the courts). Then-Judge Scalia has argued that stand-
ing can rule out adjudication of an issue in court if the court denies standing to all who
might raise it. See Scalia, supra note 65, at 892. This does not establish, however, that the
interference that judicial resolution of a legal issue would bring is inappropriate as a mat-
ter of separation of powers. To take the example Scalia used, separation of powers ought
not preclude enforcement of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Cf id.
(suggesting that denial of standing in F/ast would have eliminated judicial enforcement of
the Establishment Clause altogether).
110 See, e.g., Neal Devins, Asking the Right Questions: How the Courts Honored the Separation
of Powers By Reconsidering Miranda, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 251, 256 (2000) (stating that conserv-
atives believe that separation of powers requires review only of issues "truly in controversy
and therefore represented by vigorous advocacy" (footnote omitted)).
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While this Article focuses primarily upon constitutional standing,
the Court applies prudential limits to standing as well."' The doc-
trine of third party standing allows the Court to avoid deciding cases
in which a litigant seeks to invoke the rights of others to justify a rem-
edy.112 Under the Administrative Procedure Act,' 1 3 the Court permits
standing only when the plaintiff's injury falls within the "zone of inter-
ests" arguably protected by the statutory or constitutional provision
under which relief is sought. 1 4 And the Court sometimes declines to
adjudicate cases based upon a "generalized grievance shared in sub-
stantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens." 115 The
Court has stated that these prudential limits, like the constitutional
limits, allow the Court to avoid deciding "abstract questions of wide
public significance."
' 16
Article III requires standing largely in order to assure sufficiently
concrete adjudication. And the Court uses the ideal of concrete judi-
cial proceedings to distinguish proper proceedings under Article III
from those that may violate separation of powers. Overly abstract mat-
ters may fall outside the bounds of the case-or-controversy
requirement.
117
B. Other Justiciability Doctrines
We have seen that the Court has suggested that Article III re-
quires litigants to satisfy its standing requirements, because of a need
III See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11 (1992) (describing third party standing as a
"prudential" standing principle); Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,
99-100 (1979) (discussing prudential limits on standing); Fallon, supra note 77, at 18 (dis-
cussing limitations of generalized grievances and third party standing as prudential limits).
112 See, e.g., Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 10-11 (holding that litigant who did not intend to
travel cannot invoke constitutional right to travel); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192-97
(1976) (allowing beer vendor to invoke the equal protection rights of young males in chal-
lenge to gender discrimination in alcoholic beverage law); cf Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S.
420, 445-51 (1998) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (a party may not assert a third party's
rights unless an obstacle prevents the third party from asserting his own rights).
113 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559; 701-706 (2000).
114 See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162-63 (1997).
115 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); see Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524
U.S. 11, 24 (1998) ("[W]here a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the Court has
found 'injury-in-fact."'); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 581 (1992) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring) (suggesting that the generalized grievance limitation remains pru-
dential by stating that "[w]hile it does not matter how many persons have been injured by
the challenged action, the party bringing suit must show that the action injures him in a
concrete and personal way"); cf id. 504 U.S. at 573-74 (suggesting that the prohibition on
generalized grievances is required by Article III); Warth, 422 U.S. at 501 (if Congress grants
a right of action, a plaintiff may "invoke the general public interest in support of [her]
claim[s]").
116 Warth, 422 U.S. at 500.
117 See Dorf, supra note 96, at 247 (linking Article III case-or-controversy requirement
to the interest in "concrete decisionmaking").
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for concrete litigation. Other justiciability doctrines also involve con-
creteness concerns.
1. Ripeness
The Court sometimes dismisses cases otherwise properly before it
on ripeness grounds. The Court has remarked upon the close rela-
tionship between standing and ripeness; ripeness dismissals often sug-
gest that standing does not exist now, but might exist later.118 A
dismissal on ripeness grounds, unlike a dismissal on standing grounds,
usually suggests that the Court will be willing to hear the case at a later
date, once the facts are further developed. 119
The Court evaluates two factors in deciding whether a case is ripe
for judicial resolution. 120 First, the Court evaluates the hardship that
delay might visit upon the litigants) 21 Second, the Court evaluates
the "'fitness of the issues for judicial decision."
' 1 22
The rationale for the ripeness doctrine places concreteness at
center stage.' 2 3 The Court has repeatedly explained that avoiding
"premature adjudication" prevents courts "from entangling them-
selves in abstract disagreements."1 24 Ripeness doctrine also "protect[s]
the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative deci-
sion" has "concrete" effects upon "the challenging parties."1 25 Thus,
the ripeness doctrine also reflects the view that concrete injury makes
cases concrete.
118 See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 891-893 (1990) (finding challenge
to land withdrawal program premature based on grounds suggesting a lack of current in-
jury); Warth, 422 U.S. at 499 n.10 ("The standing question ... bears close affinity to ques-
tions of ripeness . .. ."); see also Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1,
11-12 (1990) (stating that takings claim will be ripe only after the property owner making
the takings claim has taken advantage of relevant Tucker Act remedies).
119 See Pushaw, supra note 63, at 493 (noting that "ripeness merely postpones a deci-
sion until the factual and legal issues have matured"); see also, e.g., Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497
U.S. at 892 n.3 (describing actions that will make rejected challenge ripe); EPA v. Nat'l
Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 72 n.12 (1980) (finding challenge ripe that previously
had not been, because "EPA has now taken [a] definitive position").
120 See Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998); Abbott Labs. v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967).
121 Ohio Forestry Ass'n, 523 U.S. at 733.
122 Id. (quoting Gardner, 387 U.S. at 149).
123 See, e.g., Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, Local 37 v. Boyd, 347
U.S. 222, 224 (1954) ("Determination of the scope and constitutionality of legislation in
advance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete case involves too re-
mote and abstract an inquiry . . . ." (citations omitted)).
124 Gardner, 387 U.S. at 148 (emphasis added); see Ohio Forestry Ass'n, 523 U.S. at 735
(noting that "ripeness doctrine" gives great weight to avoiding "premature review that may
prove too abstract"); Sierra Club v. Peterson, 185 F.3d 349, 362 n.16 (5th Cir. 1999)
(describing the Supreme Court's most recent ripeness case as "stand[ing] for the proposi-
tion that 'abstract disagreements over administrative policies' will not make a controversy
ripe" (quoting Ohio Forestry Ass'n, 523 U.S. at 732-33)).
125 Gardner, 387 U.S. at 148-49.
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The ripeness jurisprudence, however, recognizes that concrete
injury does not aid the merits analysis in some instances. The Court
considers cases presenting pure issues of statutory interpretation as fit
for early judicial decision, because they "would not 'benefit from fur-
ther factual development."' 1 26 Thus, the Court recognizes that facts,
such as facts about injury, do not illuminate "pure" questions of statu-
tory interpretation.1 27 Similarly, the Court recognizes that facial con-
stitutional challenges do not require facts making the litigation more
concrete.1 28 It considers such cases ripe even before the litigants ex-
perience the effects of the legislation at issue.1 29 In both classes of
cases, the Court seems to recognize something that its standing juris-
prudence tends to deny: injury is quite irrelevant to certain types of
merits analysis.
But the Court does consider factual development important to
the ripeness of as-applied challenges-both statutory and constitu-
tional. °30 If the litigant wishes to raise the question of whether a par-
ticular application of a statute conflicts with the Constitution or the
question of whether a particular application of a rule conflicts with a
statute, the Court typically insists on some experience making the rel-
evant scope of application clear.13' In other words, it wants facts-
126 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 479 (2001) (quoting Ohio For-
estry Ass'n, 523 U.S. at 733).
127 See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581 (1985) (noting
that "further factual development" will not clarify a "purely legal" issue); Pac. Gas & Elec. v.
Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 201 (1983) (finding preemption
question fit for judicial resolution because it is "predominantly legal"); EPA v. Nat'l
Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 72 n.12 (1980) (finding challenge to variances from
water pollution control requirements ripe prior to the granting of a variance, because EPA
has taken a clear position on which factors are relevant to variances).
128 See, e.g., Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1990) (adju-
dicating claim that Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause to enact the
"rails-to-trails" program, after finding a takings claim "premature"). But see Texas v. United
States, 523 U.S. 296, 300-301 (1998) (declining to adjudicate the scope of a statute's appli-
cation facially because the statute had not been applied and the Court did "not have suffi-
cient confidence in [its] powers of imagination" regarding how it might be applied).
129 See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 736 n.10 (1997) ("'facial'
challenges ... are generally ripe the moment the . . .ordinance is passed"); see also, e.g.,
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1000-1013 (1984) (adjudicating takings claim
regarding government disclosure of trade secrets, including claims about what government
might disclose in the future).
130 See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 618 (2001) (explaining that Court
must "know[ ] 'the extent of permitted development"' to adjudicate a nonfacial takings
claim (quoting MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 351 (1986))).
But see Dorf, supra note 96, at 294 (arguing that "[t]he distinction between as-applied and
facial challenges may confuse more than it illuminates" (footnote omitted)). Even if the
distinction between facial and applied challenges is confusing, it is nonetheless the typol-
ogy that the Court uses. See id.
131 See, e.g., Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1019 (holding that challenge to procedures offer-
ing compensation for taking of a trade secret was not ripe, because plaintiff's "ability to
obtain just compensation does not depend solely on the validity" of those procedures).
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sometimes including facts about injury-to frame the issue for resolu-
tion. 132 If the scope of application remains subject to definition by
future events, the Court labels the issue the litigant seeks to raise ab-
stract and often declines jurisdiction on ripeness grounds.
133
2. Mootness and Concrete Remedies
The Court also may decline jurisdiction when a party comes to
court too late, rather than too early. The Court considers the doc-
trine of mootness closely related to standing, since a moot claim in-
volves no current injury and therefore offers no opportunity for
judicial redress of an injury. 134 The mootness doctrine addresses the
problem of abstract remedial orders, rather than the problem of ab-
stract holdings, i.e., holdings not rooted in the concrete experience
provided by the controversy. A judicial order in a moot case might
have no significant effect, since the injury giving rise to the claim no
longer exists. 135 But since all of the facts regarding the injury that had
occurred remain available to the Court, a moot case offers at least as
rich a context for adjudication as a non-moot case.136 Indeed, be-
cause the Court permits standing based on likely future injuries, a
moot case, which arises after all relevant facts are fully known, usually
offers more concreteness on the merits than a live controversy.
137
Logically, any judicial order that stops a defendant from doing
something that he would otherwise do appears concrete. The Court
sometimes uses the concept of an abstract case to refer to the problem
132 See, e.g., Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank ofJohnson
City, 473 U.S. 172, 190-91, 199-200 (1985) (demanding an application for and decisions
about variances prior to deciding a takings claim, because the court must evaluate the
"economic impact" of the challenged regulations to resolve the takings claim).
133 See, e.g., Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 323 (1991) (labeling an unripe First Amend-
ment challenge to a prohibition on party endorsement of candidates abstract, as the stat-
ute did not precisely define what persons or conduct it covered).
134 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180
(2000) (declaring that Article III's case-or-controversy requirement "underpins both our
standing and our mootness jurisprudence"); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520
U.S. 43, 68 n.22 (1997) ("Mootness has been described as 'the doctrine of standing set in a
time frame."' (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States Parole Comm'n
v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980))); see also Bandes, supra note 73, at 228 (noting that
"[w]hen determining mootness, the Court emphasizes .. .adverse parties with concrete
claims" (footnote omitted)).
135 See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (stating that
mootness occurs when effects of violation have been eradicated and the violation will not
recur).
136 See Fallon, supra note 77, at 28-29 (arguing that in mootness scenarios, "[a]n actual
injury, even if past, continues to frame litigation in a factual context that illuminates and
delimits judicial decisionmaking" (footnote omitted)); Monaghan, supra note 77, at 1384
(cases becoming moot on appeal present a "concrete record illuminated by the adversary
process" (footnote omitted)).
137 See Fallon, supra note 77, at 28-29; cf Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. at 191 (noting
that mootness may entail abandonment of a case at an advanced state).
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of issuing an order that does not change defendant's conduct, be-
cause the defendant does not intend to carry out the acts the order
forbids. 138 Such an order is abstract and remedies only hypothetical
misconductZ The ripeness doctrine tends to avoid such orders by
delaying adjudication until the precise scope of a legal rule or action
becomes clear enough to allow the Court to avoid issuing hypothetical
orders. The mootness doctrine also avoids such orders by allowing
defendant to escape application of an order if it is clear that the mis-
conduct has ceased and will not reoccur. 140
But the Court sometimes recognizes that an order remedying
continuing misconduct may be appropriate, even after the opportu-
nity to redress the plaintiffs injury has passed. For that reason, the
Court has carved out an exception to the mootness doctrine for al-
leged misconduct "capable of repetition, yet evading review.' 41 This
exception supports the idea that an order remedying misconduct can
be concrete, even though it does not remedy any specific injury before
the Court.
1 42
The availability of judicial review not remedying the injury of a
party before the Court suggests that Article III does not require injury-
in-fact. 143 But the Court's standing jurisprudence emphatically de-
nies that idea.
14 4
This Article focuses upon abstraction and concreteness in resolu-
tion of the merits, rather than in the content of remedial orders. But
138 See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 632-33 (1979) (characteriz-
ing a decision about hiring practices that have been abandoned as an "'advisory opinion[ I
on abstract propositions of law'" (quoting Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969))); cf.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. at 189 (stating that a case is moot only if defendant meets a
"heavy burden of persuad[ing]" a court that violations will not recur) (quoting United
States v. Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968) (alteration in original)).
139 See, e.g., Davis, 440 U.S. at 632-33.
140 See, e.g., id. at 631-32 (state had stopped using invalid civil service exam); Allee v.
Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 810-11 (1974) (holding that cessation of wrongful conduct does
not moot a case if "there is a possibility of recurrence" (citations omitted)).
141 S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911); see
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603 (1982); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 125 (1973) (holding that abortion rights can be adjudicated after woman was no
longer pregnant, because women can become pregnant more than once and gestation is
so short that timely review is nearly impossible).
142 See Monaghan, supra note 77, at 1384-85 (arguing that "[t]he mootness cases serve
to confirm the demise of the personal interest requirement").
143 I am not the first scholar to question the notion that Article III requires injury in
fact. See, e.g., id. at 1375 (arguing that injury in fact is not a "constitutional prerequisite");
Bandes, supra note 73, at 245-50 (discussing the tension between the mootness doctrine's
flexibility and the concrete adverseness requirement found in the standing doctrine).
144 Cf Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190
(2000) ("[I]f mootness were simply 'standing set in a time frame,' the exception to moot-
ness that arises when the defendant's allegedly unlawful activity is 'capable of repetition,
yet evading review,' could not exist." (quoting Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S.
581, 594 n.6 (1999))).
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completeness requires some attention to the concept of an abstract
case as a case generating abstract orders. And the doctrine allowing
review of cases involving continuing misconduct but no current injury
casts doubt on the hypothesis that the need to avoid hypothetical or-
dersjustifies the injury-in-fact requirement at the heart of this Article's
concerns. 145
C. Formalism and Functionalism
Over time, the Court has tightened justiciability barriers designed
to make litigation more functional by providing concrete contexts for
judgment.t 46 Yet most commentators agree that the modern Court
has become increasingly formalist in its approach to the merits of con-
stitutional cases.
1 47
145 A related problem involves choices about how defendants respond to a holding
that their conduct is illegal. Some responses curing legal defects can remedy injuries,
while others may not. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 272 (1979) (state can respond to
holding that denial of a benefit is discriminatory either by offering the benefit to the ex-
cluded class or by denying the benefit to all).
146 See Pushaw, supra note 63, at 496 (suggesting that Court has converted ripeness
doctrine from a discretionary doctrine to a constitutional barrier); see also, e.g., Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-62, 571-78 (1992) (invalidating, for the first time,
a congressional grant of standing and requiring a detailed showing of injury).
147 See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits of Fonmalism, 1997
SuP. CT. REv. 199, 200 (describing the Court's opinion in Printz as "decidedly formalist");
Erwin Chemerinsky, Getting Beyond Formalism in Constitutional Law: Constitutional Theory Mat-
ters, 54 OKLA. L. Rav. 1, 2 (2001) (arguing that "the continuing allure of formalism domi-
nates constitutional law"); Andrew S. Gold, Formalism and State Sovereignty in Printz v.
United States: Cooperation By Consent, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 247, 247 (1998) (describ-
ing Printz as replacing functionalism with "structural formalism" in the "state sovereignty
context"); Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U.
CoLo. L. REv. 1395, 1395 (1999) ("Since the end of the Cold War, courts have once again
begun to craft [foreign relations] doctrines in formalistic terms . . . ."); Peter P. Swire,
Note, Incorporation of Independent Agencies into the Executive Branch, 94 YALE L.J. 1766, 1766
(1985) (arguing that "the new formalism" challenges the "functionalist approach"). But see
Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHi. L. REv.
1089, 1094 (2000) (characterizing the Court's affirmative and dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence as "cast[ing] aside the categories and methods of 'formalism' and 'real-
ism'"); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Comment, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 109 HARV. L. REV. 78, 94 (1995) (detecting a trend toward functional analysis in
recent separation of powers cases).
This does not mean that every decision of the Court falls into the formalist category.
No judge or court is completely free of either functionalist or formalist considerations. See,
e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, A Paradox Without a Principle: A Comment on the Burger Court'sJuris-
prudence in Separation of Powers Cases, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1083, 1087-88 (1987) (arguing that
the Burger Court followed an "originalist methodology" in cases testing the limits of con-
gressional power, while emphasizing functional "policy considerations" in cases involving
presidential actions); Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controver-
sies, 74 VA. L. REv. 1253, 1255 (1988) (noting that the Court has not adopted a "uniform
approach to separation of powers questions"); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Ap-
proaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488,
489 (1987) (arguing that "[ t]he Supreme Court has vacillated over the years between using
a formalistic approach . . . and a functional approach" in certain separation of powers
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A formalist approach emphasizes the use of formal legal rules ar-
ticulated at a high level of abstraction to resolve cases. 148 The Clinton
case discussed in this Article's Introduction provides an example.
While formalists often claim that the text of legal documents (such as
the Constitution) creates the rules they apply,1 49 formalist reasoning
can sometimes create rules noticeably at odds with text. 150 The lead-
ing contemporary example of formalist reasoning departing from text
comes from the Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence. 15' The
text of the Eleventh Amendment bars diversity suits by a citizen of one
state against another state in federal court. 152 The text does not limit
suits in state court or suits brought by a citizen against her own
state. 153 Notwithstanding the lack of explicit textual limitation, the
Court has held that the Constitution bars suits in state courts, and that
it does so even if the plaintiff is a citizen of the defendant state.
1 54
cases); cf E. Donald Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, The Constitution,
and the Legislative Veto, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 125, 125-26 (discussing tension between "ab-
stract formulas" and consideration of "practical effects" in constitutional law).
148 See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 5-6
(1960) (discussing the "Formal Style" ofjudicial reasoning prevalent in the late nineteenth
century); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LosT WORLD OF CLASsICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND
IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886-1937, at 123-64 (1998) (discussing the formalist style and
ideology of the "Lochne?' period).
149 See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 147, at 132 (suggesting that the formalist Chadha opinion
incorrectly asserts that the framers defined legislative, executive, and judicial powers in the
Constitution).
150 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992) (stating that the Tenth
Amendment's limits on congressional power are not derived from the Amendment's text).
151 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (forbid-
ding private damage actions against the states under the Americans with Disabilities Act);
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91-92 (2000) (holding state immune from suit
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754
(1999) (invalidating enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act by a private individual
against his own state in state court); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 669 (1999) (invalidating federal abrogation of state immunity
from private suit for false and misleading advertising); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 691 (1999) (invalidating federal abrogation
of state immunity from private suit for patent infringement); Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 58-59 (1996) (striking down an order that Florida negotiate with the Semi-
nole Indian tribe under the Indian Gaming Act). See generally Symposium, State Sovereign
Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 817 (2000).
152 See U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (text of the Eleventh
Amendment "would appear to restrict only" federal court diversity jurisdiction); cf Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (extending the Amendment's bar to suits by citizens of the
defendant state in federal court). See generally Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Elev-
enth Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 9-13 (1988) (exploring the
Amendment and its interpretation prior to the recent development of still broader sover-
eign immunity).
153 See U.S. CONsT. amend. XI.
154 See supra note 151.
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The formal legal rule from which the Court derives this result
simply provides that states retain their sovereignty. 155 The Court pur-
ports to derive this state sovereignty rule from the structure and his-
tory of the Constitution, not from the text of the Eleventh
Amendment.1 56 And the rule of state sovereign immunity has been
controversial among legal scholars. 157 Nevertheless, the rule of state
sovereign immunity stems from formalist reasoning, which derives re-
sults from broad abstract principles.
158
Functionalists tend to have a more pragmatic bent. They express
skepticism about the capacity of "[g]eneral propositions" to decide
"concrete cases," in the words of Justice Holmes. 159 They believe that
the resolution of cases involves some element of judgment in which
an appreciation of the consequences of rulings should play a promi-
nent role.
160
In the separation of powers area, Justice Jackson's concurrence in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawye'y6 1 provides a paradigmatic ex-
ample of the functionalist approach. 1 62 In contrast, Justice Black's
opinion for the majority' 63 exemplifies a formalist approach. 164
In Youngstown, the Court rejected President Truman's seizure of
steel mills in support of the Korean war effort on separation of powers
grounds. 165 Justice Black offered a formalist reason to reject the Presi-
155 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 713 (describing sovereign immunity as a fundamental attri-
bute of state sovereignty predating the Constitution); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (every
state is sovereign and immunity from suit is an inherent part of sovereignty).
156 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 713 (declaring the term "Eleventh Amendment immunity" a
"misnomer" because the immunity comes from history, structure, and precedent, not the
Amendment's text).
157 See, e.g., State Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 151.
158 The Court has not limited formalist reasoning to sovereign immunity cases. These
cases employ the same sort of formalism that Professor Caminker has noted in the state
sovereignty case of Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). See Caminker, supra note
147, at 200-01. Like the Printz decision, sovereign immunity cases exhibit "doctrinal for-
malism"-the formation of a categorical rule that does not admit of "any case-by-case bal-
ancing". See id. at 200. They also employ "interpretive formalism," in that "'essential
postulates'" (i.e., state sovereignty implies sovereign immunity) drive the reasoning. See id.
at 201 (quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at 918).
159 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting), overruled by
W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
160 See Elliott, supra note 147, at 125-26 (discussing tradition of considering practical
effects in resolving separation of powers issues); cf Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science
and Science in Law, 12 HARv. L. REv. 443, 462 (1899) (declaring that "different rights ...
stand on different grounds").
161 343 U.S. 579, 634-55 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
162 See Swire, supra note 147, at 1768 (associating Justice Jackson's Youngstown concur-
rence with a major shift to functionalism).
163 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 582-89.
164 See Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown's Shadows, 19 CONST. COMMENT.
87, 88 (2002) (explaining that constitutional law textbooks use the majority opinion as an
example of formalist reasoning and the concurrences as examples of functionalism).
165 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 585-89.
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dential seizure. Since Congress did not authorize the seizure, the
President could not carry it out.166 The President's executive power
did not justify the seizure, because he had not executed any law
passed by Congress. 167 Hence, the seizure violated separation of
powers.
Justice Jackson provided a more functional and contextual ratio-
nale for the same result.' 68 He offered a rather fluid framework for
analysis, under which presidential power would be "at its lowest ebb"
when Congress seemed to disapprove of his actions. 169 Because Con-
gress rejected granting the power to seize plants in debates about la-
bor legislation, Justice Jackson rejected the seizure.170 Justice Jackson
suggested, however, that the case might be stronger for presidential
authority if Congress were silent about the matter before the Court,
and would be quite strong if Congress approved of his actions.
17'
Hence, Justice Jackson grounded his functionalist opinion upon con-
textual constitutional judgment, whereas Justice Black relied upon a
categorical rule.
This tendency toward formalist-merits adjudication raises ques-
tions about justiciability doctrines that aim to provide context for ad-
judication. Since formalists do not need or benefit from context,
increasing use of formalist merits analysis might indicate less of a need
forjusticability barriers aimed at providing a context. Conversely, one
might argue that the justiciability doctrines raise questions about for-
malist merits adjudication that ignores context. If concrete context is
essential to adjudication, as the justiciability case law suggests, then
perhaps the courts should focus on concrete context, rather than for-
malist postulates, in adjudicating the merits.
D. Models of Abstraction and Concreteness
While scholars and courts seem virtually unanimous in their
stated desire to avoid abstraction and embrace concreteness,
17 2
neither defines these concepts.173 A model, however, will help clarify
common understandings of concreteness.
166 See id.; cf Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 586-87 (1985)
(identifying formalism with "reliance on formal categories"); Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme
Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 IARv. L. REv. 4, 21 (1996) (stat-
ing that "[r]easons are by their nature abstractions").
167 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 585-89.
168 See id. at 634-55 (Jackson, J., concurring).
169 Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
170 See id. at 639 (Jackson, J., concurring).
171 See id. at 635-37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
172 See supra note 11.
173 Cf Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 297 (1979) (stating
that "[t]he difference between an abstract question and a 'case or controversy' is ... not
discernible by any precise test").
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Concreteness involves contextualized judgment. It often means
that facts influence results, not just theories. 174 Facts tend to influ-
ence judgments because they evoke a somewhat visceral response. 175
This need not mean that the decisionmaker eschews thought. 176 But
it does mean that shared intuitions about justice cause an emotional
response to certain facts.
1. The Private Law Model
Trials before juries probably offer the best example of concrete
judgments. Juries deciding, for instance, whether a defendant's injury
constitutes a disability entitling him to compensation under a disabil-
ity insurance policy must make ajudgment about a specific set of facts.
People have experience with jobs. 1 77 Their view of whether a particu-
lar ailment disables somebody reflects a concrete judgment about
whether the disability might make it unduly difficult or impossible to
perform a job. 1
78
The case of Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth,179 an early fore-
runner of the modern standing doctrine, shows that the Court accepts
something like the model of concreteness I have identified. 180 In that
case, the Court upheld the Declaratory Judgment Act, finding the is-
sue of an insured's disability sufficiently concrete to justify adjudica-
tion at the behest of the insurance company (rather than the
claimant). 181 This holding suggests that the Court considers a case
174 See Sunstein, supra note 166, at 20-21 (associating concrete judgments with mini-
mal reasoning).
175 See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Juiy and Empathy: The Problem of Worthy and
Unworthy Victims, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 343, 354 (2003) (discussing the effects of "concrete"
facts regarding a victim on juries and finding a correlation between such concrete data and
sentencing outcomes).
176 See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF
EMOTIONS 1-7 (2001) (explaining that emotions reflect beliefs and values); Dan M. Kahan
& Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269,
282-293 (1996) (same).
177 See, e.g., N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 17 So. 2d 879, 882-83 (Ala. Ct. App. 1943)
(suggesting that jurors understand the duties of a receptionist, and thus expert opinion of
a doctor regarding alleged disability should not have been admitted), rev'd on other grounds,
17 So. 2d 883 (Ala. 1944); cf Conley v. Allegheny County, 200 A. 287, 293-94 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1938) (disallowing expert testimony, because understanding of the limitation on ability
to compete in labor market for people with obviously damaged organs is common
knowledge).
178 Cf., e.g., Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Davis, 164 So. 86, 89 (Ala. 1935) (holding
that a doctor may not testify about capacity of laborer with loss of one arm to do work, as
this "invade[s] the province of . . . [the] jury in dealing with matters of common
knowledge").
179 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
180 See id. at 240-41 (commenting that the controversy in question must be "definite
and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests").
181 See id. at 239-42.
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concrete when the judgment required rests upon an examination of
the parties' experience.
In private law litigation, resolution of the merits usually requires
some assessment of both the plaintiffs and defendant's experience. 182
In tort and contract, for example, the plaintiff must show injury and
that the defendant breached a duty in order to recover more than
nominal damages.183 Thus, juries deciding these cases focus upon
facts and experience for the most part. 1 4
2. Concreteness in Public Law
Judges and scholars see a range of abstraction in public law cases.
Such cases involve a mixture of formalist and functional elements.1 85
Decisions heavily influenced by the litigants' experience might ap-
proximate jury trials in concreteness, whereas cases relying more
upon logical syllogism appear abstract. 18 6
The Court has suggested that facts framing the issues, sharpening
arguments, and clarifying the consequences of public law decisions
make such decisions concrete. 8 7 This idea of facts serving three func-
tions appears to be based on a private law model.18 8 In a jury trial
involving disability, for example, the facts would clarify the conse-
quences of the decision, frame the issue, and form the grist for the
closing argument. Indeed, the typical jury decision focuses largely
upon how to characterize the experience of the litigant. Ajury might
ask, for example, whether the back pain the litigant experienced
made it impossible to do a job. Even if the facts perform only one or
two of the three functions in a public law case, then perhaps such a
case nonetheless becomes more concrete than a case like Clinton, in
which facts about the litigants' experience were almost wholly irrele-
182 See Fiss, supra note 39, at 17 (describing a private law model which posits a judge
observing the two parties, plaintiff and defendant, and deciding which individual is right
and which is wrong).
183 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 346 (1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 281 (1965); cf Fiss, supra note 39, at 22 (noting that the private law model relies
upon "[t]he concept of a wrongdoer").
184 See Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 1311,
1313 (2002) (describing tort adjudication as focused upon "the harm to plaintiff").
185 See supra note 147 .
186 Cf Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 586-87 (1985) (link-
ing reliance upon formal categories and abstraction to formalism and contrasting abstrac-
tion with "practical attention to substance").
187 See supra text accompanying note 72.
188 Many scholars have noted the private law model's influence on public law. See, e.g.,
Bandes, supra note 73, at 229 (noting that the implicit acceptance of the private rights
model leads to a failure to address "collective rights and collective harms"); Fallon, supra
note 88, at 20-23 (linking standing requirements to the "private-rights face" of Marbury v.
Madison); Fiss, supra note 39, at 17 (sketching a private dispute resolution model);
Monaghan, supra note 77, at 1365-66 (tracing a private rights model of public law to Mar-
bury v. Madison).
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vant, but remains less concrete than a typical jury trial in a private law
case. 189
One can see this model of concreteness (and abstraction) at work
in the famous debate about neutral principles. Herbert Wechsler crit-
icized Brown v. Board of Education's'9 0 principle that separate is inher-
ently unequal for its lack of neutrality.' 9 ' He argued that Supreme
Court decisions should rest upon abstract "neutral principles" that
would apply to all cases and make sense regardless of context.
92
Many scholars, however, have praised Brown as an appropriate re-
sponse to the facts of desegregation. 193 And these commentators call
for greater judicial responsiveness to the experience of litigants in
public law cases.
194
While almost all scholars claim to favor concrete cases, 19 5 the in-
fluence of Wechsler's neutral principles idea should caution us to take
this claim with a grain of salt. For Wechsler's idea seems to reject the
kind of contextualized judgment that the private law model sug-
gests.1 96 Wechsler asks the Court to develop a general rule, which
might be articulated at a high level of abstraction. 197 And he asks the
Court to test that rule by imagining how it might apply in future hypo-
thetical cases not presently before the Court.198
189 Cf Tushnet, supra note 77, at 1708 (defining abstract cases as those litigated "in the
absence of good information about the operation of the challenged legal rule in the real
world" (footnote omitted)).
190 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
191 See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 19, 31-35 (1959).
192 See id. at 19 (arguing that reasons must "in their generality and their neutrality
transcend any immediate result that is involved").
19- See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness As Property, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1709, 1750 (1993)
(stating that Brown appropriately recognized that segregation subordinated blacks).
194 See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1985) (arguing that while proponents of neutrality believe that it
supports equality, neutrality in fact can harm equality).
195 See generally Frederick Schauer, The Generality of Rights, 6 LEGAL THEORY 323, 324-28
(2000) (discussing strong support for the concept of concrete individual cases among legal
realists, and their distrust of abstraction).
196 Exposition of common law principles apart from jury trials may also involve ele-
ments of abstraction. See, e.g., 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *379-80 (arguing
that "[i]t is wisely therefore ordered, that the principles and axioms of law, which are
general propositions, flowing from abstracted reason, . . . should be deposited in the
breasts of the judges, to be occasionally applied to such facts as come properly ascertained
before them").
197 See Wechsler, supra note 191, at 15 (insisting on grounds of "adequate neutrality
and generality").
198 See id. (arguing that principles in cases must be "tested not only by the instant
application but by others that the principles imply"). Cf Mark V. Tushnet, Following the
Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781,
809-10 (1983) (expressing doubt about judicial. capacity to imagine all future cases in
which an announced principle might apply).
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The simple model of a highly contextualized private law jury case
leads the Court to conclude that public law should enjoy at least some
of the concreteness this model suggests.199 This private law model
helps explain why the justiciability doctrines governing public law
cases reflect a view that facts provide a valuable context that defines
issues, leads to good clear arguments, and makes plain the conse-
quences of the decision the Justices must make.200 This view amounts
to the creation of a public law model of concreteness-a vision of how
factual context will influence public law merits decisions-derived
from a private law model of concreteness.
While the private rights model sketched above helps make sense
of the decision to make "injury-in-fact," rather than invasion of a legal
interest, the basis of standing, I do not claim that this model exhausts
possible understandings of concreteness and abstraction. 20' Indeed, I
have already pointed out that the case law also reflects a concept of
remedial concreteness, with cases producing judicial orders that pre-
vent real actions, not just hypothetical ones. Other conceptions are
possible as well. But the conception I offer provides an adequate vehi-
cle for exploring the concreteness paradox and captures important
elements of the Court's understanding of concreteness. In the next
Part, I examine whether the application of standing doctrine has pro-
duced the sort of concreteness the Court seeks for public law through
its standing jurisprudence.
199 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100 (1968) (citing the private law Aetna case to
justify a standing requirement aimed at avoiding abstractness as it decides whether to adju-
dicate a public law establishment clause claim). Similarly, Baker v. Car- referred to a case
demanding a trial in a common law action to justify its demand for "concrete adverseness."
369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (quoting Liverpool N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Emigration Comm'rs,
113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)). The Liverpool Court declined to adjudicate a common law assump-
sit action. Liverpool, 113 U.S. at 34-39. This private law action raised a public law issue, the
constitutionality of a congressional enactment authorizing collection of "head monies." Id.
at 36. The Court insisted that a trial must establish a link between the private law action
and the public law issue sought to be adjudicated, by showing that the Steamship Company
had collected "head monies" under color of state law, rather than taking money for some
other purpose. Id. at 39. The Court remanded the case for a new trial on that issue. Id.
200 See id. at 100 (linking desire for concreteness to clear definition of issues); Valley
Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,
472 (1982) (claiming that the injury requirement tends to make the "consequences of
judicial decision" clear to the Court); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.- 186, 204 (1962) (linking
"concrete adverseness" to sharp presentation of issues). All of these features of a concrete
case evolved from the F/ast Court's concern with abstractness, and thus its implicit refer-
ence to the private law model in Aetna. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 100.
201 See, e.g., Bickel, supra note 74, at 53 (suggesting that for an absolutist, a bare mini-
mum of facts make a case concrete); Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REv.
633, 650 (1995) (suggesting a very closely related ideal of concreteness, that of common
law decision-making by judges).
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II
DOES THE INJURY REQUIREMENT MAKE ADJUDICATION OF
THE MERITS CONCRETE?
Most commentators say little about the Court's view that the
standing requirement makes litigation more concrete. The few com-
mentators who have said something about it disagree among them-
selves. Alexander Bickel and Cass Sunstein, for example, make
conflicting claims, with Bickel claiming that standing makes litigation
more concrete 20 2 and Sunstein denying it.203 They both seem to take
the correctness of their views for granted, with little supporting analy-
sis.204 Mark Tushnet states that "[i] t is... entirely unclear that stand-
ing rules add anything to the concreteness of the case." 205 While he
provides analytical support for this view, he does not systematically ex-
amine the relationship between injury and the merits in a large sam-
ple of cases, as this Article does.
20 6
202 See BICKEL, supra note 11, at 115.
203 See Sunstein, supra note 107, at 1448.
204 Professor Sunstein relies upon a single case, Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972), to support this view and provides only conclusory analysis of that case. See Sun-
stein, supra note 107, at 1448. He does not consider other cases that might support or
contradict his view. In fairness, though, his remark on this point constitutes a small part of
a much larger argument. See id. at 1432-34 (outlining a broad thesis about the Court's
failure to embrace a public law model and the need to repudiate Article III as a basis for
standing requirements).
The cases Professor Bickel mentions do not support his conclusion that standing re-
quirements make litigation more concrete. For example, Bickel explains that standing did
not exist in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936), but did exist in
Tennessee Electric Power Co., v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 306 U.S. 118 (1939). See BICKEL,
supra note 11, at 119-20. In both cases, petitioners sought to litigate constitutional ques-
tions regarding congressional authority to create the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).
See Tenn. Elec., 306 U.S. at 134-35; Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 317, 319. Bickel explains that the
Ashwander plaintiffs, stockholders in the Alabama Power Company, which had a contract
with the TVA, experienced no injury while the Tennessee Electric Power Co. experienced
an injury as a competitor. See BICKEL, supra note 11, at 119-21. But Bickel does not show
that a competitor's suit would create a more valuable context for a decision about the
TVA's constitutionality than that of stockholders in a company with which the TVA had a
contract. Both fact patterns would illustrate something about the actualities of the TVA
that the Court might consider in a case about the TVA's constitutionality. The contract
giving rise to the Ashwander case directly related to the TVA's allegedly unconstitutional
activities, creating and selling electric power. See Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 315 (explaining
that contract involved sale of transmission line and substations, sale of TVA's electric
power, and agreements about the service area); cf Tenn. Elec., 306 U.S. at 136 (noting that
sale of electricity gave rise to appellant's claim). Indeed, the concrete context that the
Ashwander contract provided narrowed the issue under review, notwithstanding the lack of
injury to the petitioners. See Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 326 (defining issue in terms of the
constitutionality of construction of the Wilson Dam and the sale of energy from that dam
alone); cf Tenn. Elec., 306 U.S. at 136 (defining issue as the constitutionality of federal sale
of electricity, not just electricity from a single dam, at wholesale ratesA,
205 See Tushnet, supra note 77, at 1714.
206 See id. at 1714-16.
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This Part offers an extensive review of the case law to see whether
Bickel or Sunstein and Tushnet have the better argument. As we shall
see, Sunstein and Tushnet's view that standing does not contribute to
concreteness proves correct in most instances, but Bickel's contrary
vision properly characterizes some significant cases.
A. Cases Not Explicitly Linking Injury to the Merits
In three very important classes of cases-administrative law cases,
facial constitutional challenges based on individual rights, and struc-
tural constitutional litigation-explicit linkages between injuries and
merits adjudication seldom arise. The requirement of injury-in-fact in
such cases usually does nothing to make litigation more concrete.
1. Administrative Law Cases
In the leading contemporary standing case, Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife,2 07 the Court rejected a challenge to a rule refusing to apply
the consultation requirements of the Endangered Species Act of 1973
to overseas projects. 20 The Court held that plaintiffs who had indi-
cated only vague intentions to visit the places whence endangered spe-
cies might vanish lacked injury-in-fact sufficient for standing, even
though they had visited these places in the past.
20 9
Justice Stevens' concurrence, approving of standing, but ruling
against Defenders of Wildlife on the merits, clearly shows that injury
would not have "illuminated"21 0 the merits in any way.2 1 ' Justice Ste-
vens explained that congressional intent governs the question of the
Endangered Species Act's extraterritoriality.2 1 2 Accordingly, Justice
Stevens' merits analysis never mentions the injuries he found suffi-
cient for standing. 2 13 He rests his analysis upon case law's presump-
tion against extraterritorial application of a statute,2 1 4 the lack of
explicit statutory language pointing overseas, 2 15 the position of imple-
menting agencies, 2 16 the statute's structure,2 1 7 and its general pur-
pose.2 18 Because the intent of Congress governed the question,
207 504 U.S. 555 (1992); see William W. Buzbee, Standing and the Statutoy Universe, 11
DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 247, 252 (2001) (characterizing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife as
the "base text" of modern standing law).
208 See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 557-58, 578.
209 See id. at 562-64; id. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
210 See supra text accompanying note 47.
211 See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 585-89 (Stevens, J., concurring).
212 See id. at 585 (Stevens, J., concurring).
213 See id. at 585-89 (Stevens, J., concurring).
214 Id. at 585-86 (Stevens, J., concurring).
215 Id. at 586 (Stevens, J., concurring).
216 Id. at 587 (Stevens, J., concurring).
217 Id. at 588 (Stevens, J., concurring).
218 Id. at 588-89 (Stevens, J., concurring).
[Vol. 89:808
STANDING FOR NOTHING
subsequent experience and injury to aggrieved parties, no matter how
concrete or dramatic, was quite irrelevant to the merits.
This disconnect between injury and merits does not come from
some quirk in Justice Stevens' analysis. A majority of the Court em-
ployed a similar approach with equally little reference to injury in
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian American Oil Co.
219
In that case, an alleged victim of racial discrimination by an Arabian
American Oil Company subsidiary in Saudi Arabia, a person with obvi-
ous standing, asked the Court to apply Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
abroad. 220 The Court's analysis in subsequent extraterritoriality cases,
some of which employ a weaker presumption against territoriality,
make equally little reference to injuries.
221
The lack of linkage between the merits and standing in Defenders
of Wildlife does not stand alone. Rather, this pattern prevails in almost
all cases litigating the question of whether agency action conforms to
a governing statute. 222 Indeed, in the overwhelming majority of statu-
tory administrative law cases that come before the Court in which
standing is litigated, injuries have no impact on the merits, and there-
fore no impact on the concreteness of the merits litigation. I use the
term "statutory administrative law cases" to refer to cases in which the
principal claim is that an agency action conflicts with a governing stat-
ute, as opposed to a claim that the agency's reasons for its exercise of
219 499 U.S. 244 (1991), superseded by statute as stated in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511
U.S. 244, 251 (1994).
220 See id. at 246-47.
221 For an overview of extraterritoriality, see William S. Dodge, Understanding the Pre-
sumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEYJ. INr'L L. 85, 85-89 (1998) and James E.
Ward, Comment, "Is That Your Final Answer?" The Patchwork Jurisprudence Surrounding the
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 715, 717-29 (2002).
222 See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
176 (2000) (describing merits claim that polluter exceeded permit limits, a claim which
does not require proof of harm to anyone); Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871,
875-79 (1990) (describing claim that "'land withdrawal review program'" violated the Fed-
eral Land Policy and Management Act and the National Environmental Policy Act); Bryant
v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980) (evaluating claim about the application of reclamation laws
to certain lands through statutory construction with no reference in the merits analysis to
the injuries of the farmers bringing suit); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 730 & n.2
(1972) (describing legal claims about planned ski resort in the Mineral King Valley that
almost surely would have been resolved with no reference to injuries); cf Andrus v. Allard,
444 U.S. 51, 55-64 (1979) (failing to consider injury to plaintiffs, but using the specifics of
their actions to frame the statutory issue of whether the Secretary of Interior may bar the
sale of parts of birds killed before federal protections applied to the birds). Compare Fed.
Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 21 (1998) (holding that the respondents' injury
conferring standing stemmed from their inability to obtain information that would help
them evaluate candidates for public office), with Akins v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 101 F.3d
731, 740-44 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (engaging in merits analysis without reference to
the litigants' injuries, focusing instead on the interpretation of the term'political commit-
tee" in a disclosure statute in light of First Amendment concerns), vacated by 524 U.S. 11
(1998).
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discretion are arbitrary and capricious or not supported by substantial
evidence. 22
3
The Supreme Court's response to claims that agency action was
either arbitrary and capricious or not supported by substantial evi-
dence uses the agency record to provide the context for decision.224
Parties play a role in creating this record through their comments and
submissions. Although these comments can document the parties'
potential injuries, they often focus more generally on the effects of
agency action on the public or its interaction with pertinent public
policies. Very often arbitrary and capricious review does not directly
address the injuries parties expect to incur because of the challenged
action. 225 But sometimes facts about the petitioner's projected future
223 In practice, litigants and courts often combine these types of claims. See Arent v.
Shalala, 70 F.3d 610, 616 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In principle, however, they are somewhat
separable. See 42 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (authorizing reversal of agency action that is "arbi-
trary and capricious" or "otherwise not in accordance with law" (emphasis added)). Con-
trary-to-law claims assert that agency actions conflict with the statute. Cf FEC v.
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 39 (1981) (associating "contrary to
law" claim with statutory interpretation). Arbitrary and capricious claims, by contrast, do
not assert that the substantive statutory provision governing the agency action at issue pro-
hibits the particular action taken, but rather suggest that the reasons behind the agency's
decision were arbitrary and capricious. See, e.g., Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Nat'l Highway
Traffic Safety Comm'n, 45 F.3d 481, 484-86 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (upholding decision as ade-
quately reasoned). Resolution of a contray-to-law claim could, in theory, foreclose taking
the prohibited action. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 529 U.S. 120
(2000) (holding that the FDA may not regulate tobacco). Resolution of an arbitrary and
capricious claim, however, allows the agency to take the same action again, if the agency
provides a reasonable justification the second time around. See Competitive Enter. Inst., 45
F.3d at 484-86 (upholding agency reaffirmance of a rule previously set aside under the
arbitrary and capricious standard).
These categories, however, tend to blend. See Arent, 70 F.3d at 616 n.6 (discussing
overlap between the doctrines dealing with unreasonable statutory interpretation and arbi-
trary and capricious decisions); see, e.g., Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726,
731 (1998) (noting that complaint alleged that the agency's actions were both contrary to
the authorizing statute as well as arbitrary and capricious).
224 See Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167-69 (1962)
(holding that any review of agency action must be based on the record before the agency,
not "post hoc rationalizations"); cf Ohio Forestry Ass'n, 523 U.S. at 736-37 (expressing view
that review of site-specific plans would offer more concrete context for review than a plan
for an entire national forest).
225 See, e.g., United States v. Fior D'Italia, Inc., 536 U.S. 238, 246-48 (2002) (resolving
complaint about aggregation method's tendency to overestimate a restaurant's Federal In-
surance Contribution Act obligation for tip income, although restaurant did not claim
injury from overestimation in its case); Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360,
378-85 (1989) (engaging in arbitrary and capricious review regarding agency's decision
not to prepare supplemental environmental impact statement and discussing only impor-
tance of new information in a scientific study); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46-57 (1983) (adjudicating insurance company challenge
in terms of the agency's rationale for rescinding safety standard, rather than focusing on
the impact on insurance company revenues); Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta,
458 U.S. 141, 169-170 (1982) (upholding regulation authorizing due-on-sale clauses in
federal savings and loan association mortgage contracts with no reference to potential in-
jury to homeowners who signed such contracts); FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad.,
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injury do frame issues for resolution. 226
While cases arising from agency adjudication and enforcement of
rules usually present no serious standing issues, the injuries in these
cases do frequently make merits adjudication concrete. 227 But even in
this context, policy issues arise that make the direct experience of par-
ticipants in agency adjudication irrelevant to merits analysis.22 s
2. Structural Constitutional Law Cases
The line item veto decisions exemplify a category of cases ad-
dressing the structure of government. This category includes separa-
tion of powers cases and federalism cases. 229 The separation of
powers cases address questions regarding the limits of the powers of
various branches of the federal government.23 0 Federalism cases
often address questions regarding the limits of federal power imposed
to preserve a sphere of state sovereignty. 23' In these structural consti-
436 U.S. 775, 802-09 (1978) (upholding FCC decision to "grandfather" in existing cross
ownership to prevent disruption of service in challenge brought by primarily by broadcast-
ers, not the consumers who might experience disruption).
226 See, e.g., Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 113 (1992) (deciding that EPA's issu-
ance of a discharge permit to an Arkansas polluter was not arbitrary and capricious, and in
doing so addressing the relevance of further polluting an already degraded river). I was
able to find only one "arbitrary and capricious" decision in which the Supreme Court de-
cided an issue of standing. Because of this, my analysis of injury's role in the resolution of
arbitrary and capricious claims, see supra note 225, could not employ the technique much
of this Article has used to analyze injuries' role in merits analysis, a comparison of the
injury described for purposes of standing with the Court's analysis of the merits. Instead,
my arbitrary and capricious analysis here infers the nature of the injury that made standing
too obvious to litigate from the party's identity and the nature of the challenged rule.
227 See, e.g., Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 277-79 (1978) (using
criminal charges against a company to frame the issue of whether Congress intended to
apply criminal sanctions to violations of emission standards); Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Aber-
deen & Rockfish R.R. Co., 393 U.S. 87 (1968) (using information about cost structure of
companies to frame issues and reach outcome in adjudication of challenge to ratemaking).
228 See, e.g., NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 794-96 (1990)
(relying upon context provided by a range of NLRB cases and general policies of National
Labor Relations Act to uphold NLRB's refusal to presume that strike replacements are
anti-union).
229 See MICHAELJ. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 37-38
(1982); see, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 452-53 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (noting that the separation of powers and federalism doctrines are relevant in
adjudicating the constitutionality of the line item veto); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (holding that Congress cannot compel states to dispose of radioactive
wastes).
230 See PERRY, supra note 229, at 49; see, e.g., Clinton, 524 U.S. 417 (adjudicating validity
of executive power to use a line item veto); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989)
(adjudicating validity ofjudicial rulemaking regarding sentencing by analyzing the separa-
tion of powers and nondelegation doctrines, not the experience of criminals under sen-
tencing guidelines); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-59 (1983) (adjudicating the validity
of a veto exercised by only one House of Congress).
231 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000) (holding that Con-
gress's interstate commerce authority does not authorize creation of a federal remedy for
gender-based violence); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding that
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tutional law cases, individual injury almost never significandy influ-
ences the merits.
232
3. Facial Individual Rights Cases
Facial challenges to statutes based upon individual rights claims
also rarely contain express links between injury and result.2 33 Liti-
gants making claims that the government has violated some provision
of the Bill of Rights often have a choice regarding how they frame the
issue for litigation. 234 They may either argue that the statute chal-
lenged is unconstitutional on its face or that it is unconstitutional as
applied to the plaintiffs conduct.23 5 The Court tends to disfavor fa-
cial challenges. 236 Indeed, the Court has often stated that litigants
seeking declarations of facial invalidity must show that no application
of the statute conforms to the Constitution,237 although the Court has
Congress's constitutional grant of authority to regulate interstate commerce does not allow
for federal restrictions on gun possession near schools); New York, 505 U.S. at 156 (noting
that the states maintain a degree of sovereignty despite broad congressional powers);
PERRY, supra note 229, at 38.
232 See, e.g., Clinton, 524 U.S. 417 (barely mentioning injuries of litigants in the merits
analysis section of the opinion); New York, 505 U.S. at 174-76 (holding that offering state a
choice between either taking title to low level radioactive waste or regulating such waste in
a manner dictated by Congress commandeers state government); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 412
(analyzing the case based on history and text of Constitution, not the likely experience of
criminals under sentencing guidelines).
233 See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 320 (2002) (explaining how a particular facial takings claim eliminates the need to
consider "the actual impact of the regulation on any individual"); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455, 459-71, 461 n.5 (1980) (determining whether an ordinance banning certain picket-
ing unconstitutionally discriminates between different types of speech without focusing on
particular type of picketing giving rise to suit).
234 SeeYee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535 (1992).
235 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing,
113 HARv. L. REV. 1321, 1321-23, 1335-39 (2000); see, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct.
1536, 1550 (2003) (noting that respondents were not making an as-applied argument, but
rather were contending that the cross-burning ban was facially invalid); Tahoe-Sierra, 535
U.S. at 320 (noting that the a landowner bringing this takings claim sought a categorical
rule that any moratorium on building constitutes a facial taking); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 379-80 (1992) (teenagers accused of burning a cross on a black family's yard
mounted a facial challenge to the ordinance under which they were charged).
236 See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 736 n.10 (1997) (noting
in the context of takings claims that facial challenges are particularly difficult); United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) ("A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of
course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must estab-
lish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid."). Facial chal-
lenges, however, are more commonly recognized. See Dorf, supra note 96, at 236 (arguing
that the Supreme Court has not actually applied the strict Salerno test to facial challenges);
Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48
Am. U. L. REv. 359, 421-56 (1998) (arguing that the Court's openness to facial challenges
varies with the legal doctrine involved in the challenge).
237 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745; see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301 (1993) (citing
Salerno); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 183 (1991) (same). But see City of Chicago v.
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invalidated statutes facially in many cases in which the litigants have
not made that showing.
238
Judicial opinions addressing facial challenges rarely focus on the
influence of the challenged statute upon the plaintiff.2 39 Rather, they
tend toward abstract general reasoning. 240 When they do consider
concrete situations, they often consider the situations of people other
than the plaintiffs.
241
For example, in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,242 the Court up-
held the standing of arrested plaintiffs to litigate in a class action the
question of whether county post-arrest probable cause determinations
were prompt enough to satisfy Fourth Amendment requirements.
243
One would think that the question of whether a probable cause deter-
mination was sufficiently prompt to satisfy a constitutional require-
ment regarding the reasonableness of searches and seizures might
invite narrow framing in terms of the length of time plaintiffs actually
remained in jail and the reasons for lack of immediate determinations
in the case before the Court. The context the Court considered, how-
ever, comes not from the experience of the named representatives of
the class, but from a "County policy," the content of which is never
resolved in the litigation.244 The Court does not even state how long
the named plaintiffs remained in jail awaiting a probable cause
determination.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 n.22 (1999) (Stevens, J.) (characterizing the Salerno formulation
as dictum).
238 See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 647-48 (1999) (holding the Patent Remedy Act invalid on state sovereign immunity
grounds); Morales, 527 U.S. at 60-64 (holding an anti-loitering statute facially invalid); see
also N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 11 (1988) (noting in the context
of First Amendment cases that a facial challenge may be permitted because of the lack of
any valid application, or because the statute is so broad that it inhibits third parties'
speech).
239 See, e.g., Morales, 527 U.S. at 60-64, 62 n.34 (striking down ordinance with only a
single reference to defendants' experience in a footnote); cf Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 387-91 (1978) (considering plaintiffs injury along with hypothetical injury others
may experience from statute prohibiting marriage without payment of prior child support,
but focusing analysis on state's justification for the statutory restrictions on the right to
marry).
240 See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7-12 (1977) (basing decision to grant aliens
educational benefits upon analysis of level of scrutiny for alienage discrimination under
Equal Protection Clause).
241 See, e.g., Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387 (discussing not only the actual litigant, but also
other persons hypothetically affected by statute).
242 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
243 See id. at 50-52.
244 See id. at 47-48 (noting dispute about whether County policy requires probable
cause determination within seven days or ten days). The Court assumed that the ordi-
nance provided for a "probable cause determination[ ] at arraignment", which implied a
wait of no more than seven days, for "present purposes." Id.
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In the end, the Court issued a ruling based on policy considera-
tions. The majority established a presumption that detention for
longer than forty-eight hours without a probable cause determination
was invalid.245 It established this period as presumptive, rather than
mandatory, in order to implement a policy of "flexibility" to accom-
modate varying state administrative needs.246 Justice Scalia, relying
more heavily upon historical understanding of the Fourth Amend-
ment, advocated a more stringent rule. 247 None of the Justices relied
upon the concrete facts regarding the injuries to named plaintiffs. As
a consequence, it is not clear that the decision offers relief (or a de-
nial of relief) to the named plaintiffs. The opinion, in many respects,
uses a vague hypothetical to announce a general rule, even though
injured plaintiffs brought the action.248
This tendency toward abstraction in facial challenges exists even
when the precise scope of injuries and the factual context they pro-
vide are quite clear. For example, in R.A. V v. City of St. Paul,2 49 the
Court adjudicated a teenager's claim that his arrest for burning a
cross on a black family's yard violated his free speech rights. 250 The
Court's merits discussion, however, paid no attention at all to the
teenager's conduct or precise injury. Rather, the Court focused on
the question of whether the ordinance under which he was charged,
which outlawed fighting words based on race, religion, or gender,
constituted content discrimination. 251 For the cross burner had wisely
framed his case as a facial overbreadth challenge under the First
Amendment, rather than as a challenge to the statute's application to
his appalling conduct. 252
At times, however, injury makes even rulings invalidating entire
statutes more concrete. For example, in Zablocki v. Redhail,253 the
Court invalidated a statute requiring parents to meet their child sup-
port obligations in order to obtain a marriage license. 254 Because the
applicant who brought the case was indigent and thus could not meet
245 See id. at 56-57.
246 See id. at 53-54 (citing need to encourage "'flexibility and experimentation by the
States"' (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 123 (1975)).
247 See id. at 60-70 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (proposing a rule requiring probable cause
determinations within 24 hours absent extraordinary circumstances).
248 This case is not an isolated example. See, e.g., Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesa-
peake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 52-56 (1987) (deciding the issue of whether a citizen
suit lies for wholly past violations, even though the complaint alleged that a polluter re-
mained in violation at the time of trial).
249 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
250 Id. at 379-80.
251 See id. at 380-91.
252 Cf id. at 379-80, 396 (conceding that the conduct involved was both punishable
under other laws and "reprehensible").
253 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
254 See id. at 375, 390-91.
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his child support obligation, the Court analyzed the statute as a sub-
stantial infringement upon the right to marry that was not well sup-
ported by the state's interest in collecting child support.255 Thus, an
injury to a plaintiff can make clear that a statute wholly negates the
right at issue, even though the statute on its face appears merely only
to burden that right. While injury often fails to make facial challenges
concrete, it sometimes concretizes rulings about the validity of a stat-
ute when the Court uses the injury to examine the statute's practical
implications.
B. As-Applied Individual Rights Claims Often Link Injury to the
Merits
Individual injuries often influence resolution of as-applied indi-
vidual rights claims. They often make as-applied challenges somewhat
concrete in several ways. First, the nature of the plaintiff's injury fre-
quently helps frame and limit the issue for resolution. 256 Second, the
Court sometimes uses the facts regarding the litigant's injury to illumi-
nate the consequences of the challenged government action. 257 This
in turn informs the discussion of whether the Court should hold the
government conduct unconstitutional.
Cases involving allegations of police misconduct violating individ-
ual constitutional rights provide a good example of injury informing
the judgment.258 The Court has sometimes denied standing to liti-
gants who, in its view, failed to adequately allege personal injury at the
hands of the police. 259 But in cases in which the Court does reach the
255 See id. at 378, 387-91.
256 See, e.g., Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 479 n.14 (1987) (framing issue of labeling
films "political propaganda" under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 in terms of
potential reputation harm that may befall appellee); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64-68
(1979) (framing takings issue in terms of loss of opportunity to sell artifacts of protected
birds); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280 n.14, 289 (1978) (plurality
opinion) (Powell, J.) (injury of inability to compete for all one hundred places in medical
school leads to framing case in terms of "a line drawn on the basis of race"); Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 821-22 (1975) (examining the particular contents of an advertise-
ment for abortion services to determine if the editor who published it enjoyed First
Amendment protection); Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984, 998 (Ariz. 1998) (using experience of
legislators challenging English-only ballot initiative to illustrate its First Amendment
implications).
257 See, e.g., Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229 & n.4 (1987) (us-
ing the Arkansas Times' situation as perhaps the only publication to pay a tax to show that
the tax unconstitutionally singled out a small group within the press); cf Meese, 481 U.S. at
482-490 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part) (objecting to Court's failure to use facts
presented to prove injury to evaluate effects of Foreign Agents Registration Act upon free
speech).
258 See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 366-367 (1976) (discussing allegations of
police misconduct in resolving the case); Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 804-09, 814-15
(1974) (same).
259 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (finding case-or-contro-
versy requirement unmet in suit for injunctive relief where possibility that respondent
2004]
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merits, it has relied upon documentation of plaintiffs' injuries, at least
in part, to establish a constitutional violation.
260
In other cases, one might say that the injury conferring standing
frames the issue, because the case defines the injury in terms of the
right asserted, rather than the plaintiff's concrete experience. 261 In
these cases, however, we might just as accurately state that the legal
claim defines the injury that creates standing. 262 This understanding
would suggest that the lawyer, not the client's experience, frames the
issue. In such cases, plaintiffs with standing arguably add no concrete-
ness to the litigation; plaintiffs without standing who frame the same
legal issue would present equally concrete or abstract cases.
Some of these cases involve two injuries-the invasion of a third
party's right that the Court focuses upon, and a second, more obvious
injury-in-fact that receives little discussion, because constitutional
standing is obvious. 263 And this injury-in-fact creating constitutional
standing figures not at all in the merits analysis. 264
Surprisingly, facts about injury sometimes have no influence
upon the merits even in as-applied individual rights cases. 265 For ex-
would experience future injury as a result of police practice was speculative; a showing of
past injury was deemed insufficient); cf Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371-73 (expressing doubt that
injuries experienced by the plaintiffs provided sufficient evidence of future harm).
260 See, e.g., Allee, 416 U.S. at 804-808, 814-15 (discussing the experiences of union
members and sympathizers with law enforcement policy of harassment).
261 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (noting that injury may exist "solely by
virtue" of "'invasion"' of statutorily created rights (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973)); see, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410-16 (1991) (finding
that a convicted white defendant's standing to challenge striking of black jurors rests on
the right to a proceeding that appears fair); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 476-78
(1990) (allowing alleged invasion of white litigant's right to have a venire composed of "a
fair cross section of the community" to create standing to challenge constitutionality of
peremptory challenges to strike prospective black jurors (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 526 (1979)); N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1988)
(holding a private club has standing to challenge municipal prohibition based on its "asso-
ciational rights"); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 n.8 (1987) (stating that standing
to challenge disparate sentencing based on the victim's race stems from claim that the state
violated equal protection).
262 See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2423 (2003) (describing rule that in an
equal protection case, the denial of equal treatment itself constitutes injury, so that a show-
ing of denial of a tangible benefit is not required).
263 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 629 (1991) (stating that a
party asserting a right of a third party must also suffer and demonstrate a concrete injury of
her own); see, e.g., Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 432-33 (1998) (plurality opinion) (Ste-
vens, J.) (evaluating discrimination against plaintiffs father and statute's impact on the
plaintiff); Powers, 499 U.S. at 428 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the injury creating
constitutional standing for a white defendant to challenge striking of black jurors stems
from the punishment meted out upon conviction).
264 See Miller, 523 U.S. at 433-45 (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J.) (discussing whether
statute discriminates between unwed citizen fathers and mothers in the transfer of citizen-
ship, with little mention of injury to the plaintiff, the child of an unwed citizen father).
265 See, e.g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 299, 312-14
(1979) (resolving claim that procedures delaying elections unconstitutionally denied sea-
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ample, in Renne v. Geary,26 6 the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to
California's restriction of endorsements in nonpartisan elections on
standing and ripeness grounds.267 The majority explained how await-
ing a challenge by different litigants might add context to the case by
showing "the nature of the endorsement, how it would be publicized,
[and] the precise language" used.268 The Court did not, however, ex-
plain how any of these details would influence the merits of the First
Amendment challenge. 269 Justice White's dissent, in fact, proposed a
resolution of this "as-applied" First Amendment issue that rested upon
an assessment of the state's interest and public forum analysis, not the
facts that the majority believed were necessary to make the case justici-
able.270 A subsequent lower court case also demonstrates the irrele-
vance of the context that the Geary majority found so important, by
employing an analysis similar to Justice White's. 271 And the Supreme
Court itself resolved a similar issue-whether a state may prevent can-
didates for elected judgeships from announcing their views on politi-
cal and legal questions-without reference to any specific censored
statements in Republican Party of Minnesota v. Write.272
sonal farm worker's rights to participate in union election by holding that compulsory
collective bargaining is not a constitutional right, a holding requiring no reference to facts
about the election procedure's influence on farmworker participation); Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166, 171-79 (1972) (focusing upon state action question in mer-
its adjudication with little mention of plaintiffs injury, being denied service as a guest of a
private club on grounds of race).
266 501 U.S. 312 (1991).
267 See id. at 316-24.
268 Id. at 321-22.
269 See id. at 341-42 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also points out that
"[t] he form of future disobedience can only matter in ripeness analysis to the extent that it
bears on the merits of a plaintiffs pre-enforcement challenge." Id. (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
270 See id. at 328, 332-34 (White, J. dissenting); cf id. at 343-49 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (proposing a resolution of the case based on facial overbreadth). Justice White de-
fined the issue as whether the deletion of candidate endorsements from voters' pamphlets
violated the First Amendment. See id. at 328-30 (White, J., dissenting). He found that it
did not, because the voter pamphlet is not a public forum and the state's interest in "im-
partial.., government, prevention of corruption, and the avoidance of the appearance of
bias" sufficiently justified the restriction. See id. at 333 (White, J., dissenting).
271 See Cal. Democratic Party v. Lungren, 919 F. Supp. 1397, 1400-05 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(striking down restriction on party endorsements for candidates of nonpartisan offices as
violative of the First Amendment because it serves no compelling state interest).
272 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (striking down Minnesota rule prohibiting judicial candidates
from announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues as a violation of the First
Amendment). The White dissenters claimed that "the Court's entire analysis has a hypo-
thetical quality" stemming from the unavailability of specific statements from the candidate
to make the litigation more concrete. Id. at 799 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In fact, how-
ever, the Court relied upon injuries that were not part of the case before it to make the
case more concrete. The plaintiff claimed that the rule under review forced him to refrain
from announcing his views on legal and policy issues in a 1998 campaign forjudicial office.
Id. at 769-70. But the injury incurred in 1998 could not create a concrete context for
litigation of the sort sought in Geary, because the plaintiff declined to specify what state-
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Third party standing cases cast doubt on the hypothesis that in-
jured litigants make cases more concrete than as-applied challenges
predicated upon the injuries of others. For these cases show that liti-
gants may make cases more concrete by introducing facts that demon-
strate how challenged practices injure people other than the
litigant.273 For example, defendants seeking to challenge searches or
seizures predicated upon violations of others' privacy rights have used
the facts pertaining to those searches to make litigation more con-
crete.274 The Court's third party standing doctrine has limited crimi-
nal defendants' ability to adjudicate the validity of searches invading
the rights of others,275 but even cases denying standing have become
more concrete because of information about injuries to third parties.
For example, Jack Payner, a criminal defendant, challenged the
validity of a search that uncovered a document that helped prove that
he falsified his income tax return in United States v. Payner.276 The
factual record in the case, presumably developed by Payner's lawyers,
made this allegation quite concrete by demonstrating that IRS agents
had stolen the briefcase of a banker to obtain the key document with-
out obtaining a warrant.277 Indeed, the district court found that the
government counseled its agents to deliberately violate the Fourth
Amendment rights of innocents in order to obtain incriminating in-
ments he wished to make in the 1998 campaign. See id. at 769. The Court, however, cre-
ated some concrete context by referring to the subjects the plaintiff addressed during a
prior campaign for judicial office in 1996. See id. at 771. The plaintiff probably did not
base his complaint on the events of 1996, because the Minnesota Lawyers Professional
Responsibility Board had dismissed an ethics complaint against him under the challenged
rule, see id. at 768-69, which could have created a mootness argument. Arguably, the real
injury in 1998 produced no factual context and the non-injury in 1996 did create useful
context. Cf id. (notwithstanding dismissal of ethics complaint in 1996, candidate withdrew
from that election out of fear of additional complaints). In many other cases, however,
nothing about the plaintiffs concrete experience influences the merits. See supra note 265
and accompanying text.
273 See Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 400 (1998) (stating that a white defendant
would be an effective advocate for excluded black grand jurors).
274 See, e.g., United States v. Padilla, 508 U.S. 77 (1993) (holding that conspirator had
no standing to seek exclusion of evidence seized in violation of co-conspirator's expecta-
tion of privacy); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-06 (1980) (holding that defendant
had no standing to challenge seizure of drugs he placed in another person's purse, since
he had no reasonable expectation of privacy to assert); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S.
83, 86-87, 95 (1980) (repudiating automatic standing for criminal defendants to challenge
seizure of evidence that constitutes "an essential element of the offense charged" obtained
in violation of others' privacy expectations); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 728-32
(1980) (refusing a defendant standing to contest unconstitutional seizure of documents
from another person). This rule has antecedents in earlier cases. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128, 133-40 (1978) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply unless the
contested evidence was seized in violation of the defendant's own constitutional rights).
275 See supra note 274.
276 447 U.S. at 728-29.
277 See id. at 729-30.
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formation about a suspect.2 78 The Supreme Court used this record
and characterization to frame the issue in the case as whether "a fed-
eral court should use its supervisory power to suppress evidence
tainted by gross illegalities that did not infringe the defendant's con-
stitutional rights."2 79 The Court began its analysis with a concrete al-
lusion to the specific facts, stating that "[n]o court should
condone ... this 'briefcase caper.' "280 But the Court concluded that
the importance of "ascertain [ing] the truth in a criminal case" coun-
seled against allowing litigants to assert others' Fourth Amendment
rights, even in this context. 28 1 Payner illustrates that lawyers can de-
velop facts about other people's situations to make litigation more
concrete and implies that even without an injured client, litigation
can become concrete through the development of context. Of
course, Payner's lawyer had a motivation to seek out this information,
since his client faced real jeopardy. But an ideological plaintiff's de-
sire to win her case would likewise motivate her to seek out concrete
facts to help bolster her case. 28 2 So, Payner does support the more
general lesson that noninjured parties, if represented by good lawyers,
can develop factual information making a case concrete. 28 3 In other
types of individual rights litigation as well, injuries to people other
than the plaintiffs can make litigation concrete. 28 4 In general, as-ap-
plied constitutional litigation involves some cases in which individual
injury does make litigation more concrete, but also others in which it
does not.
28 5
278 See id. at 730.
279 Id. at 733. The lower courts agreed that Payner had no protectable privacy interest
in the documents taken from the banker's briefcase. Id. at 732.
280 Id. at 733 (footnote omitted).
281 Id. at 734-36.
282 See Tushnet, supra note 77, at 1708-09, 1713 (suggesting that ideological plaintiffs
with a sufficient interest in the subject matter often will be able to present a sufficiently
detailed factual record).
283 Cf FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(b), 30(a)(1), 31(a)(1), 34(c) (authorizing discovery against
non-parties); cf, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2338-41 (2003) (affirming the
importance of developing context in an equal protection analysis, and then proceeding to
examine a record built by parties and amici that included far more than the particulars of
race relations and student performance at the University of Michigan Law School).
284 See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 56 (1992) (allowing state to assert injury
to excluded jurors); cf Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 433-34 (1998) (plurality opinion)
(StevensJ.) (experience of a hypothetical female central to Court's evaluation of an equal
protection claim alleging discrimination against males).
285 Cf Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72-94 (1978)
(describing for purposes of the merits analysis an injury that is different than the injury
forming the basis for standing); Fiss, supra note 39, at 18 (arguing that in public law, the




The lack of explicit consideration of facts regarding the alleged
injury in the merits portions of an opinion provides evidence that
those facts did not make that case more concrete. But this lack of
explicit consideration does not rule out the possibility of implicit use
of the facts regarding injury to improve the concreteness of judicial
decision-making. Even when the merits portion of an opinion does
not mention the plaintiffs injuries, those injuries might have silently
shaped the case: providing facts that strengthened influential argu-
ments made in the briefs not explicitly mentioned in the opinion, or
elucidating the consequences that motivated the decision. This sub-
part therefore considers the likelihood and probable implications of
this possibility.
If injury silently shaped cases where it had no explicit influence,
this would raise significant issues. Silent influence would suggest that
the judge writing the decision has not been wholly candid in revealing
the grounds for the decision. Indeed, functionalists often suspect that
facts influence even judges who do not mention them, and argue for
increased candor about their influence. 28 6 But this silent influence
would have other, slightly less obvious implications as well.
The failure to mention the relevance of injury to the merits deci-
sion would often influence its precedential scope. For example, let us
imagine that the Justices invalidated the line item veto in Clinton v.
City of New York287 because they were concerned about declining medi-
cal care in New York hospitals that had lost federal funding through
President Clinton's veto. This hypothetical suggests that a veto of line
items for a different purpose, such as highway construction, might
pass muster. But the Court did not provide any reasoning limiting its
holding to the veto of Medicare funding, so this argument should not
fly. The reasons given, not the silent motivation ofjudges, control the
precedential scope of the decision. And the reasons given in Clinton
rule out all line item vetoes. 288
The wisdom and validity of the Clinton decision must rest on an
assessment of the constitutional soundness of an order ruling out all
line item vetoes. Thus, if concrete context is desirable because it aids
sound judgment, as Bickel argues, 289 it failed in that case. If the judg-
ment is sound, it is for reasons having little to do with the injuries to
New York hospitals.
286 See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 147, at 145 (suggesting that the Court's formalist opin-
ion in INS v. Chadha "drives [policy judgments] underground" and arguing for "open and
aboveboard . . . conclusions" regarding the legislative veto's effects).
287 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
288 See supra text accompanying note 25.
289 See supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
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1. Implicit Framing
The above analysis regarding explicit linkages touched upon the
problem of implicit framing. For that analysis did not confine itself to
cases in which the Court explicitly said, "We use the injury to frame
the question before us." Instead, that analysis considered any framing
of issues that in fact corresponded to the scope of an injury that
helped justify standing to be an example of explicit linkage.
But the frequent lack of correspondence between injury and the
framing arising in many cases calls attention to some fundamental is-
sues that need analysis. Injuries do not frame litigation; lawyers and
judges do. 290 Ultimately, the Court determines how to define the is-
sue it addresses in its opinion. 291 Lawyers seek to frame issues in a
manner helpful to their case, and to convince the Court to adopt that
framework.2 92 The possibility of facial challenges to statutes demon-
strates that litigants need not confine their challenges to those appli-
cations that injure only them.293 Even injured litigants can make
ideological choices about which issues to raise. And judges can em-
ploy discretion in deciding how to frame issues as well. 29 4
Lawyers' propensity to frame issues to advantage their clients
does not imply that the wise lawyer will always seek a ruling confined
290 See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535 (1992) (stating that petitioners
largely frame the issue upon which they wish to seek certiorari, but that the Court may
rephrase the question); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (framing issue in
several different ways, with some Justices framing the challenge as facial and some framing
it as an as-applied claim). Professor Isserles has argued that a court's choice about "the
scope of the appropriate invalidation" is "more or less predetermined from the outset." See
Isserles, supra note 236, at 452. But it is not clear that this statement should be taken
literally, for he argues that an integral connection exists between "doctrinal tests" and deci-
sions about "how much of a statute ought to be preserved." Id. This suggests that a court's
view about how much of a statute to preserve might influence doctrinal tests. Regardless,
so many cases involve disputes between Justices about how an issue should be framed, as
was the case in Troxel, that a claim of predetermination seems at best exaggerated: Isserles
himself qualifies it. See id. at 452-53.
291 See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme
Court's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DuKE LJ. 789, 791 (suggesting that the Court could
have, and should have, decided INS v. Chadha on narrower grounds).
292 See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 184, at 1314-15 (discussing how the two sides arguing
a hypothetical takings claim would frame the issue differently, and how the Court in an
actual case with similar facts chose one position over the other); Strauss, supra note 291, at
791-92 (suggesting that none of the lawyers arguing Chadha found a narrow framing of the
issues to be in their clients' interest, and accordingly did not urge the Court to adopt a
narrow approach).
293 Cf Tushnet, supra note 77, at 1712 (arguing that Hohfeldian plaintiffs "can induce
the courts to adjudicate cases in ways that bind future courts and litigants to ... abstract
decisions").
294 See, e.g., Yee, 503 U.S. at 535-37 (acknowledging that the Court has "on occasion
rephrased the question presented" or asked the parties to address an issue not raised, and
subsequently construing the issue before it more narrowly than the petitioner had); Levin-
son, supra note 184, at 1332-75 (discussing how judicial views about the appropriate fram-
ing of a transaction influence constitutional decisions).
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to the context that the client's injury provides. A broad ruling will
encompass the client's injury as well as a narrow one.29 5 And some-
times a wide framing of an issue can help the client.296 In Clinton, a
good argument existed that all line item vetoes were invalid.29 7 It
would be very hard to construct an argument narrowly targeting the
veto of funding for New York hospitals. Furthermore, ideological cli-
ents who have experienced injury may prefer broader frames to get at
the larger problem that really upsets them. And repeat players may
seek rulings not only addressing their injuries, but also resolving all
conceivable problems that might arise in the future. 298 Injury's influ-
ence on framing does not always confine.
2. Consequences
It is impossible to know whether the injuries that justified stand-
ing influence the merits of a case when the Court does not mention
them in its merits analysis. The Clinton case would suggest, however,
that the undisclosed consideration of injuries may occur less fre-
quently than many functionalists might suspect. After all, the Justices
deciding Clinton probably did not care about the hospital's loss of
funds. It is hard to imagine that the case would have gone the other
way if no worthy beneficiary of pork barrel spending had come before
the Court. It seems quite likely that the Court shared the public's
concern about pork barrel spending, exemplified in the Clinton case
by the tax break given to the farmers' cooperative, 299 but simply found
the line item veto inconsistent with the clauses governing legislation
in the Constitution.
30 0
Just as lawyers and judges control the framing of issues before the
court, they also control the introduction and use of facts. Lawyers
with injured clients may place facts regarding these injuries in the re-
cord and use those facts to try to win sympathy. But lawyers with con-
cretely injured clients can choose to argue abstractly about the
constitutional questions, and in cases like Clinton they probably will.
295 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291-92 (1987) (stating that black defen-
dant appealing his own sentence broadly argued that Georgia's capital punishment statute
violated the Equal Protection Clause, because the death penalty applied more often to
black defendants and white murder victims than to white defendants and black murder
victims).
296 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379-80 (1992) (finding in favor of a
teenager who facially attacked the hate speech ordinance under which he was charged
after burning a cross on a black family's lawn).
297 See supra text accompanying notes 24-36..
298 See Frank B. Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 6-7 (2000)
(arguing that "repeat player[s]" have greater incentives than normal litigants to consider
the future precedential value of litigation).
299 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 423-27, 432 (1998).
300 See supra text accompanying notes 24-30.
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Even when lawyers choose to bring up the consequences of the laws or
regulations they wish to challenge, they need not confine themselves
to the injuries their clients have experienced. 30' They can, and often
do, discuss the ramifications for other people or even society as a
whole.3 02 And judges can decide whether the client's context, a
broader context, or no context at all aids wise decision-making. 30 3 So
an injured client offers no guarantee that facts will illuminate the con-
sequences of judicial decisions or influence the arguments of lawyers.
Ultimately, injured clients cannot guarantee concrete merits
litigation.
D. The Structure of Linkage
The evidence so far presented suggests a structure to the pattern
of linkage between injury and the merits. Structural constitutional
cases, significant administrative law cases, and facial challenges predi-
cated upon individual rights rarely become concrete because of a liti-
gant's injury. By contrast, as-applied individual rights challenges
more often use individual injury as a concretizing device.
The failure of injury alone to control the framing or resolution of
issues raises interesting normative and structural questions. It invites
inquiry into the structural reasons for the observed pattern of linkages
between injury and merits analysis. And it raises the normative ques-
tion of whether the facts giving rise to injury should influence the
Court's decisions, and what the Court should do about the possibility
of value flowing from such influence. Analysis of these questions
helps illuminate the structure of public law and the theoretical conse-
quences of the paradox.
III
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
This Part explains why injuries giving rise to standing have so lit-
tle impact upon the merits analysis of most cases and assesses the
broader implications of this failure of the standing requirements to
301 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (noting that a "court's judgment may
benefit others collaterally").
302 For a recent, well-publicized example of such litigation tactics, see Lawrence v.
State, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App. 2001), rev'd sub nom. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472
(2003). As a part of their challenge to Texas's law criminalizing homosexual conduct, the
defendants, both men, raised the issue of whether the law discriminated on the basis of
gender, and specifically discussed how the law would apply to two women. Id. at 357.
303 See Tushnet, supra note 77, at 1723 (arguing that "jurisprudential doctrine" will not
prevent the Court from formulating a broad, abstract rule if it wants to); see, e.g., Thomas v.
Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 590-91 (1985) (considering the broad
context of commercial disputes over data about pesticide ingredients impeding health and




improve the concreteness of litigation. It also analyzes the nature of
public law and its structure to help explain the paradox of injury hav-
ing so little influence on the merits. It then develops the normative
implications of this paradox.
A. The Nature of Public Law
Little doubt exists that a formalist approach to merits adjudica-
tion tends toward abstraction. It does not follow, however, that the
formalist approach constitutes the only or even the most important
reason for injury's failure to produce widespread concreteness in pub-
lic law litigation. A more careful examination of public law's nature is
necessary to see if the tendency to ignore injuries really comes solely
from a formalist reasoning style.
Typically, public law cases become much more abstract than jury
trials. Marbury v. Madison30 4 described judicial review as an exercise in
resolving a conflict of laws claim, laying the Constitution alongside an
Act of Congress to see whether the statute runs afoul of the Constitu-
tion.30 5 Marbury appeared quite abstract to contemporaries steeped in
the norms of the common law. President Jefferson, while not an ob-
jective observer, complained about the abstractness of Marbuy.30 6 But
some degree of abstraction is inherent in determining whether two
laws conflict, especially if one or both are phrased in broad terms.30 7
And abstraction is also inherent in any legal problem that requires a
court to interpret broadly worded grants of power.
We law professors may find this point more difficult to appreciate
than our students do. Because we are quite used to legal analysis
based on logical arguments about whether two propositions set out in
legal documents conflict, such arguments appear more concrete to us
than they might to first-year law students, a jury, or even many trial
judges. But this mode of analysis is inherently more abstract than the
type of contextualized judgment found in a jury trial.30
8
In the public law context, details about the plaintiffs experience
that would lend context to private law adjudication can become irrele-
vant to merits analysis. The Marbury Court adjudicated the question
of whether Secretary of State Madison had breached a legal duty to
304 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
305 See id. at 177-78.
306 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge William Johnson (June 12, 1823), in I
S.C. HIST. & GENEALOGICAL MAG. 3, 9-10 (1900) (referring to Chief Justice Marshall's
"obiter dissertation" in Marbury).
307 Cf Pushaw, supra note 63, at 500 (suggesting that a "'lack ofjudicially discoverable
and manageable standards' seemingly exists in many constitutional clauses" (quoting
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
308 See Schauer, supra note 201, at 658 (arguing that "reason-giving is the kin of abstrac-
tion" and can check "maximal contextualization" and "case-by-case determination [s]").
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make Marbury a Justice of the Peace. 30 9 The Court, however, did not
discuss how much the loss of this commission meant to Marbury, as it
might have had the loss of a commission constituted some kind of tort
giving rise to damages dependent upon the extent of injury.3 10 In-
stead, the Court devoted most of its attention to the question of
whether it had authority to adjudicate Marbury's claim 311 and also
concluded that Madison had breached a duty to Marbury. 3 12 The con-
text that details about Marbury's suffering might have provided be-
came irrelevant.
Something like the Marbury model of constitutional litigation also
applies to a large class of administrative law claims. Many litigants
claim that an agency action, often promulgation of a rule, conflicts
with a governing statute. 31 3 Such a claim requires a court to set the
statute alongside the agency decision to see whether the two conflict.
In this way, claims that an agency action are contrary to law tend to-
ward Marbury-type abstraction.
Therefore, the predominance of conflict of laws questions in pub-
lic law often makes injuries to litigants irrelevant to the resolution of
the merits.3 14 In conflict of laws cases, textual analysis matters. The
intent of the framers of the trumping document-the Constitution in
constitutional cases, the statute in administrative cases-matters. But
injuries to litigants may not matter. They will matter only to the de-
gree that the court cares about the consequences of its decisions for
the litigants.
Conflict of laws claims form the backbone of public law. They
encompass the broadest constitutional and statutory rulings.
3 15
Claims that an agency action or statute conflict with a trumping docu-
309 See Marbuiy, 5 U.S. at 153-62.
310 Cf id. at 164 (describing the injury as one of loss of an "office[ ] of trust, of honor
or of profit").
311 See id. at 162-80.
312 See id. at 162 (stating that the withholding of Marbury's commission was "not war-
ranted by law, but violative of vested legal right").
313 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 462-71, 476-86 (2001)
(resolving claim that EPA's rule establishing new national ambient air quality standards
conflicted with the Clean Air Act); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 164, 172 (1978)
(resolving claim that construction of Tellico Dam would violate the Endangered Species
Act).
314 I use the term "conflict of laws" here in a general sense to describe any claim that
two laws conflict. I do not mean to use the term in the narrow sense common in the legal
profession, as referring only to the question of which jurisdiction's law applies in an inter-
state case.
315 See, e.g., Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 464-71 (holding that the EPA may not consider
cost in promulgating national ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air Act); INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating legislative veto then found in numerous stat-
utes as violating the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment); Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 6-8, 11, 143 (1976) (per curiam) (greatly limiting campaign
finance restrictions as in conflict with free speech guarantee of the First Amendment).
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ment require interpretation of the trumping document. Since both
the Constitution and statutes govern not just the case before the
Court, but a range of future cases, these rulings tend to define public
values.316 And they necessarily have consequences for nonlitigants,
not just the litigants before a court.3 1 7 As a result, conflict of laws
claims draw the court's attention away from the litigants before it into
questions of interpretation and of the broader implications of the
ruling.3 1
8
Typically, cases become more abstract as they move up the appel-
late ladder. Again, we law professors may be poorly qualified to see
this, because we live in the world of appellate cases. But an appeal of
sufficient merit to generate an opinion typically abstracts a single issue
or a small number of issues from the contextual soup of trial. And a
successful petition for certiorari usually tears a single issue (or a very
small group of issues) from the context of trial and even intermediate
appellate review.3 19 The petition becomes an exercise in characteriz-
ing the issue and the holdings of other circuits in such a way that a
circuit conflict appears.3 20 Alternatively, a certiorari petition can em-
phasize the importance of the issue, not to the litigant, but to the
nation as a whole.32' And the Supreme Court issues pronouncements
at such a high level of abstraction3 22 that its decisions often fail to
316 See Fiss, supra note 39, at 2 (arguing that judges deciding constitutional individual
rights cases "give meaning to our public values"); cf Republican Party of Minn. v. White,
536 U.S. 765, 784 (2002) (noting that the American judiciary cannot be completely sepa-
rated from the enterprise of representative government because judges make common law
and "shape the States' constitutions").
317 See Pushaw, supra note 63, at 479 (stating that the Marbury "Court recognized that
its decision had ramifications far beyond redressing Marbury's injury" (footnote omitted));
see also Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990) (noting the existence of
statutes that authorize broad regulations and therefore permit judicial review before "the
concrete effects" are felt); id. at 913 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (agreeing with majority that
if a plaintiff prevails in a challenge to "a rule of broad applicability," the court will invali-
date the rule, and "not simply ... its application to a particular individual").
318 Cf Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 593 (1985) (discuss-
ing interpretation of vague statutes, which draw meaning from "'the purpose of the Act, its
factual background, and the statutory context'" (quoting Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC,
329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946))).
319 SeeYee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535-36 (1992) (discussing how certiorari
practice forces litigants to choose the most important issues from the many presented
below).
320 See Sup. CT. R. 10 (listing conflicting decisions as grounds for certiorari).
321 See Fallon, supra note 88, at 24 (arguing that the Court chooses issues requiring
attention in light of the public interest in achieving clarity and uniformity in constitu-
tional law" (footnote omitted)); Sunstein, supra note 166, at 16 (arguing that the practice
of granting certiorari for cases of national importance assures that the decision will "affect
other cases"); cf. Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years
After theJudges'Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1643, 1713-16 (2000) (describing tension between
certiorari practice and the private rights model of adjudication).
322 See Fallon, supra note 88, at 24 (noting that "the Court routinely issues broad pro-
nouncements, not rulings narrowly tailored to the case before it" (footnote omitted)).
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resolve the case before the Court, instead causing a remand so that
lower courts can figure out whether a general principle enunciated by
the Court should influence the outcome of the case.
323
A simple model of abstraction and concreteness would suggest an
inherent concreteness to private law trials and inherent abstraction in
public law litigation, especially at the Supreme Court level.324 This
distinction begins to explain why insistence upon injury does not
often produce concrete litigation. But it does not explain why rela-
tively concrete adjudication occurs in some cases, but not others.
B. The Structure of Public Law
Some simple insights into the structure of public law help to ex-
plain the patterns of concreteness and abstraction described in Part II.
They help explain, for example, why injury plays such a small role in
resolving the merits of administrative law and separation of powers
cases, but has more influence in as-applied individual rights chal-
lenges. The structure of legal problems, rather than the existence of
injury, determines whether injury to plaintiffs makes the litigation
more concrete. And elucidation of this structure helps to explain the
observed pattern.
1. The Adler-Fallon Debate
The explanation which follows sheds light upon and expands a
recent debate regarding the nature and structure of constitutional
law. 325 Mathew Adler argues that constitutional law is about the valid-
ity of legal rules, not about the rights of individuals to take certain
actions. 326 He takes as his point of departure an individual rights
case, Texas v. Johnson,327 which invalidated a prohibition upon flag
323 See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 632 (2001) (remanding case
rather than resolve question of whether or not a takings had occurred); Phillips v. Wash.
Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998) (holding that interest on client trust fund accounts
constitutes private property of the client and remanding to resolve underlying takings
claim); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 59 (1991) (remanding after an-
nouncing a general presumption regarding the length of appropriate pre-arraignment de-
tention). But see Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003) (resolving issue left
open in Phillips).
324 See Scalia, supra note 65, at 896 (claiming thatjudges are "instructed to be governed
by a body of knowledge that values abstract principle above concrete result").
325 Compare Matthew D. Adler, Personal Rights and Rule-Dependence: Can the Two Coexist?,
6 LEGAL THEORY 337 (2000) [hereinafter Adler, Personal Rights and Rule-Dependence], Mat-
thew D. Adler, Rights, Rules, and the Structure of Constitutional Adjudication: A Response to
Professor Fallon, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1371 (2000) [hereinafter Adler, Response], and Matthew
D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Adler, Moral Structure], with Fallon, supra note 235.
326 See Adler, Moral Structure, supra note 325, at 3.
327 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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burning.3 228 He asks whether we should understand this case as pro-
tecting the act of flag burning or as prohibiting the law against dese-
crating the flag.3 29 He argues that since flag burning leading to a
conflagration could still be outlawed as arson, we should understand
this individual rights case as a decision about the validity of legal
rules-specifically, the flag desecration statute.330  Texas v. Johnson
does not, argues Adler, insulate the act of flag burning from legal con-
sequences. 33' Hence, this case does not protect the individual from
injury (in the form of arrest for flag burning). By implication, consti-
tutional law does not protect certain individual actions; it invalidates
improper legal rules.3 3 2 This insight leads Adler to the startling con-
clusion that "[ t] here is no such thing as a true as-applied constitutional
challenge." 
3 3
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., challenged this statement, arguing that as-
applied challenges remain the norm.3 34 He also questioned the no-
tion that all constitutional challenges should be understood as "rights
against rules."
335
For this Article's purposes, the points of consensus that emerge
from this debate matter more than the differences. First, both Fallon
and Adler agree that many, although not all, individual rights cases
are properly, and importantly, understood as cases about the validity
of legal rules. 33 6 Second, they agree that some constitutional chal-
lenges invalidate only some applications of a rule, instead of all of
them. 337 This latter agreement lies concealed behind varying defini-
tions of as-applied challenges.338 Third, they agree that the results of
328 See Adler, Moral Structure, supra note 325, at 3-7.
329 See id. at 5-6.
330 See id. at 3-5 (claiming thatJohnson could be constitutionally prosecuted for arson
or other general offenses connected with flag burning, but not for violating the flag dese-
cration statute).
331 See id. at 4-5.
332 See id. at 3.
333 See id. at 157 (footnote omitted).
334 See Fallon, supra note 235, at 1368 ("[A]s-applied challenges ... remain the
primary mode of constitutional attack on a statute.").
335 See id. at 1364-68.
336 See Adler, Response, supra note 325, at 1374-75 (agreeing that Fallon is "absolutely
correct" that some types of rights challenges "do not entail the existence of a particular
type of rule"); Fallon, supra note 235, at 1325 (accepting "Adler's important insight that
many.., constitutional rights are rights against rules"); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber &
Lawrence G. Sager, Religious Liberty and the Moral Structure of Constitutional Rights, 6 LEGAL
THEORY 253, 257 (2000) (understanding of the extent to which Adler's view is correct can
provide "important insight into the moral structure of constitutional rights .... ).
337 See Adler, Response, supra note 325, at 1387 (distinguishing between complete and
partial repeal of a rule); Fallon, supra note 235, at 1334-35 (articulating an understanding
of as-applied challenges as invalidating "subrules" while leaving other subrules intact).
338 See, e.g., Adler, Response, supra note 325, at 1387 n.56 (addressing criticism by Fallon
and stating that "'as-applied"' challenges "vindicat[ing] the personal rights of claimants[]
do not exist, but "'as-applied' challenges" partially invalidating rules do exist).
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Supreme Court litigation typically bind, at least indirectly through the
doctrine of precedent, parties not before the Court.
339
The insights gleaned from this debate lay the foundation for a
structural account of public law adequate to illuminate the paradox.
Yet, to do this, the concept of litigation about the validity of legal rules
needs more elaboration.
On the surface, the idea that constitutional law should be under-
stood as about the validity of legal rules, rather than about individual
rights, would seem to have a fatal flaw. The Court requires a showing
of personal injury before it will adjudicate a case and often says that
constitutional rights are individual rights.340 In this sense, at least,
constitutional law is not about the validity of legal rules. But one
should understand Adler's claim as a descriptive claim about the con-
tent of merits adjudication. 34' This descriptive claim raises the nor-
mative issue this Article explores-why should injury matter so much
to justiciability, when it plays no role in many merits decisions?3 42 Fur-
339 See id. at 1412 (stating that a Supreme Court "order invalidating a statute" can
oblige officials "not to enforce the statute against anyone"); Fallon, supra note 235, at 1362
(remarking that "a constitutionally illegitimate law is no law at all and thus cannot supply a
lawful predicate for the imposition of a harm or sanction"); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (stating that "the court's judgment may benefit others collaterally").
See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Supreme Court as a Legislature, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(1978) (describing the Supreme Court as possessing the characteristics of both a court and
a legislature, insofar as the Court is a body that creates general law).
340 See Rebecca L. Brown, When Political Questions Affect Individual Rights: The Other
Nixon v. United States, 1993 Sup. CT. REV. 125, 154 (the law of standing reflects the view
that "U]udicial capital should be expended" to "vindicat[e] individual rights"); Fallon,
supra note 88, at 22 (principle that court should only adjudicate constitutional questions to
protect the rights of individuals finds "abundant expression" in post-Marburyjudicial opin-
ions); Nichol, supra note 58, at 1920 (describing "the protection of private rights" as the
"trigger of judicial power"); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bi-
zarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92
MICH. L. REV. 483, 513 (1993) ("In much of constitutional law, both substantive and proce-
dural doctrines require that harms be individuated." (footnote omitted)).
341 This is the correct reading of Professor Adler's article for two reasons. First, Profes-
sor Adler sees himself as addressing "the moral content of constitutional rights," Adler,
Moral Structure, supra note 325, at 2, which suggests a focus upon merits adjudication. Sec-
ond, Adler defines standing as "extrinsic" to his central claim. See id. at 122. To be sure,
Adler discusses the tension between Article III and his concept of constitutional law as
adjudication of the validity of legal rules. See id. at 132-45. But he does this to rebut
possible institutional objections to his theory. See id. at 132. Adler does claim that his
account of the structure of moral constitutional rights should influence standing doctrine,
id. at 153, because courts should construe Article III in ways that comport with the struc-
ture of constitutional rights, id. at 140-41. This Article, in part, begins working out the
implications of some of Adler's insights for our conception of adjudication and hence for
standing doctrine.
342 Cf id. at 153 (noting that this theory has implications for doctrine governing "the
proper parties to litigate" rules challenges). Commentators have been intrigued by Adler's
argument, but some have been skeptical about its doctrinal value. See, e.g., Eisgruber &
Sager, supra note 336, at 254 (expressing skepticism about the theory's value in construct-
ing free exercise jurisprudence).
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thermore, the concept needs extension beyond the individual rights
cases upon which Adler and Fallon focus. Public law includes notjust
individual rights claims, but structural claims about the distribution of
power and nonconstitutional claims about the validity of agency ac-
tions under governing statutes. 343 Professor Fallon has argued that
constitutional law rarely conforms to simple characterizations of the
whole, but rather involves varying structures based on the legal doc-
trines at issue. 344 The following analysis applies this insight to extend
understanding of public law beyond the individual rights cases by dis-
cussing how structures vary across areas of public law.
2. Structural Constitutional Law
Structural cases often involve facial claims implicating entire stat-
utory provisions, if not entire statutes. The statutory provisions under
attack tend to have broad and uncertain substantive impact, since they
only specify procedures, not outcomes. 345 Their impact upon individ-
uals tends to be largely incidental, the result of the substantive deci-
sions that the actors empowered to make the decision took. One can
rarely know whether relocating power to a different branch or level of
government would obviate or exacerbate the particular injuries that
might motivate a litigant to sue.
It hardly seems surprising that the pattern found in the line item
veto cases is typical of structural constitutional cases.346 The standing
inquiry seems utterly ritualistic and the litigants tend to vanish from
view as the Court debates great issues of structure. The litigants' inju-
ries typically contribute little or nothing to the concreteness, or any
other aspect of the litigation, for the doctrines of separation of powers
and federalism aim to protect institutions. To be sure, protecting in-
stitutions from each other aims to advance the welfare and liberty of
the individuals who created the government.347 But any particular
choice of institutional arrangement will affect an individual indirectly
and unpredictably, making it hard to separate the effects of institu-
343 See supra Part III.A.
344 See Fallon, supra note 235, at 1327 (stating that constitutional doctrines are too
diverse to conform to "any elegant unifying theory"). He is, of course, not alone in offer-
ing this insight. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Heterogeneity of Rights, 6 LEGAL THEORY 269,
270 (2000) ("[Clonstitutional rights are heterogeneous, and properly so.").
345 See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 421 (1998) (invalidating Line
Item Veto Act); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (recognizing as consti-
tutional statute creating Sentencing Commission to promulgate sentencing guidelines);
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (invalidating statute authorizing legislative
vetoes).
346 See supra text accompanying notes 22-36.
347 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty. ... ").
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tional arrangements from the effects of substantive political decisions
that might occur irrespective of institutional structure.
3 48
3. Individual Rights
Individual rights cases, by contrast, involve claims that the actions
of government officials transgress constitutional limits enacted to pro-
tect individuals from government. Since individual rights aim to pro-
tect individuals directly, as opposed to institutions, the Court
sometimes considers the impact upon individuals relevant to decisions
in this area.
349
Yet, as Professor Adler points out, even in this area, legal rules are
often (but not always) at stake. 350 Legal rules impact many people.3 5'
Hence, the Court often turns away from consideration of the impact
upon the individual before it, especially if the lawyers choose to frame
the litigation broadly, for example, as a facial challenge. 352 In this
area, however, the experience of litigants often bears some relation-
ship to the assessment of the merits. So, at least in the case of as-
applied challenges, the experience of litigants sometimes plays a role
in making the litigation more concrete.
Examination of the relationship between merits adjudication and
injuries justifying standing, however, helps clarify the structure of indi-
vidual rights litigation. Some legal tests make the degree of injury
relevant to resolution of an individual rights claim. Examples include
takings claims, which depend upon the degree of economic harm suf-
fered by the plaintiff,353 and procedural due process claims, which re-
quire assessment of the weightiness of the plaintiff's interest and the
348 See PERRY, supra note 229, at 53 (arguing that "it is most unlikely that the Court"
could specify how the resolution of a separation of powers challenge would affect individ-
ual freedom); Doff, supra note 96, at 246 ("Structural provisions may, in the long run,
preserve individual liberty, but they do not inevitably do so in every case."); see also Thomas
v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 579-80 (1985) (defining relegation of
claim to a non-Article III forum as an injury different from any particular monetary loss
that hypothetically could flow from adjudication in the wrong forum); Nichol, supra note
58, at 1938-39 (application of standing to federalism and separation of powers cases has
"seriously eroded" the claim that "constitutional review" only protects "private rights").
349 See Eisgruber & Sager, note 336, at 258 ("Some constitutional claims may focus
primarily on the claimant's immediate circumstances ... .
350 See supra text accompanying notes 326-36.
351 See Schauer, supra note 201, at 655 (suggesting that an opinion supported by fairly
general reasoning provides an advisory opinion for cases not yet before the court);
Tushnet, supra note 77, at 1711 ("Absent parties often benefit when a liti-
gant ... convince[s] a court to adopt a new legal rule ... .
352 See supra text accompanying note 239.
353 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (holding that depriving a
landowner of "all economically beneficial uses" of the property constitutes a taking); Penn
Cent. Transp. Corp. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (making the economic




risk of error in a particular proceeding. 354 In such cases, injury often
makes the litigation more concrete. While such cases can establish
whether a plaintiff has a right to be free of a rule, they often require
such context-specific analysis that- they may leave general questions
about a rule's validity quite open and have limited impact upon subse-
quent cases.
355
Other legal tests, however, focus upon defendant's conduct or
other factors, making individual experience rather irrelevant. And
the Court has tended to gravitate increasingly toward these tests.
Thus, for example, the Court has moved away from a test that often
exempted religious exercise from generally applicable rules-a test
that uses injury as a framing device-to a test that often permits neu-
tral, general rules, even if they impinge on free exercise inciden-
tally.356 This formalist doctrinal change means that the general intent
of the rule's framers will matter much more than individual injury in
resolving the merits. 357 This move converts a personal right to engage
in a practice into a right against rules aimed at discouraging religious
practice. 358 And it tends to convert an as-applied challenge into some-
thing more like a facial challenge. 359 Resolution of such a facial claim
can easily invalidate an entire statute.
360
4. Administrative Law
The most significant administrative law cases involve claims that
an agency action violated a governing statute. Such claims require a
354 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341-47 (1976) (establishing as factors to be
considered in a procedural due process challenge "the degree of potential deprivation" of
a right or liberty or property interest, the risk of error in a proceeding, and the cost of
providing additional procedures).
355 Compare Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (granting right to a hearing before
goods are seized from a delinquent creditor) with Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600
(1974) (denying right to a hearing before goods are seized from a delinquent creditor). See
also Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 32-34 (1981) (holding that question of
whether a mother has a right to counsel in a proceeding to terminate her parental rights
varies based on fact-specific circumstances).
356 Compare Employment Div., Dep't of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-90
(1990) (allowing a generally applicable criminal prohibition on the use of peyote to in-
clude within its bounds religiously inspired use), with Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
215-16, 234 (1972) (holding that state must exempt Amish respondents from the applica-
tion of a compulsory education statute in order to protect their free exercise of religion).
357 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533
(1993) (considering, in a post-Smith facial challenge to a statute on free exercise grounds,
"the object of the law" rather than its application); Isserles, supra note 236, at 435 n.341
(discussing progression from Yoder to Smith to City of Hialeah).
358 See Adler, Personal Rights and Rule-Dependence, supra note 325, at 342.
359 See City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 533-35 (examining text of ordinance and the context
of its passage to determine whether it has a discriminatory purpose).




comparison of the agency's action with congressional intent. - 61 Injury
typically plays no role at all in resolving the merits of such disputes. 36 2
Narrower claims that an agency exercised its discretion arbitrarily or
without substantial evidentiary support usually do not implicate injury
either, as they typically involve only an assessment of the quality of
agency reasoning. 363 To the extent that the case focuses upon agency
responses to comments about a party's injury, injury might help frame
issues. One would expect such comments to often make administra-
tive adjudication more concrete, but to play this role less often in
more broadly significant rulemaking, where the parties may rely on
hypothetical rather than real injury to test the logic of agency
rulemaking. 364
5. Problems on the Border
In cases along the conceptual border between individual rights
and structural litigation, the insistence upon personal injury contrib-
utes nothing to resolution of the merits. Perhaps the law regarding
redistricting offers the most striking example. In this area, the Court
seeks to employ an individual rights framework, rooted in the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to decide upon the
structure of government through review of redistricting decisions. 365
Redistricting, according to the Court, can injure individuals by stigma-
tizing them on account of race or depriving their votes of impact.3 66
The Court generally allows voters to challenge the constitutionality of
their own districts, but denies standing to voters whose challenges
seem rooted in complaints about neighboring districts.3 67 Yet redis-
tricting affects groups and usually does not aim at any individual
361 See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
362 See id.
363 See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
364 See supra notes 227-28.
365 See Samuel Issacharoff, Genymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARv. L. REV. 593,
607-08 (2002) (describing how the Warren Court framed "federal constitutional oversight
of the political process in the . . . language of individual fights").
366 In this area, some scholars have found the concept of injury itself extremely ab-
stract. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 340, at 506-16 (arguing that the Court's rejection of
oddly shaped electoral districts designed to enhance minority voting strength inflicts an
"expressive harm[ ]").
367 See Sinkfield v. Kelley, 531 U.S. 28 (2000) (denying standing to voter whose chal-
lenge was primarily aimed at unconstitutionality of neighboring district); Bush v. Vera, 517
U.S. 952, 957-58 (1996) (plurality opinion) (allowing residents of allegedly gerry-
mandered districts to challenge their constitutionality); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 904
(1996) (stating that generally only voters of a challenged district will have standing);
United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 739 (1995) (denying standing to voters residing
outside of gerrymandered district).
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voter.3 68 Because the lines influence the structure of government-
who gets to elect whom-linking individual harms to the redistricting
decision seems difficult.
369
The individual experience of injury that the Court envisions be-
comes completely irrelevant to analysis of the merits in this area.
37 0
When the Court reaches the merits it focuses upon questions about
legislative motive, geography, political boundaries, demography, and
transportation corridors. 37 1 Surely a requirement of individual injury
does nothing to improve the concreteness of these abstract cases.
372
C. Should Injury Influence Public Law Outcomes?
For a formalist, injuries to litigants in conflict of laws cases should
not matter. In its most extreme form, formalism cares not ajot about
the consequences of legal decisions, for litigants or anybody else.
Rather, formalist judges often believe that the answers to public law
questions come from pure textual exegesis. 3 73 When they do not be-
lieve that, they often believe that the intention of the framers of the
Constitution provides the correct answers to the questions before
them.
3 7 4
Several of the Justices on the formalist Rehnquist Court have ex-
pressed an unwillingness to let the experience of litigants influence
their judgments, especially through the medium of intuitions about
justice. They often expressly repudiate a contextual model of
adjudication.
A good example comes from Justice Scalia's statements regarding
the unprincipled nature of rulings relying upon ajudge's sense of fair-
368 Cf Issacharoff, supra note 365, at 606 (describing how a conception of equal pro-
tection limited to individual rights produced a failure to outlaw "the categorical denial of
registration to all black voters in Alabama" in Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903)).
369 See Issacharoff, supra note 365, at 608-09 (arguing that "the individual-rights-
based . . .approach" fails to "capture the nature of the constitutional insult").
370 See, e.g., Vera, 517 U.S. at 959-83 (plurality opinion).
371 See, e.g., id.; Pildes & Niemi, supra note 340, at 527-86 (discussing methodology for
addressing geographic " district compactness" concerns).
372 See Issacharoff, supra note 365, at 596 (linking early reapportionment cases to "a
somewhat abstract right to 'full and effective participation'" (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 565 (1964))). Issacharoff goes on to describe a major component of merits anal-
ysis in this area as "'indeterminate to the point of incoherence.'" Id. at 635 (quotingJohn
Hart Ely, Confounded by Cromartie: Are Racial Stereotypes Now Acceptable Across the Board or
Only Wen Used in Support of Partisan Gerrymanders, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 489, 496-98
(2002)).
373 See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Youngstown Goes to War, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 215,
225 (2002) (callingJustice Black's majority opinion in Youngstown "a masterpiece of textual
and formal analysis").
374 See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 108 n.2 (1970) (Black, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (asserting that framers' intent and literal language should
govern interpretation of the Bill of Rights).
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ness. For example, in Burnham v. Superior Court, 3 7 5 Justice Scalia re-
jected the use ofjudicial judgments about fairness as a touchstone for
due process limits upon personal jurisdiction in a case upholding
transient jurisdiction: jurisdiction through the service of process upon
somebody only temporarily within the forum state.37 6 Scalia disap-
proved of the notion thatjudges' concrete response to the facts of the
case before them should influence their judgments regarding due
process. 377 Instead, he called for reliance upon formal rules derived
from history.
378
A more functional view of the role of judicial review might sug-
gest a greater need to take injury into account.3 79 But perhaps not. A
functional view involves taking context into account. But that view
does not establish that injury to the litigants before the Court provides
important or even relevant context, even for a functionalist.38 0 In-
deed, Professor Bickel, who so forcefully advocated justiciability crite-
ria as a way of making cases more concrete, admonishes judges not to
"do in each case what seems just for it alone."
38 1
Consider Justice Jackson's functionalist approach in Youngstown.
Justice Jackson's analysis depends upon context, but not a personal
injury context. 382 Rather, the relevant context involves expressions of
congressional policy regarding the matter at hand.38 3 The injuries
that the steel makers might incur through presidential seizure played
no role in his opinion.
384
375 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
376 See id. at 622-27 (plurality opinion).
377 See id. (plurality opinion).
378 See id. at 621-22 (plurality opinion).
379 See Fiss, supra note 39, at 12 (suggesting that a judicial response to concrete facts
might produce a "true account" of "constitutional value[s]").
380 Cf Brown, supra note 340, at 126 (distinguishing consequences "involving separa-
tion of powers" from "those related to individual rights"); Elliott, supra note 147, at 150-56
(suggesting that, from a functionalist perspective, the systemic effects of the legislative veto
provide the correct context for considering its constitutionality).
381 See BIclKEL, supra note 11, at 55. Bickel links this argument to an endorsement of
the idea of neutral principles and Kant's categorical imperative. See id. Bickel understands
that his arguments about justiciability limiting the Court to a concrete context are in ten-
sion with the ideas of neutral principles. He writes, "The function ofjudicial review arises
in the limiting context of cases, to be sure; but while the Court should not surmount the
limitation, it must rise above the case." Id. at 50. Bickel does not, however, explain how
the context of cases limits judicial review if the Court "rise[s] above the case." Id.
382 SeeYoungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-55 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
383 See id. (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co.,
473 U.S. 568, 593 (1985) (discussing the role of statutory context, rather than individual
injury context, in construing statutory meaning); cf. Monaghan, supra note 77, at 1372-73
(acknowledging that "constitutional questions" can "turn[ ] on certain legislative facts,"
such as "facts bearing on matters of economic or social organization" (footnote omitted)).
384 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 634-55 (Jackson, J., concurring) (pass-
ing over takings claim to address issue of whether President had authority to issue the
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Nevertheless, it would be myopic to suggest that injuries to liti-
gants never influence judges, even in public law cases. But the more
important question for a functionalist judge would be the normative
one: should injuries to an individual litigant influence results in a pub-
lic law case?
The adage that hard cases make bad law385 raises some questions
about the value of having litigants' injuries influence the outcome of
cases. A hard case often refers to a case in which instincts about jus-
tice collide with the requirements of formal rules. 386 This collision
can occur, for example, when a case presents an unusual fact pat-
tern.387 Because the designers of the rule may have created it with
typical cases in mind, application of a perfectly good rule to an abnor-
mal fact pattern can create unjust results. 388 A hard case can produce
bad law, because the court will often modify the law to bring about a
just result for an unusual fact pattern when a straightforward applica-
tion of the rule would be unjust. 389 In so doing, the court may make
seizure order); see alsoJ. Gregory Sidak, The Price of Experience: The Constitution After September
11, 2001, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 37, 44 (2002) (arguing that "the Court in Youngstown blew
past the takings issue" the steel mill owners presented in order "to reach the separation-of-
powers" issue). Similarly, Justice White's functionalist dissent in the Court's Tenth Amend-
ment opinion in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), relied upon the context of
state participation in federal law-making, rather than individual injury, to create relevant
context. See New York, 505 U.S. at 189-94 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (describing the enactment of the statute before the Court as federal adoption of a
politically negotiated compromise between states).
385 See, e.g., N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes,J., dissent-
ing). Although Justice Holmes is credited with this famous adage, it was first introduced to
the American courts by Justice Harlan. See United States v. Clark, 96 U.S. 37, 49 (1877)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Lord Campbell as saying that "'it is the duty of all courts
ofjustice to take care, for the general good of the community, that hard cases do not make
bad law'" (quoting E. India Co. v. Paul, 13 Eng. Rep. 811, 821 (P.C. 1849))); Ashutosh
Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D)Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 30 CONN. L. REv. 961,
965-66 (1998) (explaining the origins of the adage).
386 See Phillip J. Closius, Rejecting the Fruits of Action: The Regeneration of the Waste Land's
Legal System, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 127, 131 (1995) (stating that "[slympathetic fact pat-
terns are perceived as ajudicial nightmare" because of the tension between societal values
and the need to follow legal precedent).
387 See, e.g., Andrew R. Klein, A Legislative Alternative to "No Cause" Liability in Blood Prod-
ucts Litigation, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 107, 108-09 (1995) (describing hard cases as those in
which courts have relaxed traditional rules of causation to permit hemophiliacs who con-
tracted HIV from transfusions to collect damages from pharmaceutical companies).
388 See Ruth Gavison, The Implications ofJurisprudential Theories for Judicial Election, Selec-
tion, and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1617, 1642 n.57 (1988) (stating that what is
unjust may not be the law, but the law's application to a particular case, such as the imposi-
tion of a prison sentence upon an elderly drug addict).
389 See Bhagwat, supra note 385, at 968 (stating that "[b] ad law" is the "distortion" of a
clear rule to reach a 'just" result) (internal quotation marks omitted); Markita D. Cooper,
Between a Rock and a Hard Case: Time for a New Doctrine of Compelled Self-Publication, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 373, 402-03 (1997) (explaining howjudges and juries, when presented with




the law function poorly with respect to more typical fact patterns,
thereby disserving the law's purposes in most cases.390 This quandary
suggests that allowing plaintiffs' injuries to strongly influence out-
comes can prove problematic.
In public law this problem can prove especially acute. Constitu-
tions and statutes aim to influence a wide range of future conduct. If
a particularly sympathetic plaintiff secured a favorable statutory and
constitutional interpretation just because of her particular experi-
ence, this might have pernicious effects upon many other individuals
and institutions.
The notion that the content of the injury should influence public
law outcomes raises some difficult issues. The most straightforward
explanation as to why injury might influence outcomes would rely
upon the judge's response to the injury. If the injury seemed bad
enough, the judge might strike down the law producing it. If the in-
jury seemed trivial, the judge would uphold it.
This model suggests that the judge's own values, not those of the
Constitution or statute she interprets, would control the outcome of
the case. Not only that, but the values in play would come from the
litigant's plight, not from the legally relevant sources or even the
judge's own views about the matters made relevant by those sources.
Thus, INS v. Chadha,391 which struck down a legislative veto deporting
Chadha, might hinge not upon an assessment of the relevant constitu-
tional text, general concerns about congressional bills conflicting with
fact-specific findings of executive branch officials, or the effects of leg-
islative vetoes upon democratic accountability and constitutional
structure, but upon the Justices' feelings about the seriousness of de-
portation.392 And Clinton v. City of New York 93 might hinge upon
one's view about the value of extra Medicare funding for New York
hospitals, rather than the separation of powers concerns that seem
relevant to the constitutionality of line item vetoes. Surely such an
390 See Schauer, supra note 201, at 655-56 (discussing the problem of a "'result-ori-
ented'" decision in one case causing too much harm in subsequent cases controlled by that
case's reasoning).
391 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
392 Chadha's counsel argued that a favorable ruling would make him "'a citizen by the
4th of July.'" BARBARA HINKSON CRAIG, CHADHA: THE STORY OF AN Epic CONSTITUTIONAL
STRUGGLE 211 (1988). He went on to explain the hardship his client would experience if
forced to rely upon his wife's status as a citizen as the basis for seeking citizenship. Such an
approach would involve a long uncertain bureaucratic process, leaving Mr. Chadha in
limbo. See id. Justice White in his dissent suggested that something in the facts of Mr.
Chadha's case may have influenced the Court's decision. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 974
(White, J., dissenting) (suggesting the Court had improvidently struck down all legislative
vetoes based on an "atypical" case).
393 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
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approach would raise some questions about legitimacy.394 It is not at
all clear that injury should influence all public law rulings.
On the other hand, the Court's civil rights jurisprudence lends
some support to the idea that individual injury should influence mer-
its decisions. Numerous cases showing that particular instances of seg-
regation disadvantaged black people brought the Court to the point
where it invalidated segregation altogether in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.39 5 But the Court did this not by allowing the individual injuries
of the Brown plaintiffs to make the case more concrete by framing the
issue narrowly, but by acquiring the conviction that a broad factual
finding about the state of the entire society was in order.396 Thus, the
Brown Court held that "[s] eparate educational facilities are inherently
unequal."3
97
Surely, equal protection law gained something from taking liti-
gants' experiences of inequality into account.398 Most scholars would
agree that the conditions minorities experienced under apartheid
should inform assessment of whether segregation afforded minorities
equal protection.
This may explain why Professor Bickel believed that standing re-
quirements would make litigation more concrete, in spite of the fact
that the cases he cited to support this idea cast doubt on that conclu-
sion.399 He may have had then-recent civil rights litigation in mind,
394 See Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A Prelimi-
nary Defense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L.J. 821, 826 (1985) (linking reliance upon the
values of adjudicators to illegitimacy).
395 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954) (drawing on history of segregation in graduate
schools); see, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 345 (1938) (noting that
the denial of black student's application to law school violates equal protection when state
provides no law school for blacks); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 591, 598-99 (1935)
(invalidating conviction in county that had never called a black juror to serve, after exam-
ining detailed record on county practices); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 82, 88-89
(1932) (declaring state delegation of authority to determine party membership to political
parties unconstitutional, when Democratic Party used that authority to prohibit blacks
from voting); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 364-65 (1915) (declaring that statute
subjecting citizens who are not descendants of people with voting rights prior to 1866 to a
literacy test violates Fifteenth Amendment, because it tends to deny suffrage to blacks); cf
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927) (declaring a statute "forbid[ding] negroes to
take part in a primary election" facially invalid). Of course, the Brown Court did not rely
solely upon the experience of case law. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.1l (citing social sci-
ence studies).
396 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 & n.ll (citing to social science literature in order to help
justify a broad finding that separate is inherently unequal).
397 Id. at 495.
398 See, e.g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (reversing conviction of black
defendants based on a coerced conviction after examination of a detailed record); Brown
v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 279, 287 (1936) (reversing conviction of black defendants
based on confession extracted through torture); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 50, 73
(1932) (reversing conviction of black defendants who were denied counsel after a full
trial).
399 See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text.
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even though he used less controversial and inapposite cases to sup-
port his point.
All of this suggests several conclusions. Consideration of injury is
sometimes desirable, but not always. And the question of whether in-
jury should matter to the merits would vary depending on the type of
public law involved.
D. Implications for Standing Doctrine and Justiciability
The frequent failure of the injury requirement to make litigation
concrete and its incapacity to do so under many judicial doctrines
raises doubts about the constitutional foundation of standing doc-
trine.40 0 The Court, at times, seems to recognize that experience has
crumbled the theoretical foundation for standing doctrine. Justice
Scalia's law review article on standing disagrees with the standard view
that a requirement of injury helps assure vigorous argument. He be-
lieves that an ideological plaintiff will likely litigate equally vigor-
ously. 40 1 The claim that standing fosters better "'presentation of
issues,"' which Scalia has disavowed, 40 2 supports the Court's tradi-
tional view that standing aids the concreteness of litigation.
While the Court has never disavowed the link between concrete-
ness and its Article III standing doctrine, recent cases place less em-
phasis on it than older cases. Indeed, direct references to "concrete
adverseness" nowadays often appear in dissenting or concurring
opinions. 40
3
400 Scholars have expressed doubts about standing on nonfunctional grounds as well.
See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 63, at 480-82 (arguing that a case historically required no
individualized injury).
401 See Scalia, supra note 65, at 891; see also Monaghan, supra note 77, at 1385 (arguing
that "there is no necessary connection between a personal interest and the sharp presenta-
tion of issues").
402 Scalia, supra note 65, at 891.
403 See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 121 (1998) (Stevens,J.,
concurring) (arguing that standing is meant to ensure " 'concrete adverseness'"); Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 399 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring) (citing need for a "concrete fac-
tual context"); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 583-84 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (claiming that standing should be granted because allegations are adequate to
establish concrete adverseness); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 770 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (reciting requirement of " 'concrete adverseness'" (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 204 (1962))); cf Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998) (stand-
ing requirements help court to avoid "abstract, intellectual problems," in favor of "con-
crete, living contests between adversaries" (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted)). Justice Scalia has argued in dissent that the separation of powers concept of
standing displaced the concept of standing as means of assuring concrete adverseness in
Allen v. Wright. See Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 472 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The Court has not endorsed Scalia's view, which distorts the case law. First, while the Allen
Court emphasized separation of powers, it linked that concern to the need for framing
concrete issues for judicial resolution, a function the Court identifies with concrete ad-
verseness. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 759 (linking separation of powers to need for suits on
"identifiable Government violations of law" as well as "particular" agency "programs"). Sec-
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I have already claimed that the Court has not come up with any
other explanation as to why separation of powers concerns or Article
III require injury-based standing. And I have suggested that other
doctrines serve interests in avoiding improper interference in the work
of the other branches better than standing does. The standard ratio-
nales the Court offers support some sort of limitation on jurisdiction,
but do not really explain why the Court requires injury-based
standing.
Nevertheless, the Court, in Spencer v. Kemna, suggested that a sep-
aration of powers rationale provides support for standing doctrine
apart from that which concrete adverseness seeks to provide. 40 4 While
the Court has never explained how separation of powers considera-
tions would support standing without reference to the ideas of abstrac-
tion and concreteness this Article focuses upon, Justice Scalia's law
review article seems to offer an alternative theory rooted in separation
of powers. 40 5 But Scalia's theory does not justify injury-in-fact based
standing, conflicts with the central thrust of the Court's statements
about separation of powers, and does not add up.
Justice Scalia argues that standing should confine courts to their
"traditional . . . role of protecting individuals and minorities" from
majority rule, as opposed to serving the interest of majorities.40 6 This
concept has influenced the Court's decisions to raise the standing bar,
even though the Court has not endorsed the concept explicitly.407
Scalia himself recognizes that this concept would require imposition
of new requirements going beyond those embraced in the injury-
ond, the Court has reaffirmed the importance of concrete adverseness repeatedly since
Allen. See Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 125-26 (1991) (unanimous opinion); Int'l Pri-
mate Prot. League v. Adm'rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 78 (1991) (unanimous
opinion), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Dalrymple v. Grand River Dam
Auth., 145 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 1998); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Found., 484 U.S. 49, 65 & n.5 (1987); UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 289 (1986); Diamond v.
Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 61-62 (1986); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804
(1985); see, e.g., Akins, 524 U.S. at 20 (referring to concrete adverseness indirectly by con-
trasting abstract disputes with living contests between adversaries). But the Court has en-
dorsed the more limited proposition that assuring concrete adverseness to sharpen
presentation of issues is not the only function standing doctrine performs, which is consis-
tent with this Article's recognition of remedial concreteness. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523
U.S. 1, 11 (1998) (Scalia, J.); see also Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 462-63
(1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (claiming that the view of
standing as only supporting concrete adverseness has been superseded).
404 See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 1I (stating that concrete adverseness is not the only function
that standing performs).
405 See Scalia, supra note 65, at 894-99.
406 See id. at 894.
407 See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561-62 (Scalia, J.) (noting that standing is
more difficult to establish when the plaintiff is the not the object of the regulation).
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based standing doctrine. 40 8 Indeed, this conception makes injury-in-
fact beside the point, since the central inquiry should compare a liti-
gant's interest to that of the majority to figure out whether a litigant
was in the minority.
409
The antimajoritarian thrust of this theory is noticeably at odds
with the standing cases' emphasis upon avoiding improper interfer-
ence with the democratic branches of government. Presumably,
Scalia would answer this by saying that proper interference serves the
interests of minorities, not majorities. 4 10 But it seems odd to say that it
is improper to interfere with executive branch violations of law at the
behest of beneficiaries of legislative enactments. 41' It suggests that
the judiciary need not enforce the law and that Congress must rely on
the relatively weak tool ofjawboning (through legislative oversight) or
the disruption of funding cutoffs in order to secure executive branch
compliance with the constitutional duty to faithfully execute the
law. 412 This seems at odds with traditional notions of separation of
powers, since it emphasizes congressional enforcement, rather than
enactment of law, and, in many cases, denies a judicial role in
enforcement.
Not only does Justice Scalia's countermajoritarian theory fail to
justify current doctrine, it does not add up on its own terms, for rea-
sons central to the general problem of formalist merits adjudication.
Scalia claims that courts should not protect the majority interest be-
cause they are no good at it.4 13 He argues that the judiciary's ten-
dency to "value[ ] abstract principle above concrete result" is fitting
for the protection of individuals, but not protection of majority inter-
ests. 4 14 He does not explain why merits adjudication in individual
rights cases would be (or should be) based on abstract principle, or
408 See Scalia, supra note 65, at 895 (arguing that not all injury would justify standing
under this conception).
409 But see id. (claiming that his conception explains the injury requirement).
410 See id. at 894.
411 Scalia's article suffers some problems of clarity on this point, because his concept
of majority and minority interests lacks definition. He suggests that the harm of under-
enforcement of law is a majoritarian harm. Id. This would suggest, for example, that bene-
ficiaries of environmental law are in the majority and regulated industries in the minority
(which raises issues under a system where money has influence and many people benefit
from corporate production). But he then suggests that a worker deprived of the benefit of
a particular OSHA regulation becomes a minority oppressed by the majority. Id. at 895.
But individuals make up majorities as well as minorities. Scalia does not explain why this
worker is not simply one of the individuals in the majority that secured passage of the
relevant legislation. Scalia seems to conflate lack of individual injury with membership in a
majority coalition and existence of injury with participation in a minority coalition.
412 Cf Bandes, supra note 73, at 262 (arguing that the Court's emphasis on avoiding
improper interference involves a choice not to fulfill "the Court's role of [e]nsuring that
the political branches do not exceed their powers").




why adjudication on behalf of majority interests would require empha-
sis upon concrete results. The analysis presented in this Article sug-
gests that Scalia basically has it backwards; individual rights cases
frequently become somewhat concrete, while adjudication of majority
interests, for example in the enforcement of statutes, involves some-
what abstract legal inquiries.415 Of course, adjudication of "minority"
interests in less vigorous enforcement of statutes involves equally ab-
stract inquires, for this minority interest relies upon the same sort of
contrary to law claims that advocates of stricter regulation must ad-
vance to prevail in court. At bottom, Scalia fails to appreciate the dif-
ference between a political decision to enact a law (which might well
be oriented to concrete results) and a judicial decision about how it
should be enforced (which is basically interpretive).
Justice Scalia has also suggested the possibility of relying upon
Article II as a source of standing doctrine.416 But that position has not
commanded a majority of the Court.4 17 While thorough discussion of
this theory would require another article, a brief indication of why this
argument may not prove satisfactory seems worthwhile. The Article II
theory begins with the premise that the Executive's power to "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed"4 1 3 limits other parties' ca-
pacity to sue.419 Historical evidence contradicts the thesis that the ex-
ecutive power to execute law is exclusive, for the states played a
greater role in executing federal law than did the executive branch of
415 Scalia puts forward environmental law as an example of law serving a majority inter-
est. See id. at 896-97.
416 See, e.g., Vt. Agency of Nat'l Res. v. United States, 529 U.S. 765, 778 n.8 (2000)
(Scalia, J.) (mentioning the possibility of Article II limitations upon standing); Fed. Elec-
tion Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 36 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that if "the
citizenry at large could sue to compel Executive compliance with the law," then the courts,
rather than the executive branch, would have "the primary responsibility to 'take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed'" (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)); Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (Scalia, J.) (arguing that the congressional creation of
citizen standing to vindicate public interest would "transfer" the President's duty to take
care that the law be faithfully executed to the courts); see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 209 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting
that the question of Article II's potential limitations "had not been argue[d]," but noting
Article II concerns implicated by the majority opinion).
417 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102 n.4 (1998) (Scalia, J.)
(stating that standing jurisprudence "derives from Article III and not Article II").
418 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
419 See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power To
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994) (discussing Article II); Steven G. Calabresi &
Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARv. L.
REV. 1153 (1992) (analyzing relationship between Articles II and III); Martin S. Flaherty,
The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996) (criticizing formalist approaches to
separation of powers); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administra-
tion, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1994) (discussing theory of unitary executive).
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the federal government in the early days of the Republic. 420 Such an
interpretation would disregard the historic role of state, territorial,
and tribal governments in executing laws, not to mention private
parties.
4 21
An exclusive executive enforcement power would not justify an
injury-in-fact theory of standing. It would instead require disallow-
ance of all private, state, tribal, and territorial actions litigating federal
public law questions, including actions brought by seriously injured
parties.
4 22
Furthermore, all litigants seeking judicial review, whether on stat-
utory or constitutional grounds, claim that the executive branch has
not faithfully executed the law. It is hard to see how the responsibility
to execute the law faithfully should limit claims that the executive
branch has violated the law.
423
Standing doctrine's frequent failure to perform the purposes jus-
tifying its place under Article III suggests that the Court ought to re-
consider standing doctrine. Injury's contribution of concreteness to
as-applied individual rights cases cannot justify standing as an over-
arching constitutional requirement governing a wide variety of cases
where injury is substantively irrelevant.424
420 See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REv. 1957,
2005-07 (1993) (discussing extensive reliance upon state officials to enforce federal law
prior to the advent of a large federal bureaucracy); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and
the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARv. L. REv. 2180, 2199 (1998) (dis-
cussing framers' expectation that federal government could rely upon state executive of-
ficers to enforce federal law).
421 See Vt. Agency of Nat. Res., 529 U.S. at 774-77 (recognizing the historic pedigree of
private qui tam actions to enforce federal law); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 289-90 (1981) (recognizing and approving the "cooperative federal-
ism" arrangement which allowed states to establish their own regulation with some mini-
mal standards set by federal government pervading environmental law); Nance v. EPA, 645
F.2d 701, 712-15 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding delegation of federal authority to Indian
Tribe).
422 Cf Buzbee, supra note 207, at 283 (pointing out the incongruity of Justice Scalia's
suggestion of an Article II basis for standing without even arguing that citizens can never
enforce statutory law).
423 See Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and
Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 647 (1999) (arguing that permitting suits brought by citi-
zens to allege that an executive branch official has violated the law "does no violence to
Article II"); Sunstein, supra note 107, at 1471 (arguing that the "'take Care'" clause "do[es]
not authorize the executive branch to violate the law"); see also Buzbee, supra note 207, at
274-77 (discussing how citizen suits can only enforce detailed political judgments embod-
ied in regulations and statutes).
424 Numerous critics have suggested that standing requirements under Article III
should yield to a principle of allowing Congress to create causes of action as it sees fit. See
Buzbee, supra note 207, at 283 ("[L]ogic argues strongly for standing analysis tied merely
to the presence or absence of a statutorily conferred cause of action." (footnote omitted));
Fletcher, supra note 72, at 223 (proposing to "abandon the idea that Article III requires a
showing of 'injury in fact'"); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law
Litigation, 42 DuKE L.J. 1141, 1169 (1993) (arguing that "nothing in the Constitution de-
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Of course, standing doctrine has never been applied consistently,
as many critics have frequently noted.425 Such inconsistency raises the
possibility that standing requirement demands might vary with doctri-
nal needs for concreteness. 426 Current practice does not vary stand-
ing demands in such a systematic fashion. For example, some
observers claim that the Court has been especially demanding in envi-
ronmental cases, even though individual injury has little to do with
the merits of many environmental claims reaching the Supreme
Court.
42 7
The suggestion that standing might vary with the need for con-
creteness in individual cases might support retention of ripeness juris-
prudence, but abandonment of standing requirements. For the
ripeness doctrine does engage in an inquiry into a particular case's
need for concrete context.428 Even without an injured litigant, the
Court could dismiss a case in which the law has not been applied to
clarify the scope of the challenger's claim. And mootness could still
function to bar abstract orders, that is, cases in which ideological
plaintiffs seek orders that remedy hypothetical misconduct that seems
unlikely to occur.
mands a private rights model of adjudication"); RichardJ. Pierce,Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L. J. 1170, 1178
(1993) ("[T]he Court had consistently respected indications of congressional intent to
confer standing on individuals with particular interests in the outcome of agency proceed-
ings." (footnote omitted)); Sunstein, supra note 107, at 1461-62 (stating that Article III
does not limit authority to adjudicate congressionally created causes of action). This Arti-
cle shows that a functional approach also supports the conclusion that courts should not
impose standing limitations under the Constitution.
425 See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 73, at 266 (stating the injuries similar to those found
insufficient in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1
(1972), and Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), have justified standing in other
cases); Fletcher, supra note 72, at 221 ("The structure of standing law in the federal courts
has long been criticized as incoherent."); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Causation as a Standing Re-
quirement: The Unprincipled Use of Judicial Restraint, 69 Ky. L.J. 185, 212 (1980) (criticizing
judicial manipulation of redressability requirement); Nichol, supra note 424, at 1142-43
(discussing the Court's departure from prior standing doctrine in Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)).
426 See Bandes, supra note 73, at 269 (arguing that adversity and concreteness "are mat-
ters of degree" and that the "requisite quantity [of these attributes] should vary according
to the nature of the case" (footnote omitted)).
427 See Katherine B. Steuer & Robin L. Juni, Note, Court Access for Environmental Plain-
tiffs: Standing Doctrine in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 15 HARV. ENVrL. L. Rv.
187, 188 (1991) (asserting that the Supreme Court's decision in Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990), renders the injury-in-fact requirement of standing more
difficult to meet in environmental citizen suits).
428 See Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75
YALE L.J. 517, 529-31 (1966) (suggesting that flexible application of the ripeness doctrine
reflects the Court's view that some cases require more factual context than others). Some
of the cases analyzed in this Article, however, suggest that the Court often imagines that
concrete facts will clarify a case even though an analysis of the relevant substantive law
suggests that they would not. See supra notes 268-75 and accompanying text.
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The expansion of certiorari jurisdiction since Professor Bickel's
time lessens the need for justiciability doctrine to avoid or postpone
decision at the Supreme Court level. 429 But justiciability remains an
important tool for limiting or postponing decisions in the lower fed-
eral courts. 430 So, passive virtues should continue to play some role,
albeit a reduced one.
Since a litigant without injury can bring concreteness to a case by
discovering facts about others' injuries, there seems to be no strong
need for a standing doctrine even in cases where concreteness does
help. The Court can demand concreteness through its approach to
the merits of a claim. As long as the Court responds to injuries on the
merits, lawyers will bring somebody's concrete experience into their
cases.
Of course, all of these arguments assume that standing law should
perform some function.43 1 Standing doctrine will likely persist, pre-
cisely because of the Court's formalist tendencies. Standing doctrine
establishes a set of formal rules. Those rules have no basis in the text
of the Constitution, which, after all, authorizes jurisdiction over cases
and controversies, terms that collectively may embrace a wide range of
judicial proceedings. 432 And, in light of the long tradition of relator
and public actions requiring no injury, many commentators have con-
cluded that standing has no basis in original intent either. 433 Still, at
this point, stare decisis supports standing. Because of stare decisis,
recognition of standing doctrine's futility may not lead the Court to
kill the doctrine outright or even to confine it to as-applied individual
rights challenges that use injury to create a context for resolution of
429 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80-81 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing that the Court should have denied certiorari on the issue of whether the Constitu-
tion limits visitation rights of grandparents because there was "no pressing need" to do so).
I am grateful to Harry Wellington for this suggestion.
430 I am grateful to Richard Fallon for emphasizing this.
431 See Scharpf, supra note 428, at 534 ("Professor Bickel's justification of the passive
virtues is, at bottom, a functional one.").
432 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992) (suggesting that the
literal language of the Constitution cannotjustify standing doctrine by pointing out that an
.executive inquiry" can be called a "'case'" and that a "legislative dispute" can be called a
"'controversy"'); Pushaw, supra note 83, at 480-82, 526-27 (arguing that, both historically
and in present times, cases do not necessarily involve controversies between adverse
parties).
433 See Raoul Berger, Standing To Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?,
78 YALE L.J. 816, 840 (1969) (calling "the notion that the Constitution demands injury to a
personal interest ... historically unfounded"); Nichol, supra note 424, at 1151-52 (discuss-
ing lack of historical requirement of injury under Article III); Pushaw, supra note 63, at
477-85 (arguing that a neo-federalist approach would allow standing without injury-in-fact,
if Congress or the Constitution authorized suit); see also Evan Caminker, The Constitutional-
ity of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341 (1989) (examining the long history of qui tam
actions, which do not require injury).
2004]
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the merits.4 3 4 But recognition of standing's dysfunctional nature
should, at a minimum, lead to more liberal treatment of injury, which
might include less use of heightened pleading requirements to screen
out injured plaintiffs and more generous application of the doctrine
that a court should view a plaintiff's challenged allegations of injury in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff on summary judgment.435
Lowering these barriers to presentation of facts might increase the
flow of concrete experience into the courtroom and therefore might
do more to improve concreteness than the standing doctrine ever
did.
4 3 6
E. Passive Virtues Revisited: The Active Virtues
Since standing doctrine has not realized its promise to make liti-
gation more concrete, we should revisit our vision of passive virtues.
The hope that doctrines limiting which parties can get into court
would significantly improve the wisdom and quality of judicial deci-
sion-making on the merits seems, 43 7 well, rather indirect.4 38 A litigant
with standing will almost always come along sooner or later seeking
adjudication of an issue.4 39 The Court's decisions in Bush v. Gore,
440
434 See generally Schauer, supra note 201, at 655 (explaining that reliance on general
reasoning affecting multiple hypothetical cases makes the requirement of a "concrete case
seem[ ] peculiar").
435 See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 590-93 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that the Court did not properly apply summary judgment principles in denying standing);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 528 (1975) (Brennan,J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court
denied standing through application of a heightened pleading standard); cf Nichol, supra
note 424, at 1167 (describing how the Court has "bolstered standing requirements [over]
two decades"); Winter, supra note 70, at 1373 (arguing that standing law has "increas-
ingly . .. restrict[ed] citizens' claims against their government").
436 See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2557-58 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(stating that the need for a fuller factual record justifies dismissal of writ of certiorari for
case decided below on the pleadings after briefing and oral argument). See generally Patri-
cia M. Wald, Summay Judgment At Sixty, 76 TEx. L. REv. 1897, 1942-43 (1998) (raising the
issue of whether summary judgment and increased emphasis on pleadings are cutting fed-
eral courts off from human experience).
437 See Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges As Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1709, 1713 (1998)
(describing Bickel's passive virtues as focused upon avoiding decisions through denials of
certiorari and doctrines of standing, ripeness, and political questions).
438 Standing doctrine may have emerged as a reaction against Lochnerism, since re-
jected on the merits. See Winter, supra note 70, at 1455-57 (suggesting that standing doc-
trine allowed liberals to avoid Lochner-era vices).
439 See Scharpf, supra note 428, at 536 (asserting that standing and other justiciability
restraints, apart from the political question doctrine, avoid a case, not the constitutional
issue involved).
440 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam) (holding that Florida should not recount ballots
in the 2000 Presidential election); see alsoJack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary
Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1407 (2001) (noting that Bush v. Gore has
.shaken the faith of many legal academics in the Supreme Court and in the system of
judicial review" because of its highly partisan nature).
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United States v. Lopez, 44 1 and United States v. Mo7ison442 may demon-
strate that standing cannot effectively constrain an activist judiciary.
44 3
The ideal of judicial practices designed to improve the concreteness
of public law does have merit, even if some public law can never be
terribly concrete because of its fundamental structure.4 44 But these
practices must address how the Court handles the merits when it does
reach them, not just how the Court might postpone the day when it
reaches the merits.
4 45
1. Confining Decisions to Briefed Issues
The Court often emphasizes that standing and otherjudicial doc-
trines assure adverse presentations helping to define and illuminate
the issues before it. Even if the Court has proper litigants (however
defined) before it, the adverse presentation does the Court no good if
it decides issues that the parties have not briefed.
4 46
The Court's doctrine demands that the Court confine itself to
briefed issues. 44 7 But the Court often ignores this doctrine. 4 48  In-
441 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (holding, for the first time since the New Deal, that
Congress has exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause); see also William W. Buz-
bee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REv. 87, 111 (2001) ("Lopez
was the first case in more than fifty years to find that Congress had exceeded the bounds of
the Commerce Clause.").
442 529 U.S. 598, 605, 627 (2000) (holding that Congress lacked the authority under
the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment to enact the Violence Against Wo-
men Act); see also Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 441, at 111 (characterizing Morrison as
"the first case [in more than fifty years] in which the Court rejected an explicit congres-
sional finding that an activity had a substantial effect on interstate commerce"); Catharine
A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States v. Morrison, 114 IARv. L. REv.
135, 135 (2000) (noting that Morrison is only the second case since Reconstruction to inval-
idate a federal antidiscrimination statute).
443 Because the litigants in all of these cases had standing, the Court was able to inter-
pret aggressively constitutional constraints on legislative power.
444 See Tushnet, supra note 77, at 1706-07 (suggesting several procedural devices to
serve standing's goal of aiding the understanding of a decision's consequences).
445 See Katyal, supra note 437, at 1713-15 (linking "'the constructive uses of si-
lence[s]'" and the giving of advice in merits opinions to Bickel's passive virtues) (quoting
Sunstein, supra note 166, at 7 (footnote omitted)); Sunstein, supra note 166, at 51 (linking
minimalist reasoning on the merits to Bickel's "passive virtues"); see, e.g., Elliott, supra note
147, at 131 (suggesting that even if the Court had avoided deciding Chadha, "other cases
challenging legislative vetoes" on the Court's docket would have forced it to address the
issues of the technique's constitutionality).
446 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 121 (1998) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (criticizing parts of the majority opinion not informed by parties' briefing as
not "benefit[ing] from the 'concrete adverseness' that the standing doctrine is meant to
ensure"); cf Fiss, supra note 39, at 13 ("The judge is entitled to exercise power only after he
has participated in a dialogue about the meaning of ... public values.").
447 See, e.g., Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 734 & n.8 (1997)
(refusing to address the issue of whether a litigant making a takings claim had exhausted
available state procedures, because the issue was not briefed).
448 See, e.g., Devins, supra note 110, at 261-62 (explaining that the Court in Erie Rail-
road Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), overruled Swift v. Tyson even though no party
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deed, justicability doctrines undermine the practice of resolving only
issues briefed by the parties. 449 For they require that the Court con-
sider jurisdictional defects whether or not the parties raise them.
450
The Court should adopt a simple solution to this problem. When it
sees a potential jurisdictional defect not adequately briefed by the par-
ties, it should order briefing. 451 It should not decide those issues, or
any other, without briefing.
A less obvious problem comes from judicial selection of ratio-
nales for resolution of briefed issues. The Court sometimes chooses
rationales that neither party has briefed. 452 This practice carries with
it some of the same risks of unwise decision-making that come from
deciding unbriefed issues. The Court can address this problem by re-
questing supplemental briefing when it sees the need to venture be-
yond the rationales offered by the parties. But even this may not
suffice if none of the parties has an interest in the rationale that the
Court believes serves the purposes of the law.
45 3
Current doctrine, however, allows the Court to use rationales not
offered by the parties, so long as the Court confines itself to issues the
sought that ruling); Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 915 n.16 (1990) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) (chiding the majority for addressing ripeness when it was not briefed
or argued).
449 See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 637 (1979) (Powell, J., dis-
senting) (chiding majority for moomess dismissal when defendant below did not argue this
point); see also FW/PBS, Inc., v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230-31 (1990) (finding a lack
of standing, though neither party raised the issue). The Dallas case shows how this failure
makes litigation abstract. Because both parties thought no standing issue existed, the re-
cord lacked facts demonstrating standing. See id. at 234-35. Dallas's attorney believed that
some of the petitioners had lost their licenses to run adult entertainment businesses under
the provisions they sought to challenge. Id. at 235. If so, then the Court decided the
standing issue based on a hypothetical set of facts constructed from an inadequate record,
rather than the facts of the living contest that gave rise to the litigation. Cf id. at 249
(Stevens, J., concurring) (declaring that he would remand for an evidentiary hearing,
rather than order dismissal on standing grounds).
450 See Devins, supra note 110, at 258 (asserting that if the plaintiff lacks standing, the
judiciary must dismiss the case, whether or not the defendant raises a standing defect); see
also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 393-94 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (chiding majority for its treatment of standing in a case where neither party
raised it); Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993) (noting that the
Court may raise nonjurisdictional ripeness defect "on [its] own motion").
451 See, e.g., Arizonans for Official Eng. v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997) (noting that
the Court called for briefing on standing when it granted the petition for certiorari). Com-
pare Reno, 509 U.S. at 57 n.18 (resolving ripeness claim only briefly touched upon in the
briefs), with id. at 67-68 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (chiding the Court for reaching a
decision on ripeness).
452 See Sup. CT. R. 14(1) (a) ("The statement of any question presented is deemed to
comprise every subsidiary question fairly included therein.").
453 See, e.g., Devins, supra note l10, at 262 (arguing that "the Justices [deciding Erie]
understood that neither party would call for the overruling of Swift-even if the Court
specifically requested briefing on the issue").
2004] STANDING FOR NOTHING
parties raised. 454 Because the line between an issue and a rationale
can be very blurry,455 allowing original rationales can undermine the
rule limiting the Court to briefed issues.
2. Preferring Narrow Grounds for Decision
Whether or not the plaintiff experiences injury, judges make
choices about whether to choose narrow or broad grounds for deci-
sions.456 An injured plaintiff under current doctrines licenses the
Court to decide the case on any grounds it finds sensible, although
the Court usually chooses to confine itself to questions presented by
litigants. 457 And it can choose broad grounds for decision-making if it
wants to.
4 5 8
Narrow decisions tend toward concreteness. They rely less on
general abstractions about law and more upon specific reasons for
particular outcomes in a case. Narrow decisions could have another
benefit: they might lessen the number of concurring decisions. 459
These days, multiple Supreme Court opinions, each offering a differ-
454 See id. at 282 (arguing that once an issue is before the Court, the Court should look
to "the law, not just the arguments of the parties" to resolve the case).
455 For example, in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788 (1985), the Court addressed a First Amendment challenge to the exclusion of advo-
cacy organizations from a government charitable solicitation drive. See Cornelius, 473 U.S.
at 790. The Court declined to resolve the "issue" of whether the government excluded the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund "because it disagreed with their viewpoints,"
since that issue "was neither decided below nor fully briefed before this Court." Id. at 812.
If the Court had defined the issue as whether the exclusion violated the First Amendment,
then the "issue" of motivation might become an argument about broader free speech,
rather than a separate issue. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 333-34 (2002) (identifying four theories that were separate issues
not before the Court and three theories as "fairly encompassed" within the facial takings
claim before the Court); Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 734 (1997)
(dividing the question of the ripeness of a takings claim into two sub-issues: whether an
agency has made a final land use decision and whether the applicant has sought compensa-
tion through available administrative procedures).
456 See Sunstein, supra note 166 (discussing judicial "minimalism").
457 See Pushaw, supra note 83, at 489-93 (noting that cases confer upon judges the
"right [to] expound[ ] the law" (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted)); see, e.g.,
Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535 (1992) (acknowledging that the Court has
occasionally asked litigants to brief issues not raised in the petition for certiorari); cf Liver-
pool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm'rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885) (announcing
rule forbidding formulation of a "rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the
precise facts to which it is to be applied"); Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 330 (1991)
(White, J., dissenting) (citing Liverpool rule); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S.
491, 501 (1985) (same); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 609-15 (1973) (declining to
find facial overbreadth when alleged overbreadth appears insubstantial).
458 See Fallon, supra note 88, at 24 (noting that "the Court routinely issues broad pro-
nouncements" and "occasionally renders alternative holdings" to achieve "doctrinal clarifi-
cation on multiple fronts" (footnotes omitted)); Sunstein, supra note 166, at 15 (claiming
that no consensus exists on the appropriateness of minimalism).
459 Cf Sunstein, supra note 166, at 17, 20 (suggesting that concrete narrow decisions
can bring together a multi-member court).
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ent rationale for the same result, seem fairly common.460 Such opin-
ions can leave the law in a state of confusion. 461 If judges directed
substantial energy toward finding narrow grounds for agreement, one
might see shorter, clearer opinions-and fewer of them-in some
cases.
4 6 2
Judges care about matters other than the concreteness of their
decisions for perfectly good reasons. Narrow decisions can lead to
incoherence in the law through the proliferation of numerous indi-
vidual results tied together by no coherent set of principles. 463 Dor-
mant Commerce Clause jurisprudence regarding interstate taxation
offers perhaps the best example of this problem.
464
460 See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (addressing the question
of transientjurisdiction in a case generating three opinions); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (generating no majority opinion and four separately articu-
lated opinions).
461 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2335-37 (2003) (describing lower court
confusion in the wake of multiple opinions in Bakke and acknowledging difficulty of apply-
ing the test for interpreting such opinions); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63-64
(1996) (describing lower court confusion in the wake of the Union Gas Court's failure to
agree upon a rationale).
462 See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 394 (1996) (Souter,J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (asserting that the Court's decision to address a standing issue pre-
vented issuance of a unanimous opinion on the question forming the basis for certiorari);
Yee, 503 U.S. at 539 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (writing separate concurrence due to un-
necessary remarks in the majority opinion regarding an issue the Court had concluded was
not within the scope of the question presented); id. (Souter, J., concurring) (same).
463 See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2351-53 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that making
diversity a compelling state interest in one context, but not in another, is unprincipled); cf
Sunstein, supra note 166, at 16 (discussingJustice Scalia's view that broad rules serve rule of
law values).
464 See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610-11 &
nn.2-3 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (calling Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence
"unworkable" and citing numerous statements by Justices remarking on its incoherence);
DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS
1789-1888, at 234 (1985) (describing this jurisprudence as "appear[ing] arbitrary, con-
clusory, and irreconcilable with the constitutional text"); LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAw 439 (2d ed. 1988) (describing the jurisprudence as "ad hoc" and not
based on "consistent application of coherent principles"); Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial
Constitution, 1995 SuP. CT. REV. 217, 217 (discussing the ubiquity of Dormant Commerce
Clause rulings); Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business: Perspectives on Two
Centuries of Constitutional Adjudication, 41 TAX LAw. 37, 44 (1987) (chiding the Court for
drawing a line "discernible, if at all, only to itself"). I am not suggesting that Dormant
Commerce Clause cases rely upon injury to produce concreteness. Cf Hunt v. Wash. State
Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343-44, 353-54 (1977) (injuries focus on economic
burdens, while resolution of merits focuses on lack of consumer benefits associated with
those burdens). Indeed, Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence combines narrow rul-
ings with abstraction. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 520 U.S. at 568-69, 575-76,
595 (stating that limitations on tax exemption available for charities benefitting out-of-state
residents facially discriminates and therefore violates the Dormant Commerce Clause, in
spite of lack of impact on national markets).
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Furthermore, narrow decisions can raise transaction costs. 465 De-
cisions at a high degree of generality, such as the Court's much
maligned sovereign immunity jurisprudence and its celebrated Brown
decision, can clarify the contours of a large number of situations at
once.
4 6 6
Hence, the decision about whether to prefer narrow grounds of
decision will necessarily involve many considerations. 467 But it does
offer a potential means of increasing the concreteness of decisions.
The desire to write narrow decisions can conflict with the desire
to address the precise issues briefed. If the litigants frame the issues
broadly, then a narrow decision may not benefit from party presenta-
tion of the issues.4 68 The narrowly framed issue can lose, to use a
poorly chosen term, concrete adverseness. But the Court can solve
this problem by adopting a practice of asking for supplemental brief-
ing on narrowly defined questions when litigants frame a dispute too
broadly.
4 6 9
The Court's practice of disfavoring facial challenges serves the
function that the Court wrongly assigns to the standing doctrine:
avoidance of improper interference with democratic decisions. 4 70 It
does this, however, with sensitivity to doctrine-specific needs to inter-
fere sufficiently with democratic decisions to avoid abridgment of con-
stitutional rights. This need justifies, for example, the Court's
willingness to strike down laws as overly vague or broad under the First
Amendment, even though such laws may have many valid
applications.
4 71
465 See Sunstein, supra note 166, at 17 (linking narrow decisions to high costs for liti-
gants and judges in subsequent cases).
466 Cf Elliott, supra note 147, at 162 (suggesting the possibility that the broad opinion
in Chadha might be a "wise exercise of judicial statesmanship").
467 See generally Sunstein, supra note 166 (discussing relevant considerations in the
choice of whether or not to prefer narrow grounds of decision).
468 See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 291, at 791-92 (pointing out that the disputants in
Chadha may not thought it to be in their best interest to define the issue narrowly).
469 See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535 (1992) (stating that the Court
has occasionally asked litigants "to address an important question of law not raised in the
petition for certiorari"); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 281 (1978)
(plurality opinion) (discussing how the Court requested supplemental briefing on statu-
tory civil rights claim in hopes of obviating the need to resolve a constitutional equal pro-
tection issue). A more modest, and probably insufficient cure, would rely upon narrow
questions at oral argument. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 n.3 (1992)
(noting that the Court relied upon theory raised only in oral argument and a reply brief,
and characterizing this consideration as proper). But see id. at 397-98 (White, J., concur-
ring) (disagreeing with majority's decision to consider an issue so raised).
470 See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975) (stating that "cau-
tion" is needed when considering facial challenges, because "invalidation may... unneces-
sar[il]y interfere[ ] with ... state regulatory program[s]").
471 See Doff, supra note 96, at 261-79 (arguing the overbreadth doctrine protects
against chilling of protected conduct); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83
HARv. L. REV. 844 (1970); see also, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 123 S. Ct. 2191, 2196 (2003) ("We
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The Court, however, at times, properly disallows as-applied chal-
lenges and limits litigants to facial challenges. For example, under
the Commerce Clause, the Court, even after the revival ofjudicial lim-
itation of congressional regulatory power under Lopez and Morrison,
subscribes to the rule that a regulatory program remains constitu-
tional even if a particular commercial application of that program
would violate the Commerce Clause if viewed in isolation.472 This rule
also limits improper interference with political decisions of elected
officials, by eschewing interference with programs addressing
problems that substantially affect interstate commerce through the ag-
gregation of seemingly local activities. 473 One may question whether
the Court has interfered improperly with democratic decision-making
in spite of these limits and ask whether the Court should simply rely
on the political decision-making process to restrain federal power in
light of the history of arbitrary abstraction in this area.474 Still, this
rule against facial challenges constrains interference and shows that
the desire for concreteness in adjudication must sometimes yield to
larger concerns. This exception to the preference for narrow grounds
shows that the rule favoring narrow decisions mustbe subject to some
bounds and remain flexible.
This Article's exploration of the paradox created by the Court's
insistence upon proof of injury even as the Court's jurisprudence di-
minishes injury's relevance 475 can help clarify the debate regarding
facial versus as-applied challenges-a debate about when a Court
should strike down a statute as invalid and when it should hold that a
statute is only invalid as applied to a particular litigant. Several com-
have provided this expansive remedy out of concern that the threat of enforcement of an
overbroad law may deter or 'chill' constitutionally protected speech"); City of Chicago v.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 (1999) (striking down antiloitering ordinance as impermissibly
vague on its face). See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE
L.J. 853 (1991) (analyzing the Court's overbreadth doctrine).
472 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (holding that when "'a...
regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual
instances arising under that statute is of no consequence'" (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392
U.S. 183, 197 n.27 (1968))); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000) (reaffirm-
ing the Lopez framework).; Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159,
173 (2001) (noting that the Court would have to consider regulated activity "in the aggre-
gate" to adjudicate constitutionality of Clean Water Act jurisdiction under the Commerce
Clause).
473 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; see alsoJohn Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets
the Delhi Sands blower-Loving Fly, 97 MicH. L. REv. 174, 192-204 (1998) (discussing the ag-
gregation issue in light of Lopez).
474 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628-55 (Souter, J., dissenting); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 603-07
(Souter, J., dissenting).
475 See, e.g., Isserles, supra note 236, at 435 n.340, 449-51 (discussing examples of doc-
trinal shifts away from consideration of the effects upon individuals in the free exercise
area). See generally Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 336 (discussing conceptions of free exer-
cise based on formal equality, as well as conceptions based on "privileges").
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mentators have suggested that a continuum exists between pure as-
applied challenges and facial challenges that ask a court to strike
down rules in their entirety.4 76 This Article's analysis helps clarify the
nature of the continuum.
The as-applied end of the continuum involves challenges in
which the intensity of the injury or defendant misconduct influences
the merits, as in takings cases and procedural due process cases. 477 In
such cases, even when a plaintiff challenges a formal legal rule, the
result of the case is likely to have uncertain precedential significance
for the challenged rule itself, because the intensity and nature of the
injury can vary from case to case. In these instances, the injury makes
the consequences of an application of a legal rule clear. The Court's
focus on individual consequences, however, obscures the case's signifi-
cance for the rule as a whole.
478
In the middle of the continuum, the Court explicitly invalidates
only part of a rule. 479 The Court may categorize the injury in order to
frame the issue it does resolve or the relief it offers, instead of explor-
ing the injury's intensity.480 But because both the courts and lawyers
can frame issues broadly, the injury does not determine the breadth
of these holdings or the remedies. 481 Furthermore, the Court need
not employ injury to frame the case at all. Instead, it may focus on the
government defendant's identity or conduct,482 the holding of a lower
476 See, e.g., Doff, supra note 96, at 294 ("The distinction between as-applied and facial
challenges may confuse more than it illuminates." (footnote omitted)).
477 See e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1521 (2003)
(degree of defendant misconduct measured, in part, by seriousness of plaintiff's injuries
bears upon constitutionality of a punitive damages award); Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S.
1, 4, 14-16 (1991) (relying upon the potential injury, i.e., the risk of erroneous deprivation
in a litigant's particular situation, to justify a holding that a prejudgment statute violated
his due process rights).
478 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 71-72 (2000) (plurality opinion) (using
information about parent's conduct in limiting grandfather's visitation and state trial
court's reasoning to frame an as-applied challenge, thereby leaving the opinion unclear as
to the overall validity of Washington's statute).
479 See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 23-26 (1960) (holding that Congress
may proscribe state interference with voting rights under a statute that proscribed state or
private interference with voting rights, noting that further inquiry into the constitutionality
of the statute in other factual contexts was unwarranted).
480 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 402-06, 420 (1989) (framing the issue in
terms of respondent's conduct, which was categorized as expressive).
481 See, e.g., id. at 399, 403 n.3 (framing issue in terms of expressive conduct generally,
notjust demonstrations at the Republican National Convention like the conduct at issue in
the case). See generally Schauer, supra note 195 (observing that "although rights might be
more or less general, a degree of generality is a necessary feature of all rights"); Schauer,
supra note 201 (explaining that reasons always go beyond the facts they relate to).
482 See, e.g., Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168-69 (2002) (framing a chal-
lenge to the constitutional adequacy of notice in terms of the defendant's conduct in deliv-
ering a certified letter under a statute that authorized use of the mail generally); Raines,
362 U.S. at 25-26 (limiting challenge to statutory subrule framed by defendants' identity as
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court,48 3 or its own view of the subrule it wishes to adjudicate.48 4 Be-
cause of this fluidity, many cases can be characterized as either chal-
lenges to rules or challenges to application of rules.
48 5
Finally, many statutory challenges to administrative regulations,
most structural constitutional law challenges, and a significant num-
ber of individual rights cases involve facial challenges, in which the
principal issue is whether a rule violates some constitutional or statu-
tory norm. 486 As legal tests become more formal, facial challenges
should become more common, because formal tests do not depend
upon intensity of injury at all, but upon the formal properties of legal
rules and resolution of conflict of laws claims.
487
In another variant of the paradox between formalism and insis-
tence on concreteness, the Court seems to be demanding more facial
challenges at the same time that some of its members question their
legitimacy on the basis of a private rights model. The Salerno rule,
which suggests that a litigant must show that every application of a
rule is invalid in order to prevail in a facial challenge, 488 seems to
reflect a view that constitutional litigation hinges upon the intensity of
state officials); cf Isserles, supra note 236, at 433 (describing challenge to statute construed
to conform to a particular context as an as-applied challenge).
483 See Isserles, supra note 236, at 429-30 (suggesting that challenges to statutes after
they have been narrowed through judicial construction may be considered facial
challenges).
484 See Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1556-57 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (accusing plurality of incorrectly labeling an as-applied challenge as
a facial one, and adjudicating it based on a construction implicit in a trial court's jury
instruction).
485 See Adler, Moral Structure, supra note 325, at 4, 36, 37, 156-57 (characterizing most
cases as involving "rights against rules"); Fallon, supra note 235, at 1368 (arguing that as-
applied challenges remain the norm); Isserles, supra note 236, at 423-51 (characterizing
many cases as involving as-applied challenges). Further inquiry might lead to a less agnos-
tic position, but if so, this would likely require more elaborate definitions of as-applied and
facial challenges than I can offer in this Article. I confine myself to describing the basic
illumination that the concreteness paradox provides, without extensive further analysis.
486 See Dorf, supra note 96, at 260 (noting that the Court views the drawing of discrimi-
natory lines as a constitutional violation, irrespective of their effects); Isserles, supra note
236, at 405 (equating facial challenges to regulations under a statute with facial challenges
to the constitutionality of a statute); Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. CT. REV.
1, 8 (arguing that facial invalidity involves the "relationship" between the rule and the
"applicable constitutional law"); see, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 76 (2000) (Sou-
ter, J., concurring) (noting that the lower court resolved a facial challenge to a statute
allowing any person visitation rights when visitation serves the child's best interests "based
on the text of the statute alone, not its application to any particular case" (footnote omit-
ted)); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334 (1988) (holding that a prohibition on signs that are
critical of a foreign government is an invalid content-based restriction of speech); Police
Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101-02 (1972) (holding that a prohibition on all
picketing of schools except peaceful labor picketing was an invalid content-based
restriction).
487 See Isserles, supra note 236, at 363-64 (stating that a "'valid rule facial challenge'"
confronts a "constitutional defect inhering in the terms of the statute itself').
488 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
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injuries, though many cases involve some analysis of conflict of law
claims. 48 9 But in Salerno itself, the Court engaged in an abstract analy-
sis that properly focused on the general issue of whether the Constitu-
tion permitted pretrial detentions based upon risks to the
community's safety, rather than on the risk of pretrial flight.490 The
broader perspective that this Article offers, by extending the rights-
against-rules thesis beyond the area of individual rights, confirms that
Salerno properly affirmed the legitimacy of adjudication of facial con-
flict of laws claims. 491 The preference for narrow decisions involves an
eagerness to seize narrower grounds when they are available. It does
not, however, suggest that broad decisions are per se illegitimate.
492
Concreteness after the private law model requires that the Court
frame issues in terms of the facts of the case, use those facts to ex-
amine the challenged law's effects, and provide rationales linking the
case's results to those facts. This approach can work for a number of
doctrinal tests in the individual rights area, especially when the doc-
trines permit consideration of effects. But it requires a court to
choose that approach in the face of some reasons to become more
abstract. That choice, unlike decisions about standing, can enhance
the concreteness of litigation.
3. Adding Context and Cultivating Humility
These days, the Court seems quite confident, perhaps overly con-
fident, in its ability to discern the meaning of the Constitution with
respect to vexing issues of federalism and separation of powers. 493 Al-
though the Court recognizes functional considerations that invite ex-
amination of context, it sometimes makes judgments without good
information about relevant context.
489 See Isserles, supra note 236, at 383 (concluding that Salerno's test requires a "Hercu-
lean effort" to demonstrate that "each and every [hypothetical] application of a statute" is
invalid). Professor Isserles, however, concludes that the Salerno test should be read as not
requiring the hypothetical inquiry it seems on its face to call for. See id. at 386-88.
490 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747-51; see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
739-40 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that the Court has never applied the test
Salerno suggests, not even in Salerno itself).
491 Isserles, supra note 236, at 387 (pointing out that a facial challenge demonstrates
that the terms of a statute contain a "constitutional infirmity" when "measured against the
relevant constitutional doctrine").
492 See id. at 421-23 (noting that the choice of whether to strike down a statute on its
face or to adjudicate it more narrowly must rest upon an assessment of the "practical
effects").
493 See, e.g., Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 441, at 89 (discussing the Court's lack of
deference toward legislative findings); Timothy Zick, Marbury Ascendant: The Rehnquist
Court and the Power To "Say What the Law Is", 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 839, 843-44 (2002)
(discussing the Court's declining deference to congressional interpretation of the Four-
teenth Amendment).
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For example, take the sovereign immunity cases. Making the
states immune from private damage suits, as the Court's sovereign im-
munity jurisprudence does, 494 raises functional issues under the
Supremacy Clause. 49 5 Since that clause requires that federal law re-
main supreme, even the modern Court agrees that states must comply
with federal law.49 6 This raises the issue of whether disallowing private
enforcement suits will liberate the states from compliance. The Court
answered this question by assuming that states will comply with federal
law even without private enforcement and by pointing out that federal
enforcement (as opposed to private enforcement) remains available
under the Court's sovereign immunity law.49 7 Yet the Court consid-
ered no data about the validity of the assumption that states will gen-
erally comply with federal law absent private enforcement. 498 Thus,
the Court obviously did not have an adequate basis for its conclusion
that states will continue to comply with federal law, or that federal
enforcement, which might be sporadic because of resource con-
straints, produces substantial state compliance. 499 Hence, the Court's
belief that sovereign immunity does not conflict with the Supremacy
Clause appears suspect.500 The Court will likely make better judg-
494 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 731-35 (1999).
495 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 153-158 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
496 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Alden, 527 U.S. at 754-55; cf Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 278 (1997) (Kennedy, J.) (stating that "'the need to promote the
supremacy of federal law must be accommodated to the constitutional immunity of the
States'" (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984)).
497 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 755; Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71 n.14. In addition, suits for
injunctive relief may lie against state officials acting in their official capacities. See Alden,
527 U.S. at 756-57 (noting that some suits against state officials are permitted); see, e.g.,
Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 635, 648 (2002) (holding that a telecom-
munications company may sue state officials acting in their official capacities under federal
law); cf Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 281-88 (declining to authorize a suit against state
officials when state title to land is at stake); Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh
Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex Parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 495, 510-41
(1997) (discussing "the availability of injunctive relief against state officers to prevent viola-
tions of federal law" (footnote omitted)). Congress may abrogate state immunity when
acting under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 756; Seminole Tribe, 517
U.S. at 59; cf Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 634-35 (1999) (quoting language from Seminole Tribe in invalidating federal abroga-
tion of state immunity from private suit for patent infringement); City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 517-36 (1997) (construing congressional enforcement power under the
Fourteenth Amendment narrowly). In addition, states may consent to suit. See Alden, 527
U.S. at 755.
498 Cf Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 157 n.52 (Souter, J., dissenting) (expressing skepti-
cism about the efficacy of the remaining remedies).
499 Cf Alden, 527 U.S. at 757 ("Established rules provide ample means to correct ongo-
ing violations of the law .... ).
500 Cf id. at 810 (Souter, J., dissenting) (expressing skepticism about the capacity of
the federal government to enforce the Fair Labor Standards Act); DanielJ. Meltzer, Over-
coming Immunity: The Case of Federal Regulation of Intellectual Property, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1331
(2001) (discussing problems with the remedies remaining after the Court disallowed dam-
age suits against states for violation of intellectual property law).
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ments about the congruence of broad sovereign immunity and the
Supremacy Clause if it remains aware of its information deficit and
tries to compensate for it.
Contextual knowledge, such as knowledge about the behavior of
state governments and the effects of enforcement (or lack thereof)
comes slowly over time. This kind of knowledge is often important to
wise constitutional judgment. Yet this sort of knowledge frequently
goes far beyond the experience of most litigants. 50 1 Individual injury
may be irrelevant or even distorting.50 2 The Court may need informa-
tion about institutional tendencies that experienced politicians or
other government employees may understand much better than even
the cleverest Supreme Court Justices (unless they had recent prior ex-
perience) .503 And the Court, trapped as it is in a routine of consider-
ing lawyers' arguments, may get very distorted views of these sorts of
questions.50 4 Similarly, judges should avoid misplaced concreteness-
the rendering of a broad ruling responsive to atypical facts shown in
the case before the Court, rather than through consideration of the
full range of relevant factors.
This suggests that the Justices need humility about their capacity
to make good judgments. 50 5 Such humility should make Justices
more eager to add context when they can or to defer to coordinate
branches of government. And it should also lead the Justices to exer-
cise more caution.
501 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20 n.21, 21 n.23 (1976) (per curiam) (drawing
on various sources of statistical information that go beyond the litigants' personal
experience).
502 See, e.g., id. at 34 n.40 (discussing the experience of small political parties in ob-
taining contributions, but conceding that their prior experience may not capture the fu-
ture effects of a new campaign finance law); see also Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, 484
U.S. 383, 395 (1988) (declining to rely on lower court construction of statute prohibiting
the sale of books "'harmful to minors'", because the bookstore owners who testified below
were "unfamiliar with the statutory definition" of this term).
503 See AbnerJ. Mikva, Why Judges Should Not Be Advicegivers: A Response to Professor Neal
Katyal, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1825 (1998) (explaining why judges lack the capacity to give useful
advise to legislative bodies); see, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000) (deferring to congressional finding that civil penal-
ties deter future violations of the Clean Water Act); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 148-49
(1940) (deferring to legislative judgment regarding what remedies adequately deter unlaw-
ful conduct).
504 See Mikva, supra note 503, at 1829 (contrasting the legislative and judicial processes
for obtaining information and advice); cf Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits
of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1858
(1998) (explaining how the Court's reliance on lawyers led to a misunderstanding of legis-
lative history in a landmark case); cf Scharpf, supra note 428, at 524-27 (discussing approv-
ingly a German practice of systematically incorporating a wide information base into
constitutional litigation).
505 See Fiss, supra note 39, at 45 (arguing that "self-righteousness" limits a judge's ca-
pacity to perform adequately).
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An insistence upon injured litigants cannot substitute for these
sorts of habits. Wise adjudication ultimately depends upon the
Court's wisdom when it reaches the merits.
CONCLUSION
Courts and commentators have exaggerated the functional value
of requiring injured litigants in public law cases. Injured plaintiffs
help define the merits of some controversies, but public law properly
depends upon a mixture of formal legal analysis and pragmatic policy
judgments that go far beyond the context that any litigant's experi-
ence provides. This conclusion has implications for justiciability doc-
trine, our understanding of public law, and the proper approach to
merits adjudication in public law cases.
Understanding the limited role that injury plays in making cases
more concrete eliminates, at least in many cases, the principal ratio-
nale linking the current doctrine of standing to the Constitution. Be-
cause injury often does not make significant public law litigation more
concrete, requiring injured plaintiffs does not create a case or contro-
versy conforming to the private law model. Courts regularly, and
often quite properly, resolve cases or controversies without reference
to individual injury. This shows that injury, in theory, should not be a
constitutional requirement under Article III. At a minimum, courts
should liberalize injury requirements, rather than require heightened
pleading at the motion to dismiss stage or an extraordinarily detailed
factual showing at the summaryjudgment stage.
Recognition of injury's failure to assure concrete litigation also
leads to better understanding of public law's nature. Public law often
involves conflict of law analysis and a context broader than that pro-
vided by an individual litigant. As a result, individual injury often
properly plays a limited role in resolving the merits of public law cases.
Injury's role varies, however, with the type of public law problem. The
structure of public law problems helps explain this variation. Injury
often helps frame as-applied individual rights cases, but rarely influ-
ences the resolution of administrative law cases or structural constitu-
tional law cases. The structure of the legal problems, rather than
information about parties' injuries, explains the variations.
Injury's failure to make cases concrete should lead courts to pur-
sue "active virtues"-approaches to addressing the merits that can
compensate for injury's failure. Courts should seek narrow grounds
for decision, confine themselves as much as possible to briefed issues
and rationales, and seek information needed to understand the broad
institutional consequences of many public law decisions.
The "passive virtues" have assured neither passivity, nor virtue.
While some of this failure stems from the Court's movement toward
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formalism, justiciability doctrines never had the capacity to substitute
for wise decision-making. Hopefully, understanding the paradox of
demanding individualized concrete context for formalist public law
adjudication will help improve justiciability doctrine and the Court's
approach to the merits of public law controversies.
